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Rust v. Sullivan and the
Control of Knowledge

Dorothy E. Roberts*

Prologue: Three Stories About Oppression and Knowledge
[My mistress] finally became even more violent in her opposition
to my learning to read than was Mr. Auld himself. Nothing now
appeared to make her more angry than seeing me, seated in some
nook or corner, quietly reading a book or newspaper. She would
rush at me with the utmost fury, and snatch the book or paper
from my hand , with something of the wrath and consternation
which a traitor might be supposed to feel on being discovered in a
plot by some dangerous spy. The conviction [was] thoroughly es tablished in her mind , that education and slavery were incompa tible with each other. 1

***
In Derrick Bell's "Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls," th e narrator,
Geneva Crenshaw, finds a model slave ship on a desolate beach

* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A. 1977, Yal e
Coll ege ; J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. Prior drafts of this Article were presente d at
the Rutgers University School of Law-Newark Fa cu lty Colloquium and the Fourt h Annual Critical Race Theory Workshop. I would like to thank th e parti cip an ts , particularly
Norman Cantor, Peggy Davis, Alan H yd e. Eric Neisser, Annamay Sheppard. and Kendall
Th o mas, for their suggestions. I am especially grateful to my colleagues Jim Pope and
George Thomas for their detail ed comments and ge nerous encouragement. Sherley
Ayala, Jeanne-Marie DeRobertis, Deborah Reid, J ea n Stewart, and Guy \Vimers provided valuabl e research ass istanc e.
l. fREDERICK DOU GLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRED ER ICK DOUGLASS 74 (Citadel
Press 1983) (1841).
March 1993

Vol. 61

No. 3

587

during a pilgrimage to Ghana. 2 Inside she discovers three parchment scrolls containing a testament from African slaves in which
they answer the mystery of their survival in America: " 'What
tools of the spirit were in their hands with which to cut a path
through the wilderness of despair?' " 3 Returning to America , Geneva begins to teach the Slave Scrolls' lessons of overcoming the
burdens of racial oppression. Blacks who attend the pres cribed
"healing groups" are enabled by the knowledge of th eir ancestors ' survival to discard their o ppression mentality and rapidly
transform their communities into centers of industry and achievement. The reaction of whites is swift and brutal : they ban the
healing sessions through "Racial Toleration Laws. " 4 They resort
to violence and economic threats to suppress the teaching of the
Scrolls. In the end, thousands of Blacks are forc ed to renounce
publicly their rediscovered knowledge .5

***
In 1992 a young Black woman named Mary received the results
of her pregnancy test at a federally-fund ed family planning clinic
in h er neighborhood: she was pregnant. 6 Mary was scared and
confused, but she knew that she did not want to have the baby.
She wasn't sure if it was too late to have an abortion or where she
could obtain one . She had heard about another woman in her
nei ghborhood who had been rushed to the hospital bleeding fr om
a perforated uterus after getting an abortion at a sto refront doctor 's office. She wasn ' t sure if her diabetes would make it more
dangerous to go through the procedure.
Mary was grateful to be able to turn to the clinic for help because she had no health insurance and could not afford to visit a
private gynecologist. When sh e addressed her concerns to the
counselor, the counselor refused to give her any information
about abortion. 7 She would not eve n tell Mary whe re she could
2. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: T HE ELuSIVE QuEsT Fo R RAC IAL
j USTICE 2 15-21 ( 1987).
3. !d. at 2 17 (quoting Dr. Howard Thurm an, On Viewing the Coast of Afnca, In FoR
TH E INWARD j ouRNEY: THE WRITI NGS OF H owARD THURt-.IAN 199-200 (Ann e T hu r m an
ed. , 1984)).
4 . !d. at 22 0.
5. !d. at 22 1.
6. Title X o f th e Publi c H ealth Service Act, Pub. L No. 9 1-57 2,84 Stat. 1506 (codifi ed as amended at 42 U.S. C . § § 300- 300a- 41 (1 982)), enacted in 1970, provides federal
grants to public and non-profit organi zati ons " to assi st in th e establishment and operation of vo luntary famil y planning proj ects." 42 U .S. C. § 300(a).
7. In 1988 th e Department o f Health and Hum an Se rvices iss ued reg ul a ti o ns which
pro hibited family-planning clini cs tha t rece ive Ti tle X fun ds fr o m p rovidin g th eir pat ie nt s with info rmati o n about abo rtio n. See 42 C.F .R . § § 59.2 , 59.7-. 10 ( 1989). I will
refe r to thes e regulations throu ghout thi s Articl e as "the r egulations. " Ne wly e lec ted
Presid e nt Cl int o n repea led the regul a tion s on J an uary 22, 1993-the twenti e th ann iversary of th e Roe v. J-l'ade d ecision . See Robin Ton e r, Clinton Orders Reversal of/lbortzon R estrictwns Left by Reagan and Bush, N.Y. TIMES , Jan . 23, 1993, a t I .
For a description o f th e legislativ e history and summary of the regulatio ns, see C .
And rew Mc Cart hy, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling and Referra l In Fedem lly- Fun ded
Family Planning Clin ics. 77 CAL . L. R Ev. 11 8 1, 11 83 -88 ( 1989).
Specifi call y, the r egula tio ns banned Title X proJeCts from cou nselin g th e ir pa tie n ts
about abortion, refe rrin g a pregnant wom an to an abort ion p r ov id e r , a nd even from
info rming her where thi s informa ti on m ay be obtained. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(l)
(1 989). T he r egul ation s a lso pro hibit e d Title X projects from en gagin g in act iviti es that
"encourage , promote or ad voca te abortion as a method of fa mil y p lanning ," id.
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find a safe and inexpensive clinic that performed abortions. Instead, the counselor gave her a selective list of clinics and hospita ls providing prenatal care. 8 She told Mary that some of these
facilities might also perform abortions, but she could not identify
them. When Mary insisted that she had made up her mind to terminate the pregnancy, the counselor responded: "this project
does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion. " 9 Mary
left the clinic even more bewildered, wondering where to turn

next. 10

Introduction
T he Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan 11 upheld the regulations
that prohibit employees of Title X-funded clinics from discussing
abortion with their patients. The Court rejected the First and Fifth
Amendment challenges brought by clinics and their doctors, reasoning that the regulations were merely a constitutional refusal by government to subsidize the delivery of abortion information. 12
According to the majority, the "government is not denying a benefit
to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent
for the purposes for which they were authorized." 13 Although the
regulations subsequently were repealed, the Rust decision remains a
powerful defense of government restrictions on speech. 14
§ 59.10(a), and required that Title X projec ts remain "physically and financially separate" from pro hibited abortion activities. !d. § 59.9.
8 . The re g ulations required Title X projects to provid e their pre gnant patients
with a referral list of health care providers " that promote th e welfare o f moth e r and
unborn child," but which did not include any health care provid e rs that otfered a b o rtion
as th e ir "principa l business." See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2)-(3).
9. See id. § 59.8(b) (5).
10. My story about Mary is h ypothetical because a federal judge e njoined th e goYernm e nt from e nforcing the regul a tions prior to their repeal. See Nation a l Family Plannin g & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan , No. 91-935, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7043
(D.D. C. May 28 , 1992) , aifd, 979 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The stori es o f wom e n who
hav e e n d ured unwanted pregnancies and suffered mutilation from bo tched ab o rtions
arc, however, re al. See, e.g., Tama r Lewin, Hurdles Increase for :\lanv Wo111 en Seeking .1borttons. N.Y. TI MES, Mar. 15, 1992 , at AI, Al8 (telling the st o r y of 23-vear- o ld Marv
Jived e n , a divo rce d , un e mplo yed mother, who traveled to three c ities in a n un s u ccessful
and e xpensive a ttempt to get an abortion); Robert D. McFadd e n , .-l bDrt lo n ,\1/!ls Tfm ulng
Behilld Secrecy and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24 , 1991, at Al, A36 (telling th e story of Doris
Oli vo, a 29-vea r-old un e mployed , Domini ca n moth e r of two children , who r eceived a
bot che d aborti o n from a doctor she read a bout in a newspa pe r a d verti se ment). Thus,
eve n th o ugh th e Tille X directiv es were not ultimat e ly enforce d, thes e s to rie s illu s trate
that women d e speratelv need m o re information about abortion and o ther a spe cts of
repro duction.
11. Ill S . C t. 17 59 (1991 ).
12 . See id a t 1771-78.
13 . !d. at 1774.
14 . Indee d , the Bu s h administra tion a gg ressivel y used Rust in court Cl nd befo re C ongress to s upp o rt severa l limitati o n s on gove rnment-funded sp eec h. Sec Da vid .-\ . Ka plan
& Bo b C ohn , Take the ,\-Ioney and Shut Up-': Th e Go vernm ent's 1\'ew Efforts to R egula te Speech,

1993]

589

l'
This Article is about the struggle over knowledge. It examines
how the Court in Rust aligned with the side of the powerful on two
fronts. We live in a society in which poor Black communities are
isolated geographically in inner cities and excluded from the benefits of society. 15 Rust upheld regulations that deliberately withheld
from women in these communities knowledge critical to their reprodu ctive health and autonomy. By promoting ignorance among
th ese women, the Court erected one more layer of the "structural
entrapment" that keeps poor Black women at society's margins.I 6
T h e Court's reasoning also excluded them from the concern and
compassion of the rest of society, by portraying Title X patients as
undes erving of the care to which affluent women are entitled simply
b ecause poor women are dependent on the government's charity.
The Court's logic foreclosed the possibility of an alternative constitu tional interpretation that requires affirmative protection of Title X
patients' right to self-determination. Poor women of color live in
co mmunities hidden from sight. The Court's legal discourse hides
th em from the mind, as well.
T his Article has two goals. The first is to critique the Court's First
Amendment analysis in Rust. The Court' s rh etoric, which focused
on the abstract equality of ideas, masked th e violence that the regulati ons inflicted upon women . It failed to recognize that the governm ent's control of knowledge available to poor Black women not
only suppresses an idea, it also represses a p eople. My second goal
is to use this analysis as the foundation for an alternative vision of
the government's role in nurturing individual liberty and achieving
racial justice. I am more interested in the way that we think about
dependency and government control of kn owl edge than in manipulating current First Amendment doctrin e to reach a more desirable
outcome. My particular task is to articul ate an affirmative government obligation to provide abortion counselin g to Title X patients.
I see this project as part of the broader inquiry into the relationship
betw een constitutional liberties and th e distribution of wealth.
Rather than present a generalized entitlemen t theory, howev er , I
defend a narrower claim b y people dep endent o n government aid to
a particular resource-information n ecessary fo r self-d etermination. 17 I t is my hope that my explanation of this particular claim to
NEWSWEEK, J a n. 20, 1992, a t 55 (expl ainin g, fo r examp le. how th e Rust d ec isio n is o r
co ul d be u sed to d efe nd th e Natio n al Endowm e nt fo r th e Arts' withdrawal of fun ds fr o m
an a rti st' s co ntro versial p erfo rma n ce , or to defend de ni al o f fu nding for AID S e du ca tio n
m a te ri als di scussing h o m osexua lity).
15 . See DouGLAS G . G LASGO W, T HE BLACK U NDERC LASS: Po vERTY, UNE MPLOY MENT,
M.JD ENTRAPM ENT O F G HETTO YouTH l-15 (1980 ) (di sc uss ing ins titutions that m aintain
the s tat u s o f lo n g-te rm, pe rsis te ntl y po o r, and imm ob il e Blac ks); Lo'ic J.D . W acq ua n t &
W ill iam J. W il so n , The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion In the Inner City, 50 l ANNALS AM.
AC AD. Po L. & Soc. SCI. 8 , 8-l 0 , 25 (1 98 9 ) (a ttribu tin g the " unde r class" to t h e un p receden ted social, eco no mi c, a n d sp at ial m a rg ina li za ti on of poo r Bla cks , ra th e r th a n to a
cu lture o f po ve rt y).
16. See W acqu a nt & W ilso n , supra n o te 15, a t 25.
17. A number of lega l sch o lars h ave e lab o ra ted theo ries of minim a l en titl emen ts
based on th e C o n stitu tion and on principles o f d ist ributive j u s ti ce . See, e.g., C . Edw in
Ba ke r, Ou tco lll e Equ ality or Equality of Respect: Th e Substantive Con/en/ of Equal Protection, ! 3 1
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information will illuminate the need to change the negative constitutionalism that has supported unjust relationships of power.
One of the most important contributions of critical race scholars
is their vision. Their negative critique of liberal and universalist
doctrine refuses to remain mired in a deconstructionist mode. They
have added to critical scholarship the historical ability of people of
color to criticize the law while embracing an aspirational vision of
the law. 18 Their critique of critical legal scholars' failure to recognize that the oppressed experience the law as both alienating and
liberating has helped to advance progressive legal thought to a
more positive, reconstructive plane. 19 Scholars of color have
U. PA. L. REv. 933, 959-98 (1983) (describing an "equality of respect " model of state
guarantees "designed to provide everyone the opportunity fully to participate in co mmunity life and to have a meaningfu1life as understood by the community"); Thomas C.
Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive justice, 28 STAN. L. REv.
877, 888-901 ( 1976) (arguing "that individuals who cannot meet their esse ntial materia l
needs thro ugh free transactions have a right, which should be enforceable through law,
to have these needs met out of the assets of others"); Frank I. Michelman , The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term: Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REv. 7, 13 (1969) [hereinafter Protecting the Poor] (proposing a vision of social
justice in which citizens are entitled to "minimum protection against economic hazard");
William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Mo. L. REv. 1, 16
(1985) (describing a distributive premise of need that " permits sufficient participat io n in
the mainstrea m activities of the community to enable the person to be regarded and to
regard hers elf as a member"). These entitlements have been conceived either as a specific welfare guarantee-a right to provision for a certain need, such as food, shelter,
education or medical care-or as a right to a minimum income th at protects agains t
excessive inequality of wealth. See Frank I. Michelman, In Purswt of Constitutwnal ll'elfa re
Rights: One View of Rawls' Themy ofjustice, 121 U. PA. L. REv . 962,966 (1973) (interpreting Rawls' theory of justice to support a structured set of priorities that assures specil1c
needs of liberty and self-respect before reaching the question of generally amplifying
one's income).
18. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581 , 584 (1990) (discussing the complex dialogue between the asp irational vo ices
of liberalism and the voices of real people); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Afultiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential !vfethod, 11 WoMEN 's RTs. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989) (o bserving tha t outsider lawyers and schol ars must often adopt a "dualist approach" that
incorporates an elitist legal system and the concept of rights while seeing the world from
the standpoint of the oppressed); Dorothy E. Roberts , Purushing Drug Addicts Wh o Hrwe
Babies: rvome71 of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 141 9, 1464
( 1991) (recognizing the tension betwee n rel ying on th e "liberal rh e toric of choice ,"
while acknowledging " the fallacy of choice for poor women of color") .
19. See, e.g. , Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: Th e Recons tmctwe Th eo iogy
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. , 103 HARV. L. REv. 985, 986 (1990) (arguing that rh e Critical
Legal Studies ' (CLS) theore tical critique of liberal society failed "to appreciate th e roie
the state can play in neutralizing and eradicating ubiquito us racial oppress ion" ); Mari j.
Matsuda , Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 323, pasmn (1987) (describing lesso ns that critical legal studies can learn from
" looking to the bottom"); cJ. Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human R1~r;hts, Lega l Entitlem ents. and
the Sana! Struggle: A Friendly Cntique of the Critical Legal Studies Movem ent, 36 STAN. L REv.
509, 552-60 ( 1984) (criti cizing critical lega l theorists for preseming the negative a tta ck
on liberal lega l doctrine as the principal path to lib era ti on, and for di sco unting the affirmative re lat ionship of law to social mov eme nts). Mark Tushnet, one of criti ca l lega l
s tudies ' most ardent rights-trashers, has suggested rec entl y that th e minority and fe minist critique of CLS may force CLS to adopt " classi cal so cial the o ry" by "stressmg the
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pushed forward the frontiers of legal inquiry by insisting that,
"[a]lthough theoretical deconstruction is important, the ultimate
goal of critical theory should be the reconstruction of community
from the debris of theoretical deconstruction. " 2 0
In this Article, I hope to advance the discussion among cntiCal
legal scholars, feminists, and critical race theorists by applying critical and reconstructive methods to the particular context of government-funded information. I attempt to move beyond theoretical
deconstruction and the call for reconstruction to the project of
fleshing out the vision for social change. 21 This undertaking rests on
the faith that the relationship between power and knowledge is not
unidimensional. The tales of oppression and knowledge in the Prologue do not tell the whole story. Our understanding of human liberty is not simply imposed on us by the ideology embodied in the
Rust decision. We can resist and imagine and struggle for a better
way. On the contested field of power and knowledge, I want this
Article to be a volley on the side of the dispossessed.
Part I of this Article sets out the context in which the Rust decision
must be understood. It explains the violence that the regulations
would inflict on poor women-especially poor women of color-and
th e ways in which the Court made their suffering invisible . Part II
presents a critique of the Court's First Amendment analysis. I
demonstrate how the Court's two theories of free speech-the marketplace of ideas and the unconstitutional conditions doctrineused neutral principles to avoid confronting the political significance of the government's control of knowledge.
Parts III through V examine the role that the control of knowledge plays in the oppression and liberation of subordinated groups.
I rely primarily o n Black people's historical struggle for knowledge
in America to illustrate the relationship between knowledge and
power. I discuss three aspects of this relationship-the determination of social meaning, education, and the control of sources of information. Part II I examines how the powerful use knowledge to

limits tha t social circumstances pl ace on the acco mplishment o f substanti a l cha nge while
ackn o wl e dging th a t people do inde ed . .. m ake history with will and co nsc iousness."
Ma rk T ushnet , Critical Legal St udies. ,..J Political H is tory, 100 Y.-\LE L.J. 1515 , 1538 (1991).
20 . Co ok , supra no te 19 , at 993 . Feminist lega l scholars a lso hav e as se rt ed the need
w appl v our scho la rship in positive ways. See, e.g. , Drucill a Co rn e ll , Sexual Dljference, the
Feminine. an d Eq w valency: A Critique of .\1acKuw on 's Tow.-\R D A F EMI NIST TH EORY OF TH E
STATE , I 00 YALE L.J. 2247, 224 8 ( 1991) (" Of co urse , we need a program that legally
d e leg itimates th e gend er hierarchy and expos es th e seriou sne ss o f sexual a bu se. But we
a ls o need a more e xp ansive , p os iti ve program . .. . " ); Robin W es t, jurisprudence and Gender. 55 U. C m . L. R Ev. I , 72 (1 988 ) [hereina ft e r vVest , J unspmdence ] (" Fe mini sm must
e n visio n a po st-pa tria rchal world , fo r with o ut su ch a visio n we ha ve littl e direc tion. " );
Ro bin W e st, Rela tivism, Objectwity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 147 3, I SO1-02 (1 99 0 ) [hereinafter \tV es t, Relatw ism ] (s uggestin g th e need fo r th eo ries aim ed to ward acti o n ra ther than
criti cism).
21. See. e. g., Coo k, supra n o te 19, a t 98 8 (d escribin g Dr. Martin Luth er King, Jr. 's
"philoso phical praxi s" whi ch in co rporated " th eo retical d eco ns tructi o n , exp e rienti a l
d eco nstru ction , reco nstru cti ve th eo rizing, a nd co llccti\-c ac ts o f tran sfo rm a ti ve socia l
stru ggle " ).
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secure their superior position. Part IV discusses the connection between the oppressive control of knowledge and dependency on government charity. Part V explores how the oppressed recreate
knowledge as a means of liberation.
Finally, Part VI attempts to connect this account of the oppressive
and liberating potential of knowledge to the reconstructive project.
I focus on two features of a liberating constitutional vision. First, I
suggest that this theory would seek to provide poor women of color
with the information necessary to enable them to struggle against
their subordination. Second, liberation requires a radical change in
the prevailing concept of dependency and its ideological connection
to human freedom.

I.
A.

Uncovering the Violence OJ Rust

The Violence of the Rust Decision

In his compelling article, Violence and the Word, Robert Cover reminds us of a reality about legal interpretation that judges work so
hard to obscure: "[T]he interpretive commitments of officials are
realized, indeed, in the flesh. " 22 Because Rust v. Sullivan was an
opinion about ideas , it is easy to overlook its imprint on the flesh:
The regulations upheld by the Supreme Court violated th e minds
and bodies of real women.
Congress enacted Title X in 19 70 2 3 to give millions of poor and
low-income women access to reproductive health services that
otherwise would not be availabl e to them. 24 T itle X-funded clinics
are a critical source of medical care for poor women ,2 5 giv en that
these clinics are often the only provider of medical services and
health information that their patients can afford. 26 Congress recognized that T itle X proj ects woul d serve as a point of entry into th e
22. Robert M. Cove r, Violen ce and th e IVord, 95 Y.:...LE LJ. 16 01, 1605 (1986): rf Cornel W e st , Tlze R ole of Law In Progresswe Politics, 43 VA ND. L. R Ev. 1797, 18 03 (199 0 ) (comm e nding th e C LS mo ve ment fo r linkin g th e " intell ec tual blinders o f Ameri ca n liberal
legal scholarship " to " th e actu a l b lo od th a t has Row e d beca u se of the hidden rea lities" ).
2 3 . Titl e X of th e Public H ea lth Servi ce Act, Pub. L. No. 91-572,84 Stat. 1506 (codifi e d as amende d at 42 US. C. §§ 3 00-300a-4l (19 8 2 )) .
24. SeeS . REP. No . 1004, 9 l s t C on g ., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) , reprinted 111 116 CoNe. RE c .
S24, 095; H.R. REP. No . 1472 , 9lst Co n g ., 2d S ess. 4 (1970), repnnted 111 1970
U.S. C. C.A.N. 5068, 5074.
25 . In 198 7 , Titl e X supp o rt e d nearl y fo ur th o u sand clini cs nati o m vide th a t served
o ve r fo ur milli o n po o r a nd low-in co me wo m e n. S te ve n V. Ro b e rts , L·.s. Proposes Cu rb on
Climes G1 u1ng A bo rtlon .-J dv1ce, N.Y. TIME S, J u ly 31 , 198 7, at A I. Title X is the sin g le larg est so urce o f fe deral funding fo r familv pl a nning a nd repro ductive h ea lth care , providin g support to seventy-se'.-cn p e rce nt of a ll fa mil y-planning cli n ics in th e nati on . Ga r v :-\.
Wint e rs , L'nconstltu tlonal Condltlom as ".\ 'onsubsldles ". 1\'hen is Defermce ! nappropnate ?_ 8 0
C EO . L.J. ! 3 1, 159 n.l 38 (199! ) (c iting Brieffor Pe titioners a t 2 & n .2, Rust\. S ulliv a n,
Ill S . Ct. 1759 (1991) (No. 8 9 -1 391)).
26 . U NITED STATES DEP.-\RTMENT or Ht.ALTH AND HuMA N S ERVIC ES , PRoGRA r.t G urnr.LI NES FOR P ROJ ECT GRANTS FOR FAM ILY P LANN ING SERVI CES § 9 .4 (39:\.) (1 98 1); see a/so
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health care system. 27 These clinics provide, in addition to contraceptive information and services, related medical tests, such as general physical examinations and counseling. 28
The government's stifling of medical information endangered the
health and lives of low-income women. The regulations prohibited
clinics from discussing abortion or from providing women with the
names of accessible, low-cost clinics that perform abortions.29
Some pregnant women would interpret the clinic's failure to discuss
abortion to mean that abortion is not a safe and legal alternative.3o
This obfuscation of referrals would mean dangerous delays in obtaining an abortion. 31
In addition, pregnancy may accelerate the progression of certain
serious medical conditions, such as heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, sickle cell anemia, cancer, and AIDS. 32 For example, a woman with diabetic retinopathy who becomes pregnant may go
blind. 33 The regulations prohibited doctors from advising women
suffering from these conditions that abortion may reduce the long-

Nadine Brozan, Poor are Rocked by Closing of Gynecological Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1991, at B 1 (describing the difficulty of poor and low-income women in New York City
in finding subsidized family-planning and gynecological care). Ninety percent of clinic
clients have incomes below 150% of the poverty level. Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Title X,
The Abortion Debate, and the First Amendment, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1737, 1738 (1990).
27. See SPECIAL SuBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE SuBMITTING fiVE-YEAR PLAN FOR fAMILY PLANNING SERVICES AND POPULATION RESEARCH
PROGRAMS, 92d Cong., I st Sess. 318 (1971) ("[F]amily planning is often the point of
entry into a fragmented health care system for many individuals.").
28. S. REP. No. 29, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1975), repnnted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
469,517.
29. See supra note 8. This limitation typically means that the only abortion providers
that the referral list may include are hospitals and private physicians, which are often
financially or geographically inaccessible to poor women. Brief of Amicz Cunae The
American Public Health Association, The American College of Physicians, eta!., in Support of Petitioners at 12-13, Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. I 759 ( 1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 891392) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for Petitioner]. Poor women often lack information
about abortion providers; they turn to sources such as newspaper advertisements that
may steer them to an expensive and unsafe abortion mill. See supra note 10. Many poor
women in New York, for example, are unaware that they live in one of the few states that
cover abortions under Medicaid. McFadden, supra note I 0, at 36.
30. Many women are unaware of their legal right to obtain an abortion. See NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, HICKMAN-MASLIN PoLL FOR AMERICAN VIEWPOiNT 4 (! 987) (finding that 367a of American adults believe that, during the first three
momhs of pregnancy, abortion is allowed only under "extreme circumstances" or not at
all).
31. The mortality risk for abortion increases 50% and the risk of major complications increases 307a ;vith each week after the eighth week of pregnancy. AmlCl Cunae
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 29, at 13-14.
32. See, e.g.. ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAw 251-54 Q. Douglas Butler & David F.
Walbert eels., 1986); MATERNAL-FETAL MEDICINE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 734-1!49
(Robert K. Creasv & Robert Resnick eds., 2d ed. 1989); OBSTETRICAL DECISION MAKING
86-166 (Emanue!' A. Friedman eta!. eds., 2d ed. 1987) . But see Howard L. Minkoff, Care
of Pregnant !Vomen Infected with Human lmmunodeficzency l'irus, 258 JAMA 2714 ( 1987) (criticizing studies that demonstrate the effect of pregnancy on HIV disease progression).
33. ,-Jmici Cunae Brief for Petitioner, supra note 29, at ~ 9 (declaration of Dr. David A.
Grimes).
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term risks to their health. 34 Moreover, the recommendation of prenatal care may give the false impression that pregnancy does not
jeopardize these women's health.3 5
The regulations also had broader implications for the health care
services available in poor communities. Many clinics would find it
economically unfeasible to separate their family-planning facilities
from those for abortion services, and, therefore, would eliminate
one part of their program. 36 Some clinics would refuse the conditioned federal funding altogether for ethical reasons and would be
forced to cease operations .37 The regulations, thus, might have created a serious reduction in the provision ofhealth care-beyondjust
abortion counseling-for poor women.
The regulations violated more than the flesh. Scholars of oppression have explained that the violence imposed by oppressive regimes injures the mind, as well as the body. 38 Oppression includes
34. See id. at ~ 9. Physicians should advise patients with a dangerous m e dica l co nditio n about ab o rtio n, as well as prenatal care. See id. at ~ 10. Other situations where
abortion counseling is medically indicate d include pregnancy wherein the moth e r has an
imm o vable IUD in place and pregn ancy involving the possibility of severe genetic o r
co n genital problems with the fetus. !d. at ~~ 11-14. See generally ABORTION, MEDICINE,
AND THE LAw , supra n o te 32, at 251-57 (di scussing diseas es and disorders suffered by
pregnant wom en and fetal a bnormalities that may indi ca te th e rapeutic abort ions) . I
highlight thes e m e dical complications because they provide a reason for considering
abo rtion that the preg nant woman h e rself may not be awa re o f. Of course, women h av e
non-medical reasons for considering ab o rtion, as well. See, e.g., West,junspmdence, supra
note 20, at 30- 32 (describing women's exp e ri e nces of unwanted pregnan cy) .
35. See Brief of Amici Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and 117 Organ ization s Committed to Women 's Equality in Support of Pe titio ners, Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. C t. 1759 (1991) (Nos . 89-139 1, 89-1392).
36. See Massachusetts v. Secretary o f HHS, 8 8 9 F.2d 53 , 59-60 (l st Cir. 1990) (en
bane) (acknowledging the argument that " the new reg ul a tion s would r eq uire many clinics eith e r to give up their Title X funding or to te rminate famil y pla nnin g se rvices altoge the r. ") ; see also Tamar Lewin , Latest Administration Ta ctic Ma kes Abortion Fight a Free
Speech Iss ue, N.Y . TI MES, Feb. 7, 1988 , at E7 (noting th a t it would co st Pl a nn ed
Parenthood of New York an estima ted one million dollars to segregate its abortion
co un seling from its other family planning activiti es).
37. See Caro le I. C hen·in, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule. Can the Govenz men t Buy
Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 40 I, 408 (1989) (citing telephone interv ie w
with Sco tt R. Swirling, ex ecutive direc tor of Nation al Family Planning and Reproducti ve
Health Association, predi cting that a m aj ority of curre nt Titl e X programs would refu se
to withhold abo rti o n info rma tion fro m their cli e nts); Linda Greenhouse , 5 Justices Upho ld
U. S. Ru le Cu rbing Abortion Adv ice, N .Y. TIMES , May 24 , 199 1, at A I (s tatin g Pl a nn e d
Parenthood clinics will n o t withhold info rmati o n because th e ir doctors fear legal liability); Congress, Agencies l!'restle with Abortion Regulatwns, SEATTLE T IMES, july 21, 199 1, at AS
(s tating Caiifornia stat e family-planning clinic s will pro bab ly tu rn d o wn Title X fundin g
becaus e of th e beli e f that th e federal ba n o n couns e lin g amounts to m e di cal
malpra ct ice).
38 . See, e.g. , FRA NZ FANON , THE WRETCHED Of TH E EART H 249 -3 11 (1963) (describing men tal di so rd e rs in victims of vi o len ce imp osed by op press ive regimes); PAULO
FREIRE. PEDAGOGY Of THE OPPRESSED 28 (Myra B. Ramo trans., 197 0 ) (sta tin g that a n
u nju st o rd er stimulates violence in the o ppressor and , in tur n , de hum a ni zes th e
op pressed).
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the brutal control of the mental processes necessary for self-determination and personhood. "Any situation in which some men prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of
violence .... [T]o alienate men [and women] from their own decision-making is to change them into objects." 39 The regulations inflicted this form of mental violence by dominating poor women's
deliberations about pregnancy.
T he regulations' violence would be most dramatic in the Black
community. Black women are more likely than white women to rely
on publicly funded clinics because they are less likely to have health
insurance, sufficient income to pay a private physician, or a regular
source of medical care. 40 Of the nearly four million women in 1988
who used a Title X clinic for their last family-planning visit during
the previous year, twenty-eight percent were Black. 4 1 This number
represented fifty-three percent of Black women, compared to thirtytwo percent of white women. 4 2 These figures demonstrate not only
that a large number of Black women would be denied information,
but also that the Black community as a whole would feel the deprivation most. 43 T his significant impact is bound to increase as the
number of Blacks who are desperately poor continues to grow. 4 4
Moreover, the medical consequences of the regulations would be
gravest for Black women. Black wome n are more likely than white
women to suffer from the heal th conditions that are aggravated by
pregnancy. 4 5 They also are more likely to experience difficulties in
39. FR EIRE, supra note 38, at 73. T h e respect for autono mous d ecisionma king is, o f
co urse, a cen tral ten e t of lib eralism. See RoNALD DwoRKIN , TAKIN G RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
272 (1977) ("Governm e nt mu st treat those wh o m it governs ... with respect, that is , as
hum a n b e ings who are ca pabl e o f formin g and ac ting on inte lligent co ncepti o n s of h ow
the ir lives sh o uld b e live d. "). Fo r th e classic liberal defe n se of p e r so nal aut o n o my , see
j OH N STUART MILL, O N LIBERTY 77-79 (Ge rtrud e Himme lfa ub ed. , Penguin Publishin g
1974) (1 859) ("Over himself, over his own bod y a nd mind , th e indi vidual is sove reign. ")
40. William D. Mosher, Use of Family Planning Services 111 the United Stales: 1982 and
1988, VITAL AN D H EA LTH STATISTICS, Apr. 1990, a t 3. In 1984, 32.3';7o of Black wom e n
liv ed in po ve rty as co mpared to 11.5 % o f white women. Julie B. Wilson , Women and
Poverty: A Demog·raphic Ovennew, in WoMEN, HEALTH AND PovERTY 21, 26 (Cesa r A. Pe ra les & Laure n S . Young eds. , 1988). The pove rt y ra te of Black children is even m o re
staggerin g. In 1987, a lmost h a lf of a ll Black children (45.6 ';7o of Black childre n und e r
age e ighteen and 49 ';7o of Bl ac k childre n under age six) liv e d in poverty. CE NTER ON
BUDG ET .-\NO PO LICY PRIORITIES , STILL FAR FRO M T HE DR EAM: REC ENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
BLACK I NCOME, EMPLOYM ENT AND POVERTY v (1988).
4 1. Mosher, supm note 40, at 2-3.
42 . ld.
43 . l\!y focus on the g roup as a wh o le is different fr om dis prop ort io nate impact analys is which focuses o n the p e rce ntage of a ll p a ti ents a ffec ted who are Black, co mpared to
the percentage who are white. Mv p o int comp ares the percentage of Blacks as a gro up
wh o use Title X clini cs w·ith th e perc entage of whites as a g roup who use them.
44. Bl ac ks in th e "poores t of the po or" category , with inco m es below h a lf the p ove rty line (be low $4,528 for a familY of t hree in 1987), in creased b y 69 perce nt in the
perio d b e tw een 1978 a nd 1987. CE:--:TER ON B uDGET A:--JD PoucY PRIORITIES , supra n ote
40, a t vii.
45. See Laurie Ns ia h-Jefferson , Reproduclrue La ws, ll"omen of Color, and Low-Income !!'omen, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990s, a t 23. 27 -2 8 (S h e rrill Co h e n & Nadine T aub
eds ., 1989) ("Fo r exam ple, b lac k wom e n have hi g her rates of di abe tes , card iovascul ar
di seas e, ce rvical can cer , and hi g h blo od pre ssure ."). In 1988, AID S killed nin e times as
m a n y Black women as whit e wo men. Susan Y. C hu et a l. , Impact of the Hum an lmmunodejiciencv Virus Epidemic on .\lorlohty in ll'omen of Reproductive .-lge, United Stoles, 264 JAM A
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obtaining abortions because of other obstacles to abortion
services. 46
Race is significant in the Rust decision at a less obvious level.
Although the Reagan and Bush administrations could not succeed at
imposing a ban on all abortion counseling in America, they did succeed at imposing such a ban on women dependent on government
assistance. Of course, the latter was doctrinally more feasible; but
why was it politically acceptable? Race may help to explain the government's willingness to exclude Title X patients from the privileges
that other women enjoy. It may help to explain the Court's refusal
to require that the government provide equal access to medical care.
Race generally has proven to be a barrier to social reform in
America. White Americans have been unwilling to pay for subsidies
perceived to benefit primarily Blacks. As economist Robert Heilbroner noted, the "merging of the racial issue with that of [social]
neglect serves as a rationalization for the policies of inaction that
have characterized so much of the American response to need." 47
Whites' stake in their privileged racial identity-their property right
in their superior status 48 -is a powerful incentive to leave the existing social order intact. 49 Derrick Bell has concluded that whites in
225, 226 (1990). Black women are also three times more likely to die from complications
of pregnancy and childbirth than are white women. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1989, at 33 (1990). It is equally
important, however, that physicians and government policies do not deny pregnant women of color the choice of continuing a pregnancy. See, e.g., Taunya L. Banks, IVomen and
AIDS: Racism, Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351, 358-63 ( 1990)
(arguing that abortion counseling of HIV-infected women occurs within a coercive atmosphere and discriminates against poor women of color); Roberts, supra note 18, at
1462-76 (discussing the constitutional protection of Black women's decisions to bear
children).
46. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 45, at 30-33 (listing financial, cultural, social, and
geographic factors contributing to the difficulty in obtaining abortions).
4 7. Robert L. Hei1broner, The Roots of Soczal .Veglect zn the Cnited States, in Is LAw
DEAD? 288, 296 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971).
48. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896) (conceding, for the purposes of
that case, that "the reputation of belonging to the dominant race" is the "property" of
the white man).
49. See Derrick Bell, £1fter We're Cone: Prudent Speculations on Amenca zn a Post-Racial
Epoch, 34 ST. Lours U. L.J. 393, 402-03 (1990) (suggesting that the failure to address
racial inequities is based on both whites' incentive to preserve their "superior" status
and the need for white America to have a scapegoat); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitzmation zn Antzdiscrwunatwn Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1380-81 ( 1988) (observing that viewing the Black condition as illegitimate
would require whites to be convinced that the free market system is flawed and that
equal opportunity is a myth); Margaret]. Radin & Frank Michelman, !'ragmatzst and Poststructuralist Critzcal Legal Practzce, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019, 1039 (1991) (discussing the
"knowledge of peoples of color ... that it is not just legal consciousness but racial consciousness that supports ... the prevailing pmver dispensations in American society").
For a discussion of how racism blocked social reform during Reconstruction, sec vV.E.B.
Du Bars, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 700-01 ( 1976). Du Bois explained that whites resisted
labor reform because "the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were
compensated in part bv a sort of public and psychological wage." ld at 700.
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America believe that they gain from continued economic disparities
that leave Blacks at the bottom: "Even those whites who lack wealth
and power are sustained in their sense of racial superiority by policy
decisions that sacrifice black rights." 50
The Court made no mention of the particular meaning to Black
women of its decision. Although litigants acknowledged the regulations' disproportionate impact, no one suggested that it made any
difference to the analysis of the constitutionality of the regulations.
Prevailing legal doctrine tends to conceal the racial implications and
origins of social practices that do not overtly discriminate on the
basis of race. 51 This omission is consistent with the practice of discussing the maldistribution of wealth in the nonracial terms of poverty and class. 52 Professor Gary Peller attributes this myopia to
society's embracing an integrationist ideology that "has signified the
broad cultural attempt not to think in terms of race at all. " 53
B.

The Court's Reconstruction of Patients' Lives

How was it that-despite the regulations' violent impact on women's lives-the Court was able to conclude that "[t]here is no
question but that the statutory prohibition contained in [section]
1008 is constitutional"? 54 How is it that the Court's opinion does
not mention the pain and confusion that women would experience
because of the regulations? How did the Court make their suffering
invisible? The Court avoided the question of whether the doctor50. Be ll, supra note 49, at 402. A corollary of Professor Bell's thesis is the principle
of "imerest convergence," which posits that "( t)he interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality wi .\1 be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites."
Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BRowN: NEw PERSPECTIVES ON ScHOOL DESEGREGATION 9\ , 95 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) (hereinafter
SHADES OF BROWN). Professor Bell supports this claim by demonstrating tha t civil rights
ga ins have taken place only when the y do not threaten white supremacy. See Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Bakke, J'vfinority Admissions, and the Usual Pnce of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REv. 3,
14-16 (1979).
51. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis , 426 U.S. 229, 237-45 (1976) (requiring proof of
discriminatory intent, not just a showing of disproportionate impact, in equ a l protection
cases arising under the federal constitution). See generally T. Alexand e r Aleinikoff, A Case
for Race-Consciousness, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. I 060, I 086-87 ( 1991) (arguing th at the law has
o ft en "denied the presence of blacks and the iss ue of race in American hi story and culture"); Crenshaw, supra note 49, at 1335 (criticizing critical legal scholarship for overlooking the relationship of racism to hegemony); Jerom e M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black
Legal Scholarship: Race and Origmal Understandings, 1991 DuKE L.J. 39, 77 (arguing that
"( l)egal scholars have virtually ignored the issu e o f race in thinking abo ut what is impo rtant in the formulation of legal theory ") ; Neil Gotanda, A Cntique of " Our Constitution is
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 16-23 (1991) (arguing th a t "color-blind" nonrecognition of ra ce is self- co ntradictory and a ll ows racial subordination to continue).
52. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758, 845 (arguing that "fi lter[ing) the discussion of th e wide disparities between African Am erican and white communities through the nonracial la nguage of poverty and class" embraces
integrationism); cf Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal S!udies and the
La w of Race Relations. 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043, 1053 (1988) (stating that the current
racially id ent ifiabl e distribution of social resources is the legacy of histori cal
subo rdin at io n).
53 . Peller, supra note 52, at 845.
54. Rust v. Sullivan, IllS . Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991).
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patient relationship should enjoy special First Amendment protection, similar to that enjoyed by publicly funded universities, 55 by
inventing a legal fiction to define the clinic doctor-patient relationship. 56 The Court reasoned that the regulations did not constitute
enough of an impingement upon the doctor-patient relationship:
Nothing in [the regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his
own any opinion that he does not in fact hold . Nor is the doctorpatient relationship established b y the Title X program sufficiently
all-encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the
patient of comprehensive medical advice. 57

Both of these observations distort the nature of medical treatment
in the lives of poor women.
First, the Court incorrectly assumed that patients will not trust
their doctors' advice. In fact, patients expect more than neutral
medical consultation; they expect their physicians to provide comprehensive counsel directed toward the patient's best interests. 58 A
doctor is more than someone we objectively consult for pieces of
55. See id. (recognizing that " th e university is a traditional sphere of free expression
so fund am ental to the functioning of our society that the Governm ent 's ability to control
speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by th e vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First
Amendment"). In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1 967) , for example, th e
Supreme Court struck down a statute th a t conditioned the e mpl oym e nt of professors in
th e S ta te University of New Yo rk upon co mpliance with a pla n designed to eliminat e
"s ub vers ives" from publi c education . See also Board of Tru stees of Sta nford University
v. S ulliva n , 773 F. Supp. 472 , 47 6-77 (D.D.C. 1991) (distinguishing Ru.st in declarin g
un co nstituti o n al a co nfidentialit y clause in a National In stitute of Health research
contract).
56. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776. Courts sometimes invent lega l fictions to support a
deci sio n that wo uld seem unjust if it wer e based on the rea l circum sta nces of people's
lives . On fictions invented by th e law, see generally LoN L. FuLLER, LEGAL FrcnoNs
(19 6 7) (exam ining the use ofl egal fictions-i.e. assumption s, impli ca ti o ns, characterizations and ana logi es-as instrum ents in human thinking); Aviam Soifer, Reviewzng Legal
Fictions, 20 GA . L. REv. 871, 914 (1986) (observing legal fi cti ons' potential to do "great
harm by narrowing thought and deed.") ; Ibrahim J. Wani , Tmth , Strangers and Fictwn.
The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immig-ration Law, II CARDOZO L. RE v. 5 1, 53 ( 1989)
(a rg uin g th a t lega l fictions in immi g ra tio n law are often " di stort io ns and misre prese nt ati o n s" which are " used to achieve end s that would be unthi nkable in o th e r areas of
American law an d popular be li ef').
5 7. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1776.
58. Ju st ice Blackmun, in dis se nt , disagreed with the m aj orit y's ass umption, statin g
th at "[a] woman seeking the servi ces of a Title X clinic has every reaso n to expect, as do
we a ll , that her physician will n o t withh o ld relevant informati on r ega rdin g the very purpose of h er visit." !d. at 1782 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissentin g). See genera lly GEORGE J.
ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIE NTs: THE BASIC ACLU Gu iDE TO P.-\TlENT RIGHTS 83-l 00
(2d ed . 1989) (d is cussin g the importance of the doctrin e of in formed co nsent). The
tru st th at pat ie nts repose in the ir doctors need not be coextensi ve wit h the belief that
d oc to rs ca n act o n their behalf. Rather, it m ay be an expectation o f hon es t a nd complete
information th a t enable s pa ti en ts to participate in the m edical d ecisionmak in g process.
See.J.w K.-nz, THE S ILE NT WoRLD OF DoCTOR AND PATIE NT 85-103 ( 1984). Professor Katz
rejects the trad iti o na l m odel of tru st. based o n parent-child inte rac ti o n, that e mpha sizes
th e doctor's a uth o rit y. He proposes instead a co nvers ationa l mod e l in which ph ys ici zm~
assist patients in making their ow n decisions. !d. at 100-0 2 .

1993]

599

information. We faithfully turn to our doctors in a time of need for
uncompromised guidance so that we may make informed decisions
about our health. The physician' s failure to discus s abo rtion as a
legal option is likely to lead at least some patients to conclude incorrectly that abortion is not such an option. 59
Second, the Court wrongly assumed that Title X patients have the
ability to seek other medical advice . In fact, these women may encounter num erous obstacles in attempting to obtain reproductive
h ealth services elsewhere. 60 Indigent women may simply lack the
resources to afford private medical counsel. 61 Low-income patients
may be forced to rely exclusively on the T itle X doctor' s advice in
order to conserve limited funds.
Finally, th e Court's narrow focus on the private exchange between physician and patient concealed the full significance of the
regulations which affect more than the words exchanged be tween a
woman and her doctor. Although the regulations do violate doctorpatient confidentiality, they more clearly impact the ability of poor
women to de termine their own destinies and to participate fully in
society. The Court's nearly total privatization of the regulations'
realm of influence obscured the broader political meaning of the
Court's decision which this Article addresses.
C.

The Court's Doctrinal Blindfold

More insidious than the Court's misrepresentation of women's
experience was its misuse of doctrine. The Co urt not only fa iled to
acknowledge or consider the pain in women's lives; it affirmatively
manipulated legal rhetoric to obscure the existence o f that pain.
Perpetrators of official violence commonly blur the sufferin g that
th ey cause by carefully cultivating the justifica tion for their actions. 62 A frequ ently us ed technique is to " focus[] our attention on
abstraction, when it is particularity and real-world detail that alone
59. See Plann ed Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sulliva n. 9 13 F.2d 14 92, 1500-01 (1Oth
Cir. 1990) . T hree fed eral courts of appea ls co n sid e red th e co n stitutio n alit y o f the regulations . Th e First and T e nth C ircuits struck down th e regulati o ns as a vio lati o n o f Titl e
X patients' right to make informed decisions co ncerning abo rti o n an d th e ir p h ys ician s'
First Amendment ri ghts to advise them properly. See id.; Mass achu se tts v. Sec retary of
HHS, 899 F.2d 53 ( 1st C ir. 1990) (en ban e) . A di vid ed pane l of the Seco nd C ircuit
upheld the regul a tion s. See Ne w York v. Sullivan, 889 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989).
60. See generally Ruth Co lker, -'In Equa l Protection ,·lnalysis of Cnited States Reproductive
Health Policy; Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 199 1 DuKE L.J. 324 , 340-50 (d escribin g th e
un ava ilability of contraception a nd sex edu ca ti on , p re natal care, and aborti o n for poor
or adolesce nt fem al es).
61. See Ma rga ret T. Orr & Jacquelin e D. Forres t, The ,.J. vailabillty of R eproductive Health
Services f ro m U.S. Priva te Physicians, 17 FAM. PLAN. P ER SP . 63 , 67- 68 ( 1985) ("S ub sta ntia l
proportions o f physicians who provide reprod u ctive health serv ices are in accessib le to
th e po or, becau se th ey will not accep t Medi ca id re im b urs e ments o r redu ce th e ir fees ." ).
In co n sidering petitioners ' Fifth Am e ndme nt a rg ument, th e Court did ackn ow led ge p etiti o n e rs' con temion that mos t Title X cli en ts a re too p oor to consu lt with an o th e r
hea lth ca re provider for aborti o n-rela ted services. R ust, Ill S. C t. at 1778. T h e Co u rt
simpl y dismissed thi s claim on the ground tha t th e pat ients' in ab ilit y resu lted from in d igency ra th er th an from govern ment restrictions o n access to abo rti o n. !d.
62. See Co ver, su,IJra note 22, at 1629.
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move us." 63 This technique is part of a discourse that makes the
current social order seem fair and natural. 64 The power wielded by
the Court in Rust was evident not only in its ability to punish those
who violate th e regulations, but also in its "capacity to persuade
people that the world described in its images and categori es is the
only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live." 65
Legal doctrine provides an important language through which the
powerful justify their immense share of society's wealth. It also enables them to ignore the suffering caused by the material ineq ualities from which they benefit. It allows us all to tolerate the
lawfulness of the intolerable. 66
The Court's doctrinal blindfold was the distinction it drew between direct state interference with a protected activity and the
state's mere refusal to subsidize a protected activity. 67 The former,
the Court conceded, raises a constitutional issue because it involves
63. Ri ch ard De lgado, Nonns and Normal Sczence: Toward a Critique of Nonnativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REv . 933, 956 (1991) (describing how judges use normative
lega l theory as permission to ignore suffering); see also RoBERT M. CovER, JusTICE Ac CUSED : ANTISLAVERY AND THE jUDICIAL PROCESS 154 (1975) ("National evils are only
cure d b y h o lding m en 's eyes open, and forcing th e m to gaze on th e hideous reality.")
(quoting WENDALL PHILLIPS, A REVIEW OF LYSA NDE R SPOONER's UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SLAVERY 3-4 (184 7)). Pro gres sive legal schol ars can help forc e our soci ety to "gaze
up o n the hid eo us r ealities" of o ur tim es by stripping away the veil of abstract ion. See,
e.g., Kath arine T. Bartl e tt , Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 ( 1990) (describin g the feminist legal meth od of attending to th e parti cu lar experiences of women involved in cases); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, An tldiscn.minatlon Law, and a
Ju rispmdence for the Last Reconstruction, I 00 YALE L.J. 1329, 1394 (!991) [here in after Matsuda, Voices] (d escribin g the work of progressive scholars as "unmasking" exercises of
power dis gu ised as science, history, and law); C h arles A. Re ich, Th e Individual Sector. 100
YALE L.J. 1409, 1445 (1991) (proposing the study of individual lib e rt y as a n area of
factual and scientifi c knowledge, rath e r than m er ely on e of p hilo sop hy and p rincipl e).
Two examples of progressive scholarship tha t have a ttempted to remove the lega l
int e rpretatio n of "free speech" from the realm o f abs tract rhetoric are Ca th arin e MacKinn o n's d esc ription of porn ography and Mari Matsuda's description of racist sp eech
which treat these forms of speech as violence to women and pe op le of co lo r , resp ec tive ly, rather than th e mere express ion of ideas. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FE!\liNISM UNMOD IFIED: DISCOURSES ON LrFE AND LAW 158 -6 2 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Pu blic
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victzm's Story , 87 MIC H. L. REv . 2 320, 23 56- 6 1
( 1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Raost Speech J.
64. C ritica l lega l sc holars refer to thi s process as the law's " legitimation func tion ."
See T ushn e t, supra note 19 , at 1527 .
65 . Robe rt W. Gordon, Cntzral Legal His/on es , 36 STAN. L. RH. 57, 109 (1984).
66. See Robe rt M. Cover, Th e Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and .\'analive, 97 HARV . L. REV. 4, 39 ( 1983) (describin g th e genesis of ut opian constitutiona li sm
as the "inability to b ea r th e dissonance of the law fuln ess of the into lerabl e"); see also
T h o mas R oss, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Th eir lmm ma!ity, Our Helplessness. 79 Gc:o. LJ . 1499 ,
1546 (199!) (a rguin g that " [ t]h e rh eto ri c of poverty shelt ers us from our choices ... [by]
all ow[in g] us to imagine that the suffe rin g o f the poor is just or that we arc he lp les s to
e nd it"). On the law's "dismissal of women's gender-s pecific su~Te ring," see Rob in L.
West, Th e Difference in Women's Hedonzc Lives: ,-1 Phenomenologica l Critique of Fenums t Legal
Theory, 3 \V1s. WoMEN 's Lj. 8 1,82 (1987).
67. Rustv. Su ll ivan, 111 S . Ct .1 759, 1772(1991).
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state action, whereas the latter was characterized as a constitutionally insignificant failure to act. 68 Embedded in this distinction is a
concept of constitutional protections that is limited in three ways.
First, the prevalent view holds that the Constitution protects only an
individual's "negative" right to be free from unjustified intrusion,
rather than the "positive" right to actually lead a free life. 69 Second,
this view restricts constitutional protection to interference by the
state. 7 ° Finally, this view measures government action and inaction
against a baseline of the current arrangements of wealth and privilege: "Decisions that upset existing distributions are treated as 'action'; decisions that do not are thought to stay close to nature and
thus to amount to no action at all." 71 The prevailing conception of
the Constitution, therefore, does not recognize any affirmative government obligation either to ensure the social conditions and resources necessary for individual liberty or to protect the individual
from degradation inflicted by social forces other than the state. It
often fails to recognize, as well, the ways in which the government
uses its authority to fortify private relationships of power. 72
The Court's distinction in Rust serves three purposes: It forecloses serious inquiry into the standard of review, it insulates judges
from the violence they inflicted, and itjustifies the unequal distribution of medical care. First, in considering the regulations, many
judges deemed women's reliance on government funds to obviate
68. !d. (" 'A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated
with the imposition of a "penalty" on that activity.' ... 'There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an
alternative activity, consonant with legislative policy.'") (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,475 (1977), respectively).
69. See Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional A1ethod, 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 91,96 (1992); Robin L. West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REv. 441 (1992);
see al-<o Susan Bandes, The Negatwe Constitution: A Cntique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990)
(critiquing the prevailing conception of the Constitution as solely a charter of negative
liberties).
70. Michelman, supra note 69, at 96; West, supra note 69. See generally Gotanda, supra
note 51, at 7-16 (discussing the public-private distinction in the context of racial discrimination); Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982) (analyzing the past, present, and future of the public/private distinction).
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law ( iVith Specwl Reference to Pornogmphy, Abortion, and Sunogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. REv. l, 2 (1992); accord Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term, Foreword: jwtice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10,56-57 (1987)
(discussing the Supreme Court's assumption that critical features of the status quogeneral social and economic arrangements-are "natural and good"); David A. Strauss,
Due Process, Government Inactwn, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 53, 53-54 (criticizing the Supreme Court's distinction in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), between government action versus failure to act).
The Supreme Court has employed this narrow view of liberty to deny welfare claims
and other forms of government aid. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 ("[O]ur cases
have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governrnemai aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, libertv, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual."); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("[T]he Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for everv social and economic ill.").
72. Cass ·sunstein, for example, agrees that the First Amendment concerns only the
exercise of public power, but criticizes courts for failing to acknowledge that legal strucrure5 restricting speech, such as a right of exclusive ownership in a television network,
are created by the exercise of this public authority. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Xow, 59
U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 263-77 (1992).
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automatically any need for critical thinking about the regulations'
effects. They indicated that when claimants depend on a government gratuity, their claims become "constitutionally irrelevant." 7 3
The phrase "mere refusal to subsidize" served as an often-invoked
talisman , enabling courts to ignore whether the refusal warranted
heightened scrutiny as a denial of rights. 74 As Justice Blackmun
noted in his Rust dissent, "the Court, for the first time, upholds
viewpoint-based suppression of speech solely because it is imposed
on those dependent upon the Government for economic
support." 75
Second, by characterizing the government policy it upheld as inaction, the Court distanced itself from the violence of its decision. 76
Judges would not be directly inflicting pain on women who receive
inadequate or harmful medical care as a result of the regulations.
These women's suffering results from the circumstances of poverty,
for which the judges hold no responsibility. Because the brutality
was carried out in health care clinics by means of physicians' o missions-not the typical brute force of a tyrant-the law did not recognize it as official violence. Thus, the language of government
inaction fulfilled the law's mesmerizing role: "Those in power sleep
well at night-their conduct does not seem to them like
oppression. " 77
Finally, the Court's distinction between action and inaction allowed it unabashedly to impose separate standards of justice for the
rich and the poor. The dichotomy rendered " equal" th e plainly unequal system that ensures full medical advice for the wealthy, while
denying it to the indigent. This inequality is es peciall y strikin g in
73. See, e.g., New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 ,4 11 (2d Cir. 1989) C'(S]o long as
no affirmative legal obstacle to aborti o n services is created by a d enial of th e usc of
gove rnmental mo ney, fa cilities , o r perso nnel , the practical effect of such a de nial o n th e
avail ability of such services is const ituti o nall y irreleva nt. '').
74. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed 'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 91 3 F.2d 14 92 , 1506 n.4
(lOth Cir. 1990) (Baldo ck, J. , dissenting in part) (" H ow ... ca n the first a mendm e nt be
read to pro hibit a res tri ct io n on the dial ogue between a phys ician and pati e nt , wh e n th e
physician an d pati e nt rely on federal funding to carry o n su ch dial ogu e)") ; New York v.
Bowe n , 690 F. Supp. 126 1 (S.D .N .Y. 1988) .
75. Ru st v. Sulli van , 111 S. C t. 1759 , 1778 (1991 ) (Blackmun,J., di ssen tin g).
76. See Cover, supra note 22, at 162 8 (describing the social organ izati on of vio lence
thro ugh whi ch responsibility fo r offi cial violence is sha red).
On th e o ther hand, th e Court's willi ngness to uph old th e regula tions without clear
con g ressi ona l approval of the Sec retary's con structi o n of Title X, and despite th e se rious constitutional questions that co nstru ctio n raised , ca n b e seen as a Aa g ra nt vio lati on
of the prin ciples ofj udici al restrai nt. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Tmn: Leading Cases, 10 5
HARV. L. REv. 177 , 397-99 (a rgu ing th at the Rust Court should hav e set asid e th e regulation s o n sta tuto ry grounds a nd awa ited a cl ear demonstration of congress iona l intent);
see also R usi, 111 S. Ct. a t 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., di ssentin g) (sam e) .
77. Ri chard De lgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: .-J Plea for Nanative, 87
M I C H. L. REV. 24 11 , 24! 3-14 ( ! 989).
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the courts' recognition that the same restrictions would pose a constitutional problem had they applied to women who could pay for
medical care. The Second Circuit, for example, explicitly acknowledged that it would be a matter of judicial concern if the regulations
restricted abortion advice given to private patients who used a clinic
receiving Title X funds. 78
T he Court's reasoning can be challenged either by accepting its
action/ inaction dichotomy or by rejecting it. First,-accep ting the
action/inaction dichotomy-petitioners very persuasively argued
that the regulations did constitute government action. 79 Petitioners
portrayed the government's offer to poor women of pregnancy testing, medical advice, and referrals as affirmative conduct. O nce inside the clinics, most patients would rely solely on the co unseling
mandated by the regulations which was intended to deter th em from
obtaining an abortion. Had the government not provided this servi ce, some of these women might have managed to receive full and
accurate information about abortion elsewhere . I t is arguable that,
even if they could not afford to pay for alternate advice, th ey would
be in a better position to judge their medical options without the
biased information dispensed at Title X clinics.80 In thi s sense , patients are worse off than if the government had not become involved
in family planning at all. "Lured into Title X clinics b y the apparent
promise of reliable health care, indigent women leave the clinic not
m erely unenlightened but affirmatively misled. " 8 1
An alternative challenge is to reject the constitutional significance
of the Co urt 's action/inaction dichotomy alto gether. Indeed, the
ease with which the regulations can be characterized alternatively as
a mere failure to subsidize abortion co unseling or as the affirmative
manipulation of women's choices demonstrates th e futility of the action/inaction distinction as a basis for judging the regulations . We
can easily recharacterize government omission as affirm ative interference: The sta te actively protects the rights of affluent women
throu gh laws that require informed cons ent, while deliberat ely promotin g ignorance of medical information among poor women. 82 As
78. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401,413-14 (2d C ir. 1989).
79. See Brief for Petitioners at 19, Rust (N os . 89 -1391).
80. See Brief of Amici Curiae Planned Parenth ood Federa ti o n of Ameri ca and the National Fam il y Plannin g and Reproduc ti ve Health Associa tion in Support o f Pe titi o n ers a t
17 , Rust (Nos . 89-1391 , 89-1392 ); cf Da vid A. Strauss , Persuasion, Autonomy. and Freedom of
£.,pression, 9 1 COLUM. L. RE v . 334, 356-60 (1991) (arguin g that a m a nipulative r es triction
of acces s to info rm a ti o n, like a li e , violates indi vidu al autonom y) .
8 1. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Rust (No. 89 -1 39 1); accord Pla nned Parenthood Fed 'n
of Am. v. Sullivan, 9 13 F.2d 1492 , 1500-01 (lO th C ir. 1990).
8 2. The Constitution doe s con ta in g uarantees of affirmati ve governm e nt protection.
See Akh il R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse .·Is Sla ve1y: :1 Thirteenth .-lmen dm ent R espo nse to DeS han ey , 10 5 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 138 1 (1992) (arguing th at th e a bsen ce of a
stat e ac tio n requirement in th e Th irteenth Amend ment impli e s th a t cert ain state inaction is pro hibited) ; Dav id P. Curri e, Positive and .Vega tive Constitutional Rzghts. 53 U . C HI. L
R ~::v. 864 , 87 3-80 ( 1986) (giving examples of a rgu a bly positiY e gove rnm ent duti e s found
in th e primari ly ne gativ e Constitution): Steve n J. Heyman , The First Duty of Coc•ern ment:
Proteciion, Liberty and the Fourteenth :lmendment, 199 1 DuKE LJ 507, 512- 45 (trac ing th e
origins and devel o pm e nl of th e positive rig ht to go ve rnm ent pro tec tion in An glo -,\m e ri ca n co nstitm ional ism); Su n stcin, supra not e 71, a t 9 (no ti ng that pri\·atc proper! \' and
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the regulations demonstrate, the welfare state wields as much power
by withholding benefits as by coercive force. 83 In a society where
survival depends on inclusion in an economy dominated by government welfare of one sort or another, the consequences of exclusion
may be more devastating than criminal punishment. 84
Changing the perspective from which we view government policy
destroys the traditional significance of the action/inaction dichotomy. A constitutional lens that looks at the broader impact of government conduct on the status of subordinated groups diminishes
the importance of that distinction. The critical questions become:
Is the state perpetuating existing hierarchies of power? 85 Does the
government's policy further alienate an already-outcast community
from society's privileges?

II.

Critique of Rust's First Amendment Analysis

The contest in Rust rested on two First Amendment theories-the
marketplace of ideas and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Both theories assert that the aim of the Constitution's guarantees is
government neutrality. This focus on neutrality cannot illuminate
the regulations' injury to Black women because it fails to recognize
the significance of speech and government restrictions on speech
within the context of relationships of power.

contract rights are positive because they depend on state enforcem e nt of trespass laws
and contractual arrangem ents). Profess o r Sunstein gives two examples of the p os itive
dimensions of current First Amendment law-governm e nt's obliga tion to protect sp eakers from a hostile private audience and constitutional constraints on the common la w of
libel that , in effect , comp e l th ose who are defamed to subsidize sp eech through th e lo ss
o f their own reputation. See Sunstein , supra note 72 , at 273-74.
83. See Se th F. Kreim er , ..Jllocal!onal San ctions: The Proble111 of .\ 'egatwe Rights in a Pos rtwe State, 132 U. PA. L. R Ev. 1293, 1295-96 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Cn constitutwnal Conditions Doctrine is an ..Jnachroms111 (with Particular Reference to Rehgwn, Speech, and
..Jbortron) 70 B.U. L. REv. 593-603 (1990) (arguing that the subsid y/ penalty di stincti o n
ca nnot b e sustained in light of the omnipresence of go vernment sp e nding and fundin g);
Note , Cn constitutwnal Conditwns, 73 HAR V . L. REv. 159 5 , 1609 (1960) (arguing th a t " the
p o wer to impose conditi o ns is not a less er pan of th e greater pow er to withh o ld, but
instead is a distinct ex ercise of pow e r whi ch must find its own justifica tion").
84. See Reich, supra note 63, at 14 38. Charles Re ich described the ways in which
governm e nt la rgess increases the politi ca l a nd legal bas es for go ve rnment pow e r in hi s
la ndmark articl e , The .\'e;u Property. C hi e f among th e m is the go ve rnment's abilitv to
"purchase" th e abandonm e nt of con stitutional ri g hts . Charles A. Re ich, The .\'no Property, 73 YALE L.J. 73 3 , 764 (1964 ). Gove rnment funding also in crease s gov e rnmental
power bv expanding administrative di sc re tion in poli cymaking and inte rpreting le gislative poli cy. !d. at 749.
85. See Ro bin \Vest , Progressrve and Conserva ti ve Cons l!tutwna!islll , 88 ~v1rcH. L. RE\'. G4 l,
693 ( 1990) ("The targe ted ev il IS no t irra ti o nal stat e ac tion , but state ac tion o r in acti o n ,
ra tional o r not .... that p e rpe tuates th e d a maging soc ial, economi c, d o mestic o r p ri va te
domin a ti o n of some gro up s b y· others." )
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A.

The Marketplace of Ideas

The freedom of speech theory framing the arguments in Rust was
the marketplace of ideas model. The marketplace metaphor
originated in Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States, 86 which invoked "free trade in ideas" as the theoretical foundation for freedom of speech. 87 It has since dominated the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment. 8 S The
marketplace of ideas theory provides that speech should be protected from government interference because exposing the public
to different viewpoints is the best way to discover truth. The theory
posits that truth will prevail ultimately in public debate wherein all
ideas are allowed to compete freely.s9
Both sides in Rust viewed the regulations as government participation in the market's public debate on abortion. The point of contention was whether interjecting the government's antiabortion
viewpoint distorted an otherwise rational and fair marketplace.9o
Petitioners argued that the government's participation in the marketplace potentially could drown out other viewpoints. 91 The government failed to see any distortion of the marketplace at all but saw
merely the government's effort to add its voice to the debate. The
test that both the majority and the dissent used to answer the question of government distortion was whether the regulations violated
the principle of viewpoint neutrality. 92 The danger in the regulations was that they breached the touchstone of First Amendment
86. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissentin g).
8 7. See id. at 630; see also Lamont v. Postmaste r G e ne ral , 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(Brennan , J., concurring) (using for the first time the phras e "marketplace of ideas" to
support the right to receive ideas). Milton 's Areopagitica, which based freedom of e xpression o n the search for Truth , foreshadowed Holmes's metaphor of the free trade in
id e as. See JoHN MILTON , AREOPAGITICA (1644), repnnted in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM
28 (Milton Mayer ed., 1957); see also David Cole, Agon at Ago ra: Creative lv!isreadings in First
A mendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 876 (1986) (pointing out Milton's foreshadowing
o f Holmes' concept of fre e trade in ideas).
88. For a description of th e Supreme Court's consistent use of marketplace ima ge ry
in its discussions of fr eed o m o f speech, see C. EDWIN BAK ER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREE·
DOM OF SPEECH 7-12 (1989).
89. See, e.g. , Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holm es, J., disse nting) ("[T]he best te st o f
tru th is the power of th e thou g ht to get itself accepte d in the competition of the m a rket
. . .. " ); Whitney v. Ca lifo rnia, 274 U.S. 357 , 3 75 (1927) (Brandeis , J., concurring)
("[ F]reedom to think as yo u will a nd to speak as you think are means indisp ensabl e to
the di sco very and sprea d o f po litical truth .... " ), ovemded by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U .S . 444 (1969).
90. See generally Rob ert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishmen t Clause, 67 CAL. L. REv. ll 04 (1979) (proposin g p o litical establishme nt cl a us e,
impli ed from the First Am e ndm ent, that would prohibit gov ernment advocacy of politica l vi ewpoints that distorts th e marketplace of ideas). Co mpare MARK G. YuDOF , WHEN
G o vE RNMENT SPEAKS 204 ( 1983 ) (observing that gov ernm e nt expression may distort citize n judgment and dro wn o ut o pp o sing mess a ges ) with Fred eri ck Schauer, Is Governmen t
Speech a Pro blem~. 35 STAN . L. RE v . 373 (1983 ) (re vi ewin g Yu ooF , supra, and dis co untin g
the impact of go vernm e nt speec h o n public opini o n).
9 1. Brief for Pe titi o ne rs a t 23-24, Rust v. Suliiva n, ll I S. C t. 1759 (1991) (No. 8 9139 1).
9 2. See Rust, Ill S . C t. a t 1772, 178 0. But see generally Paul B. S(ephan III , The Fi rst
, Jmendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. RE v . 20 3 ( 198 2) (suggesting " that a b r oad
co nt en( neutrality rul e n o t o nl y o bscures free speech qu es tio ns , but is antithetic al to an y
r at io nal analysi s of fre edo m of expression").
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doctrine-" equality of status in the field of ideas." 93 By refusing to
fund family-planning projects advocating abortion, petitioners argued, the government targeted a particular ideological viewpoint
and forced doctors to be instruments for fostering public adherence
to the opposite orthodoxy. 94 This First Amendment analysis focused on the individual and on ideas. The constitutional evil was
perceived as suppression of abortion advocacy. The right at stake
was the individual's right to be free from imposition of the state's
viewpoint.
One weakness of the marketplace approach is that constitutional
answers can vary, depending on the delineation of the "marketplace." Petitioners presented the marketplace as the limited forum
in which poor and low-income women can obtain medical counsel
and information-in other words, the Title X project itself. 95 This
marketplace is monopolized entirely by the government. Petitioners' construction of the marketplace recognized that poor communities have fewer resources to challenge the government-sponsored
view. Respondents, on the other hand, described the government
as a participant in a bigger marketplace of diverse ideas.
An analogy in respondents' brief illustrates this distinction. Respondents likened the regulations to a government grant to produce
93. Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley , 408 U.S . 92, 96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER
MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27
( 194 8) ); see also Kenneth L. Kars t, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U .
CHI. L. REv. 20 , 28 (1975) (asserting that " Mosley is a landmark first amendment decision" beca use it declares that "the essence of the first amendment is its denial to government of the power to determine which messages shall be heard and which suppress ed").
94 . See Brief for P~titioners at 18-21, Rust (No. 89-1391); see also Rust, IllS. Ct. ac
1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (using same argument).
The free speech values rais ed in Rust illustrate the tension between individualisti c and
com munitarian interpretations of the Constitution. While a lib eral focus on autonomy
questions the power of governm en t speech to influence individual choice, a communitarian p e rspective recognizes the co mmunity's need to in culcate its members with a set
of sha re d values. In contrast to the liberal opposition to th e regulations ' interferen ce in
women 's abortion decision s, the co mmunity's comp e tin g interes t might support greater
gove rnm e nt power to impart its antiabortion messa ge. For discussions of the te n sion
between indi vidualistic and communitarian speech values in o th e r co ntexts , see Staniey
In gber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Indi vidual R1ghls: The First Amendment in !nslltutlonal Corziex/s, 69 TEx. L. REv. l, 24-46 ( 1990) (discussing the te nsion between indi vidua li st ic an d communitarian traditions and suggesting a First Amendment analysis that
includ e s the communal worth o f individual rights);Jam es C . O'Brien, The Promise of Pico:
A :\lew Dejinitwn of Orthodoxy, 97 YALE L.J. 1805, 1823 (1988) (proposing an expand ed
app roach to orthodoxy tha t reso lves "the conflict betw ee n sch oo ls' inculcative fun ct ion
and the need to equip students for self- government") .
For arti cles arguing that the government need n o t remain id eo logically neu tra l and
shou id contribute its voice to the public debate over abortion policy. see Th eodo re C.
Hirt , Why the Government Is !Vol Required /o Subs idi:e A. borlion Counseling and Referral, l 0 1
H.-\RV. L. REv. 1895 , 1906 (1988); Edward G. Reitl e r , Th e Tit le X Family Plann ing Subsidies:
Th e Government 's Role in M oral issues, 27 HAR V. J. ON LE GIS. 453 (1990). Sef generally JoSEPH Tuss rvL\N, GovER>IMENT AND THE MIND ( 1977) (defe nding the government 's legiti mate , co nstitutional power to influ ence citizens' mind s) .
95. See Brief for Petiti oners at 22, Rust (No. 89-1391).
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a television documentary that discusses family-planning techniques,
but not abortion. 96 The government may decide simply not to enter
the market of abortion documentaries. In respondents' hypothetical, a lack of absolute control over the available information is what
makes the government a market participant rather than a regulator
of expression. Other producers remain free to present alternative
views, including documentaries about abortion.
T he government's analogy, however, mischaracterized the regulation s' overwhelming impact on patients' access to abortion information . Nor was the proper analogy a solely government-owned
station that force s all citizens to imbibe the state's message. The
hypothetical that more accurately illustrates the injustice of the regulations is a society where the dispossess ed only have access to a
governmen t television channel that broadcasts limited, misleading-even harmful-information, while the privileged have their
pick of channels that provide a wealth of information.
Petitioners' focus on neutrality among abstract ideas also limited
the force of their argument. T he logical extension of this neutrality
perspective is that government must stay out of the marketplace of
ideas altogether and fund no viewpoint, or it must fund each and
every viewpoint equally. T his approach has two immediate shortcomings. First, the Court pointed out that petitioners' assertion
would mean that, if government choos es to subsidize one protected
view, it also must subsidize all counterpart views. 97 If the government sponsored programs aimed at dissuading people from drinking alcohol, for example, it must also fund programs that encourage
drinking. State funding of messages promoting racial harmony
would require funding for hate speech. This logical extension of the
neutrality argument is undesirable both because the costs are prohibitive and because we do want the government to be somewhat
selective in its fu ndin g decis ions. 9 s
Second , under the neutrality approach, the constitutional wrong
was that the governm ent suppressed only one of two reproductive
options-abortion and not childbirth. T he government's "neutral"
elimination of all pregnancy counseling would remedy this viewp oint discrimi na tion. T h e government's to tal retreat from the marketp lace of reproductive information , however, would have a
devastating impact on the health of poor women. 99 T hu s, n either
96. B rief for the Respondent at 22-23, R ust (Nos. 89 -1 39 1). In fact, the federa l gove rnm e nt spends hundreds of milli o n s of dollars eac h year o n films, TV pro grams, and
rad io broadcasts. Yuoor, supra n ote 90 , at 7.
97 . Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1772-7 3.
98. See, e.g., Bob J ones Univ. v. Un ited States, 461 U .S. 574 (1983) (upholdin g se lectiv e government subsidi es of non-racist educational instituti o n s) .
99 . Mos t poor wom e n of co lor bee financi a l and other ba rriers to receiving proper
prenata l care. See C HILDREN's DEFE:-JSE Fu ND, THE H EALTH OF AMER ICA's C HILDREN 43-18 (1991) (di scus sin g women' s ina bilit y to pay fo r h ea lth-ca re ser vices); Ma ry A. Curry,
>:onfinancial Ba1Tiers to Prenatal Care, 15 Wo~ tE N & H EALTH 85 -87 ( 1989) (d isc u ss in g tra nsportat ion and ch ildca re problem s th at limit access to hea lth ca re sit es); Ruth E. Za mbrana, A Research Agenda on Iss ues .·lifectzng Poor and .\!lnonty ll'omen: .·1 .\lode/ for
L'nderstanding Thm Health X eeds . 14 WOMEN & HEALTH 137 , 148-50 ( 1988) (d isc u ss ing
cultura l barriers to prenatal care) . In 1986. onl y h alf of all p regnant Black wom e n in
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solution to the problem framed as viewpoint discrimination-government funding of all viewpoints or government funding of noneadequately addresses the harm caused by the regulations .
The marketplace of ideas assumes not only a marketplace in which
ideas trade freely, but also one which is open to all citizens who seek
knowledge. 100 It is based on the fiction that prohibiting government
restrictions on access to knowledge is enough to ensure access to
everyone. The negative protection against government interference
alone, however, overlooks the effect of existing inequalities of resources in the marketplace. 101 It also ignores that many people are
silenced by social domination on the basis of race, gender, and
class. 102 A laissez-faire market inevitably will produce an exchange
America received adequate pren a tal care. See CHILDRE N's DEFENSE FuND, supra, at 4 (table 1). Fo r my argument that the government has an obligation to provide poor wome n
with pre natal care, see Roberts , supra note 18, at 1479.
I 00. The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional "right to receive information " which limits the government's ability to restrict publi c access to information. See,
e.g., First Nat') Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (sta ting that the First Amendm e nt "p ro hibit[s] government from limiting the stock of info rmation from which memb ers o f the public may draw"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(sta ting that the government "may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendm e nt, contract the spectrum of available knowledge"); Lam ont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) ("It would be a barren marke tplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers."); cf. Dani el A. Farber, Free Speech Withou t Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, 105 H ARV. L. REv . 554, 568 , 573 (1991) (showing that publi c
choice theory , which views informa ti o n as a public good, suggests a government dut y to
promote speech). But see Benjamin S. DuVal , Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. P1·rr. L.
R Ev. 579 ( 1986) (defending government restrictions on the acquisitio n and disseminati on o f kn ow ledge) . See generally William E. Lee , The Supreme Court and the R ight to Remve
Expression, 198 7 SuP. CT. REv. 303 (noting the Warren Co urt' s recognition of a First
Amendment right to receive exp ress ion); Note, The Rzghts of the Public and the Press to
Cather Information, 87 HARV . L. R Ev. 1505 (1974) (discus sing the free flow of inform a tion
as a n o bj ec tive of the First Amendment). The Court, howe ver, has never interpreted
this limita ti o n as a positive right of citizens to compel the go vernment to provide inform at ion. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S . 1, 15 (1 978) ("Neither the First
Am endment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a ri g ht of access to governm e nt
informat io n o r so urces of informa tio n within the government's co ntrol. ") ; San Antonio
Ind ep. Sch. Dis t. v. Rodriguez, 411 U .S. 1, 36 (197 3) (" (W] e have never presum ed to
p ossess e ith e r the ability or th e a utho rity to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective
speech o r th e most informed electo ral choice.") .
l 0 I. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowen ste in , Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent
Expenence, Public Chozce Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 608 ( 1982)
(arguing th a t "the power of some groups to raise enormous su ms of money to oppose
ballot propositions, without regard to ... popular feelin g, serio usly interferes with th e
ab ility of o ther groups to us e th e in stitutions of direct d emocracy for their intend ed
purp ose") ; Ca rl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Cmporate Freedom: A Comment on First Nati o n al Ba nk of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1227 , 128 7 (1986) (discussing th e
Co urt 's unwillingness to acknowledge that instituti ons con trollin g large clusters of
wealth pose First Amendment problems). See generally Sta nl ey In gber, The Marketplace of
Ideas: A Legitunating My th, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1, 5-6 (d e mo ns trat in g th a t the marketpl ace
in evitab ly supp o rts entrenched p ower stru ctures and id eo logies).
102 . See MACK INNON, supra no te 63, a t 158 ("For wo men , th e urgent issue of freed o m
of speec h is not primarily th e avo id an ce of state int e rvent io n as such , but findin g an
affirma ti ve m ea ns to get access to speech for those to whom it has been denied .") . The
government often is impli cated in this private silencing by gran tin g to private citizens
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of ideas dominated by those with the most economic and social
power. The monopoly of mass media ownership and the difficulty
of organizing participation by less powerful groups compound marketplace failures. 103 Government involvement may be necessary to
counterbalance the overwhelming communications power wielded
by corporate and wealthy interests. 104 The poor often must depend
on the government to express or subsidize their views. 105 Thus,
government intervention may broaden, rather than distort, the spectrum of views expressed.
The focus on neutrality is one of the chief instruments of legal
legitimation. It provides the conceptual means for concluding that
"particular social practices are fair because they are objective and
unbiased." 106 Liberal discourse concerning racial discrimination
uses neutral principles in a similar way. Its assumption of a realm of
the legal authority both to harm others through speech and to limit the speech of others.
See J .M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DuKE LJ . 375, 414; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 277.
103 . BAKER, supra note 88, at 38; cJ. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, PoLITICS AND MARKETs:
THE WORLD's POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 173 (1977) (describing business' disproportionate influence on government decisions in capitalist polyarchi es) . Knowledge has
become a valuable commodity, appropriated by private interests and sold by private
enterprise only to those who can afford to pay its price. This privatization of information fosters increased restrictions on access to knowledge, because this is the way that
the m arket economy ensures information's profitability. SuE C. jANSEN, CENSORSHIP:
THE KNOT THAT BINDS PowER AND KNOWLEDGE 168-69 ( 1988); cJ. Farber, supra note 100,
at 579 (arguing that First Amendment protection provides nonfinancial motivation to
encourage the production of information) . For a legal history of the confli cting approaches to information as a public resource and as a fo rm of private wealth, see Diane
L. Zimmerman , Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on ivlarketplaces
and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665, 674-724 (1992).
104. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1415-24
( 1986) (arguing that the Court should encourage state interve ntion that e nrich es public
debate); see also Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE LJ. 2087, 2104
(1991) ("[A] decision of the state not to act-to go out of the fundin g busin ess altogether-might itself be a form of action prohibited by the First Amendment.").
The Supreme Court generally has rejected government restrictions on speech
designed to ensure a more balanced public debate . See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48-49 ( 1976) (overturning campaign spending restrictions ; stating that " [t]h e concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in o rder to
e nhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to th e First Amendment"). In
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, however, the Court for the first tim e uph eld limits
on corporate campaign speech as a means of correcting "the corros ive a nd distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth." 494 U.S. 652, 660 ( 1990); see also David
Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire m Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. &
PoL'Y REv. 236, 264-77 (1991) (discussing th e potentiall y revolution a ry reper cussions of
A us tin's recognition of the systemic distorting effects of wealth).
105. See Balkin, supra note 102 , at 412 (proposing governmental inv est ment in communica tion technologies as a mea ns of enhancing th e substantive liberty of speech);
Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795, 799
( 1981) (distinguishing between government promotion of th e system of freedom of expression-facilitating expression by private individuals or groups-a nd government participation in the system); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(upholding the fairness do ctrine which required broadcaste rs to present public issue
programming, giving time to each sid e).
106. Peller, supra note 52, at 775; see also Delgado, supra note 77 , at 2421 (describing
the use of neutral, pro cedural terminol ogy to submerge substan tive questions of sub ordination). For an examination and critique of the prevailing concept of ne utralit y rooted
in exis ting distributions of power in the context of a wid e ran ge of co nstitution al issues ,
see Sunstein, supra note 71 .
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"neutral" social practices developed outside the influence of racial
history parallels the marketplace-of-ideas doctrine's focus on government distortion of an otherwise rational exchange of ideas. Racism, like viewpoint discrimination, is viewed as isolated incidents
deviating from an otherwise rational decisionmaking process. 107
Although conservatives and liberals differ as to the extent of desirable race-consciousness, both embrace neutrality-or color-blindness-as meritorious and divorced from social power. 108 Similarly,
both the liberal and conservative positions in Rust relied on the
principle of viewpoint neutrality to judge the regulations without
considering their relationship to the distribution of power in
America.
Identifying neutrality alone as the First Amendment ideal accords
with the claim that Enlightenment- "the free use of reason"-can
abolish the bond between knowledge and power. 109 According to
this view, it is possible to separate theory from practice, form from
content, and to attain free inquiry and objectivity. It presumes the
possibility of achieving "epistemological humility" by removing
government censorship. 110 Government neutrality eliminates coercion, allowing ideas to be judged on the basis of rational argument
alone. The Enlightenment view, however, mistakenly assumes that
reason-and not power-will determine the debate within the marketplace, as long as neutral rules are followed. 111
It is important to rethink the fixation on viewpoint neutrality by
107. See Peller, supra note 52, a t 779; see also Cren shaw , supra note 49 , at 1344
(describing the "restrictive view" of antidiscrimination law th a t ass umes that a raciall y
equitable society already exists); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discnmination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MrNN. L. REv.
1049, 1054 (1978) (describing the prevailing perception of ra cism as disconnected acts
of "blamewo rthy individuals who are violating the otherwise shared norm").
l 08. See Peller, supra note 52, at 772-79 . Reliance on the supposedly neutral criterion
of merit is used to justify the exclusion of Blacks and disguises the way that racism still
influe n ces decisionmaking. See Patricia]. Williams , The Obliging Shell (An Informal Essay on
Formal Equal Opportunity), in ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 98, 98-110 (1991). See generally Go ta nda , supra note 51 (explaining how the Supreme Co urt 's co lor-blind constitutionalism fosters white domination) . Similarly, Mari Matsuda has demonstrated h ow
emp loyers ' use of a purportedl y neutral standard to det ermin e intelligible accent s is
ac tu all y a hidden exercise of power. See Matsuda, Voices, supra n ote 63 , at 1394.
109. See .J ANSE1\, supra not e 103, at 4-6; Gary Peller, The JV!etaphysics of American Law, 73
CAL . L. REV. 1151,1159 (1985).
110. See Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom ofExpression and the Civic Republzcan Revival in Constitutional Themy: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267, 281
( 1991) (arguin g that the ess ence of freedom of expression is th e doctrine of "episte mo logical humility," which protec ts autonomous deci sionmaking from government
interfe ren ce).
I ! i. Co ntrar y to liberal principl es, n e utralit y is not n ecessa ril y th e critical prerequisite for aut o no mous decisionmakin g. Joel Handler, for exa mpl e, exp lains tha t in social
wo rk prac ti ce " client self-det erminatio n justifies the abandonment of ne utralit y." Joel F.
H and le r, Dependent People, the State, and the J\.Jodem/Postmodem Search for the Dialogzc Commum!y, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999,1099 (l988);seealso Simon , supra note 17 , at 2-23 (describing
the welfare jurisprudence d eveloped by social workers during and after the New Deal);
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considering the social and political context of government speech.
An alternative approach examines the effect of government control
of information on relationships of social power. It does not allow us
to use the shield of neutral principles in order to avoid confronting
inequalities in the power to communicate. This view rejects the illusion that we can achieve knowledge without the taint of power.
Rather, it purposefully examines how the relationship between
knowledge and power operates in our society. It asks how knowledge functions to secure the powerful and how it might serve to
liberate the oppressed. This analysis reveals the real evil of the regulations: The government's control of knowledge not only suppresses an idea, it represses a people. This inquiry then calls us to
determine what information is essential for self-determination and
demands that the government provide this information to people
who are dependent on government aid.
B.

Unconstitutional-Conditions Doctrine

The other theory framing the First Amendment analysis in Rust is
the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. This doctrine provides
that the government may not condition the conferral of a benefit on
the beneficiary's surrender of a constitutional right, although the
government may choose not to provide the benefit altogether. 112
The doctrine rests on a negative vision of the Constitution. It
presumes that the state has no affirmative obligation to fund the exercise of rights, but asks whether its conditional offer of a benefit
requires stricter scrutiny than its denial of the benefit. 113
Both sides in Rust accepted the premise that "[n]o one has a right
to a subsidy for the exercise of rights to speech and privacy ." 114 Petitioners argued, however, that once the government had chosen to

cJ. Margaret]. Radin, lv!arket-inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1886-87 (1987) (rejecting the liberal position of neutrality as to the good life for human beings and advocating instead an ideal of "human flourishing").
In Joel Handler's dialogue between social worker and client, the concern for client
empowerment overcame any adherence to formal neutrality:
[T]he workers were not expected to be neutral in this dialogue . This did not
mean lack of respect for client autonomy; rather, it was a recognition of the
possibility that the social context was conditioning the client ' s perception of
her own interests. Neutrality would inhibit the dialogue and the ability to
challenge the client to develop her own ideas as to her interests. It was also
important for the worker to show herself as a distinct individual who had
ideas and was capable of empathy and feelings of solidarity. Disdaining neutrality did not mean embracing paternalism. It was the client's choice to engage in the dialogue and to make whatever decisions emerged.
Handler, supra, at 1097. Ironically, in Rust, the isolated appeal of neutrality justified the
abandonment of client self-determination.
112. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1415
(1989); Sunstein, supra note 83, at 593-94 n.2. Legal scholars have posited numerous
theories to determin e when a beneficiary's agreement to accept a conditioned benefit
should be unenforceable. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Const ra int on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctnne, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473, 485-504 ( 1991)
(cataloguing five unconstitutional-conditions theories).
113. Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1425.
114. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rust (No. 89-1391); see also Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Center for Constitutional Rights et al. as Amici Curiae in
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subsidize family planning, it could not exact adherence to its antiabortion orthodoxy through the imposition of viewpoint-based
conditions on its largesse. 115 The Court rejected petitioners' unconstitutional-conditions argument on the ground that the regulations did not deny a benefit to anyone, nor did they prevent
grantees from engaging in First Amendment activities outside the
scope of the federally funded project. 116 The regulations simply required that Title X funds be spent on the purpose for which they
were intended-establishing and operating projects that provide
preventive family-planning services.
Framing the First Amendment problem as an unconstitutional
condition is also a demand for government neutrality. 117 This approach recognizes the potential for government use of conditions
on benefits to prefer one constitutionally protected viewpoint over
another. 118 As the Supreme Court noted in Speiser v. Randall, "the
denial of [funding] for engaging in certain speech necessarily will
have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. The denial is 'frankly aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.' " 119 As with the marketplace-of-ideas model, inequalities of communications power caused by social and economic
disparities are beyond the doctrine's reach. 120
One failing of the unconstitutional-conditions approach in Rust is
that it focused on the wrong distinction. The doctrine classifies potential beneficiaries into two groups: those who comply with the
Support of Petitioners at 14, Rust (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392) ("[A]mici do not suggest that
the government is affirmatively required to provide women with information regarding
their post-pregnancy reproductive options."); see also Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1497
(stating that "a right against government distortion need not entail a right to government equalization").
115. See Brief for Petitioners at 18, Rust (No. 89-1391).
116. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1759-74.
117. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1506 (stating that the doctrine "preserves
spheres of private ordering from government domination and ensures that citizens receive appropriately evenhanded treatment from the government"); Sunstein, supra note
83, at 60 I ("[T]he current constitutional mainstream[] sees the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an effort to preserve legal requirements of governmental neutrality
under different social and economic conditions.").
118. See Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1496-97.
119. 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
120. See Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1497 n.359; see also Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of
Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 1185,
1219 (1990) (placing the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine in the context of constitutional rights that "function to prevent the State from imposing various deterrents ...
above and beyond those economic deterrents that are a natural concomitant of a market
economy"); cf. RoGER M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 25455 (1985) (discussing the rational liberty position that regards the inequalities of market
society as legitimate, but demands strict scrutiny where public measures exacerbate the
significance of economic difference in ways that endanger basic liberties).
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condition and receive the benefit and those who do not. 121 The critical inequality created by the regulations was not between those provided with government aid-i.e., clinics that do not advocate
abortion-and those denied aid-i.e., clinics that do. The violence
of the decision was not suffered by the physicians whose speech was
restricted, but by their patients, the third-party beneficiaries of Title
X. 122 Moreover, the violence did not consist solely of the distinction
the government made between ideologies. Rather, the regulations'
injustice lies in the distinction they allow between the powerfulwho attempt to control knowledge-and the dispos sessed whose
status is maintained through that control. 12 3
The tortured history of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine
also raises questions about its utility as a test of constitutional legitimacy. Scholars have noted the use of the doctrine to justify irreconcilable decisions. 124 Different justices have manipulated the
doctrine to achieve desired results based on their respective substantive ideals. 125 T he doctrine was "invented by a laissez-faire
Court bent on dismantling progressive legislation that reduced the
liberty of corporations, but then perpetuated b y a Court seeking
strong protections for personal liberties." 126 T he Court more recently has disregarded the doctrine, as it did in Rust, to weaken
these very protections . 12 7
12 1. Sullivan, supra note 112 , a t 1496.
122 . See Chervin, supra no te 37, a t 425 (recognizing the interdependence b e tween
unconstitutional conditions and the third parties they affe ct).
12 3. Cf Sullivan, supra note 112 , at 1489-99 (discussing three distributive concerns
that unconstitutional conditi ons present); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Uncons titutional Conditions and the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327, 334 -3 5 (1989 ) (applying
these distributive conce rns to th e Title X regulatio ns). Professor Sullivan's theoretical
foundation for the d octrin e centers on the "sys temic effect o f conditions on the di stribu tion of rights in the polity as a whole ," including the co nstituti onal casce created b y
discrimination among rightholders on the basis of th eir relative dependency on a gov ern m e nt benefit. Sullivan, supra n o te 112, at 1421. This sys tem ic approach reco gnizes
that th e regulations' unequal trea tment extends beyond discrimination betwe en id eas
about abortion: The regula ti ons divide pregnant women into two "constitutio n al
cas tes." !d. According to thi s view, the critical hierarchi es of power are those created by
the government condition itself-either vertical hie rarchi es bet ween government and
ri ghtho lders or horizontal hierarchies among rightho ld ers- ra the r than b y preexisting
arran gemen ts of social power. An accurate account of the balance of societal p ower,
however , must examin e how th e government condition fun ct ions in the p art icula r co ntext of race, gender, and class rela tionships.
124. See, e.g., Sulliva n , s·upra n o te 112 , at 1440-41.
125. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U .S. I (1936) (prohibiting Congress from
using its sp e nding power to purchase state compliance with federal agricultural policy)
with South Dakota v. Dol e, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholdin g cond itioning of fed era l hi ghway funds on state adopti on o f minimum drinking age); compare She rbert v. Vern er, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that de nial ofunemployment benefits to persons who refu se to
wo rk on Sa turdays for reli gious reaso ns violates th e First Amendment) with Lyng v. International Union , UAW, 485 U.S . 360 (l 988) (holdin g denial of foo d stamps to strikers
does not violate the First Amendment); compa re Arkansas Writers' Projec t, In c. v.
Ragla nd , 48 1 U.S . 221 (I 987) (striking down selective exe mpti on of specialty journals
from state taxation ) w1th Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (uphoiding selective state
subs idy of on ly childbirth, no t abo rtion, expenses) .
126. Sullivan , supra n ote 11 2, a t 1505.
127 . T h es e conflicting uses of th e doctrine contradi ct Professor Su llivan 's conclus ion
th at "(t]he doc trine occupi es a demilitarized zone b etween d ifferent substan tive theories
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Kathleen Sullivan defends the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as a useful method for identifying "a characteristic technique
by which government appears not to, but in fact does burden . . .
liberties ." 128 The state, however, appears not to burden liberties by
conditioning benefits only if we accept the premises of the action/
inaction and positive/negative rights discourse. 129 The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine explains the harm of government conditions within the constraints of this discourse; thus, abandoning the
prevailing use of these dichotomies would dispense with the need
for the doctrine altogether. 13 0 We would then face squarely the critical question ignored by the Court: How can the governmentjustify
its denial of information to people who rely on government aid? By
addressing directly the issue of dependency and the opportunity it
creates for oppressive government control of knowledge, we may
develop a stronger claim to the government's affirmative
obligations.
The Court's reliance on neutral principles to address the First
Amendment questions raised in Rust masked the regulations' violence and overlooked broader issues of social power. I have suggested the need for an alternative approach that rejects the
exclusive focus on neutrality with respect to ideas and considers the
political implications of government speech. How does this critique
sugges t a path for transformation? After explaining how Critical
Legal Studies has freed us to conceive of and to create more just
communities, Professor Anthony Cook asks a number of questions
about the task that critical scholars face:
of consti tutional law because it identifies a p owerful technique of government m a nipulation." !d. at 150 5. I do n o t believe that there is such a safe zone in constitutional theory
unaffec ted by the struggle fo r sub stantive vision. Examining techniqu es o f gove rnment
powe r is an impo rtant pa rt o f und e rstanding the politi cs of law. The unco nstitutio nalconditions doctrine , h owever, do es not en co mpass the realm o f power relationships in
which governm ent wield s those techniques.
128. /d. atl419 .
129. See Sunstein , supra note 83 (advoca ting the a bandonme m of th e unconstiwtional-conditi ons d octrin e as an antiquated co nception of the re gulatory/welfare sta te).
Sunstein suggests that we re place the doctrin e with an inquiry into "first, the na ture of
the in cursion o n the relevant right , and seco nd, the legitimacy and stre ngth of th e gove rnme nt 's justifica tion for an y such incursion ." !d. a t 620-21 ; cf. Albe rt J. Rosenthal ,
Co nditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STA N. L. REv. 1103, 1123 (19 87) (rejecting uncons titutional- conditions principl es as "far too blunt to serve as tools to separate valid from invalid co ndition al spendin g").
130. The unconstitutio nal-co nd iti ons doc trine is necessary o nl y to explain how a gove rn me nt conditio n on fu nding co uld possib ly be un constitutional when th e gove rnment
has n o o bligati o n to provi d e fundin g in th e first place. If the go vernme nt may co n stitution all y de n y th e gra nt altogeth e r, wh y sh o uld recipie nts be heard to complain abo ut a
res tricti o n ? Th e doc trin e all ows so me prot ec tion aga inst su ch governm ent interfere nce
with ri gh ts, while pres e rvin g th e trad itional view th a t the Co nstitution co nfirms n o affirm a ti ve claim to gove rnm ent su bs idies. If th e gove rnment we re required to subsidize
certain pro tened activities, h oweve r, there wo uld be n o need for a sp ecial do ctrine to
p ro hi bit govern me nt con dit io ns tha t threa te n these ac ti vities.
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How do we begin this reconstructive enterprise? What u se do we
make of our newfound liberation? If we are free to d efine collectively our existence and to transcend our present context, are we
any better equipped to act than before? How do we know that the
community to which we aspire is better than the social order we
transcend? . .. In short, what values and concerns will guide us in
this reconstructive moment?l 3I

We must move towards a theory that draws upon and cntiques
current legal jurisprudence, but does not attempt simply to fit the
experiences of Blacks and other dispossessed people into existing
legal doctrine. 132 The task is to study the form and methods of oppression and to develop legal theories that seek to end it. Stated
positively, we need a law of liberation. We will benefit in this project from studying the works of scholars of oppression and liberation, as well as progressive legal scholarship. The following three
parts explore the role that the creation of knowledge plays in the
oppression and liberation of subordinated groups. I rely primarily
on Black people's historical struggle for knowledge in America to
illustrate the relationship between knowledge and power.

III.

Oppression and the Control of Knowledge

The regulations banned from publicly funded clinics information
vital to a woman 's well-being, autonomy, and participation in the
community. From the perspective of the people most affected , the
regulations deliberately promoted ignorance among poor Black women.1 33 T hey are an example of the control of knowledge that helps
to maintain the existing structure of racial domination.
To understand the political implications of the state's promotion
131. Coo k, supra n o te 19, a t 99 1.
132 . See, e.g., Culp , supra note 5 1, at 97-99 ; Al ex M. Johnso n , Jr. , The New Voice of
Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2032 (1991 ); cf. Co ok , supra note 19 , at 101 4 (stating as to
Martin Luth er King, Jr. 's multidim e nsional critical ac tivity, that "[d]ra win g from the bes t
o f libe ralism a nd the bes t o f C hri stianity, King forge d a vision of community tha t tra nscended the limita tion s of each and built upo n th e accomplishments of bo th " ); Robe rt
Stapl es, What is Black Sociology ?, in THE DEATH or W HITE Soci OLOGY 161 , 168 Uoyce A.
Ladn er ed ., 197 3) (" If white sociol o gy is the science of oppression, Black sociol ogy must
be the science of libera tion "); C o rnel West , The Dilemma of the Black Intellectual, I CULTURAL CRITIQUE I 09 , 122 ( 198 5) (describin g the "insurgency mo d el" for Black int ell ectual work).
Dru cilla Cornell 's cautio n again st o ver-relia nce o n traditio n is releva nt to thi s tas k:
" We should not pretend th a t there is a better view of law and politics in the traditi on
than is actually ope rati ve und er eve n th e most gen e rous interpre tati o n. We mu st always
b e cl ear tha t we are bringin g o ut the po te nti al of th e might have been. " Drucill a L. Co rnell , Jnstitutionalizatzon of Meaning, Recollective h naginatzon and the Potential for Transfonnative
Legal Interpretation, 136 U . PA . L. REv . 11 35 , 120 5 n .225 (1 988) . For exampl es offemi n ist
theory that reject p atriarchal doctrine and m ethod ology , see AUDR E LoRD E, The !'viaster 's
Tools IVlll Never Dismantle the 1'vlaster's H ouse, in SISTE R OuTS IDER 110 ( 1984); MAcK INNON ,
supra n ote 63, at 32- 4 5; Bartle tt, supra n o te 63 .
133 . See supra n o tes 40-4 3 and accompanyin g tex t; see also Brief fo r th e NAACP Lega l
Defe n se and Educa ti o nal Fund, In c. , and Oth e r Organizati on s as Amici Curiae in Sup po rt
of Petitioners at 8, R ust (No s. 89-1 391 , 89-1 392) ; Massa chus e tts v. Bowe n , 6 79 F. Sup p.
137, 14 6 (D. Mass 1988) ("In its a ttem p t to impl eme nt a health ca re p o li cy which pro motes child b irth , the defen da nt has d evi sed a sys te m whi ch res ts in la rge part on keeping Title X clients in ignorance." ).
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of ignorance, it is helpful to look at theories about oppression and
the control of knowledge. The Brazilian scholar Paulo Freire illuminated the relationship between education and oppression in his
book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 134 Freire defines oppression as any
situation in which one person hinders another's pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person, thus interfering with "man's ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human." 135 The
chief preoccupation of oppressors is to prevent the oppressed from
taking steps to change their status. It is in the interest of those in
power to keep the oppressed in a state of "submerged consciousn ess," impotent to critique and transform their situation. 136 The
powerful are so afraid that critical thinking will lead to revolution
that they instinctively use any means , including physical violence, to
keep the oppressed from this enterprise. 13 7
The most critical weapon of oppressors, then, is the control of
knowledge . Those in power control knowledge in three interconnected ways: They attempt to determine social meaning; they reinforce their dominance through education; and they stifle sources of
information available to subordinated groups. These methods of
oppression may operate outside the conventional political and legal
processes. Their repressive function is not always curtailed by legal
doctrines, such as the marketplace-of-ideas and unconstitutionalconditions doctrines , which promote neutrality. The most potent
instruments of domination go unnoticed in opinions such as Rust v.
Sullivan.
A.

Socia l Meaning and Oppression

T h e most powerful mech anism for controlling knowledge functions at th e level of social meaning. This view of knowledge recognizes the inextricable bond between knowledge and power. 138 In
co ntrast to the Enlightenment claim of objective truth , this model
134. FREIRE, supra note 38.
135. fd. a t 40 -41; see a/.so MA UR ICE CORN FORTH , TH E TH EORY OF KNOWLEDGE 197 (3d
ed. 1963) (asserting that oppress ion includes den ying th e oppressed " the opportunity of
utili sing for th eir own inte res ts the knowledge and pow er whi ch ex ist in society").
136. FREIRE, supra not e 38 , at 3 7.
137 . !d. a t 146; see also BELL, supra note 2, at 221-2 2 (d iscuss in g examples of Black
leaders wh o were perse cuted because they "p lac ed a hi gh priority o n ridding bla cks of
their slave mentality") .
138. See MICHEL FoucAULT , DISC IPLINE .-\ NO PuN ISH: Tm: BIRTH OF THE PRI SON 27
( 1977) (h e re inafter , Fo ucAULT, DI SC IPLINE] ("[T]h ere is no p o \\"Cr relat io n without th e
correlative cons tituti o n o f a fi e ld o f kn ow ledge. nor any knowl edge th a t does n o t presupp ose and cons titute at the sa me time power relation s"); i'vli che1 Fouca ult , Tmth and
Power, in PowER/KNOWLED GE: SELECTED INTF:R\'IEWS .-\ND OTHER vVRITINGS 1972-1 977,
at 109 -33 (Co lin Gordon eel., 1980).
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posits that knowledge is a social construct that emerges from relationships of power. 139 Power constitutes the interpretation of reality through disciplines and institutions that permeate every aspect of
our lives. How we experience the world-our very categories of
thought-is determined by our social relationships. Thus, the regulations contributed to shaping society's understanding both of abortion and of the government's role in a way that supports existing
social arrangements. By banning the mention of abortion, they defined it as a degrading and dangerous experience. 140 They also reinforced the dominant view that poor women of color are not
capable of self-determining activity or worthy of society's support.
Those in power seek to preserve their sovereignty by creating and
enforcing definitions of social reality that maintain the current social
boundaries, excluding others from the privileges they enjoy. 141
This epistemological function operates in the minds of both the oppressor and the oppressed. The powerful invent stories that create
a shared reality in which their domination seems fair and natural. 142
As we have seen, the law is a critical aspect of ideology that obscures
the suffering of the oppressed and relieves the oppressor of his
complicity in that suffering. 14 3
The dominant culture tries to transmit this "wisdom" to
subordinated groups as they interpret their own experiences. By
teaching the oppressed the official story, those in power hope to
snuff out rebellion at its inception. The oppressed learn that the
present social arrangements are actually in their best interest and
that change is inconceivable. 144 In this way, the oppressor attempts
139. For a description of the so ciology of knowle dge, see KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOG Y
AN D UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SoCIOLOGY OF K NOWLEDGE (1936) . Its principal
thesis is tha t mode s of thought can only be understood by examining their social origins.
!d. at 2; see also CoRNFORTH, supra note 135, at 3 (describing the Marxist stud y of knowledge, which asks "how ideas actually arise, d evelop and are teste d in the co ncrete conditions of real human life, in the material life of societv").
140 . Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucduldian and Republican Approaches to
Privacy, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 861,914 (1991). For a discussion of the constitutive struggle
over abortion, see id. at 910-17.
141. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 71, at 61 (1987) (discussing feminist recognition of
the "power of naming" whi ch takes "a male as the reference po int and trea t[s] women as
. 'differe nt,' [and] 'dev iant'") ; Martha Minow , When Difference H as Its Home: Group
Homes for the 1\1entally Retarded, Equal Protection & Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV.
C. R.- C. L. L. REv. Ill , 179 ( 1987) (discussing feminist recog nition " that knowledge a nd
identity are forged in social relationships"); Peller, supra note 109, a t 1274-85 (discussing the repre sentation of social hierarchies through a la ngu age "which es tabli shes the
ca tego ries through which th e rel a tion with the social other is mediated ") ; cJ Matsuda,
Vozces, supra note 63 , at 1398 (explaining how accent is a social co nstructi on that e nforces
soc ial boundaries).
142. See Delgado, supra note 77, at 2412-13 ("The stories ... told by th e ingro up
remind it of its identity in r e lati on to ou tgro up s, a nd provide it with a form of sh ared
reality in which its own superior position is seen as natural." ).
14 3. See supra notes 62-66 and accom pan ying tex t; see also Peller, supra note l 09, at
1289 (describing lega l thou ght as a "po liti ca l act of power'' in that " it in stituti o na li zes
socially crea ted metaphors for th e repres entat ion o f so cial life ").
144 . For a d esc ripti o n of Antonio Gramsci's co nce pt of hegemony , the p revail ing
consciousness th at is internalized by th e ma sses and supports the esta bli she d order , see
C ARL BoGGS, GRAMScr's MARXISM ( 19 76). According to Gramsc i, hegemon y "en couraged a sense of fatalism and passivity toward political action; an d it justified every
type of system-serving sa crifice a nd depriva tion. In short, hegemony work ed in ma n v
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to erase from the minds of the oppressed any memory of a dignified
heritage or vision of a just future.
Am erican slavery epitomized the oppressive control of knowledge. The brutality of enslavement was not limited to physical restraint; its captive power operated in the realm of the imagination.
Slavery' s critical tool of social control was to transform the African's
identity from a human being into an object of property. Slavemasters made slaves more vulnerable to subjugation by ex tinguishing
the Africans' collective memory of liberty. 145 A Louisiana doctor,
Samuel W. Cartwright, attributed runaways to a disease of the mind
peculiar to Africans, which he called Drapetomania. 146 His cure for
Drapetomania-which included medical advice and whipping-embraced slavemasters ' need to stifle their slaves' dream of
freedom. 147
Racial ideology is the particular manifestation of the control of
knowledge to oppress Blacks in America. 148 The American psyche
holds a set of consistent beliefs about the superiority of whites and
the inferiority of Blacks that legitimate Black subjugation. Kimberle
Cre nshaw describes the hegemonic function of racist ideology embodied in an "oppositional dynamic, premised upon maintaining
Blacks as an excluded and subordinated 'other.' " 14 9 Under this
pattern of oppositional categories, whites are associated with positive characteristics (industrious, intelligent, responsible), while
Blacks are associated with the opposite negative qualities (lazy, ignorant, shiftless). 150 T he dominant society blames Blacks, rather
ways to indu ce the oppressed to accept o r 'consent' to th e ir own exploitation and daily
misery." !d. a t 40. As I exp lain in Part V , this unidim e nsio nal view of kno wledge a nd
power neglects the ways in which people use knowledge to res ist th e ir o ppress ion.
145 . Cook, supm note 19 , at I 01 5 . Th e practices of forbidding slaves from speakin g
their n ative language, prohibiting th e pra cti ce of African custom s, and separa tin g slaves
with similar backgrounds reinforc ed the brutal d e tachment from Afri ca n so cie ty. ! d. at
n.86 . See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AN D Soc iAL DEATH: A C o:vtPA RATIVE
STUDY ( 1982) (describ in g th e rituals of enslavem e nt in variou s cultures tha t co ntrib uted
to the slave's soc ial dea th). Professor Patt ers on terms th e oblite ration of sl aves' gen ealogical and cultural roo ts, " natal alienation," which created a "socially dea d p erson." ! d.
at 38 .
146. See KENNETH M. STAM PP, THF. PECULI AR IN STITUTION : SLAVERY IN THE ANTE- BE LLUM SouTH I 09 ( 1956).
14 7 . !d.
148. See RoBERT STAPLES , INTRO DUCTI ON TO BLAC K SoC IOLO GY 26 0- 6 1 ( 197 6). On the
historical deve lopm e nt of Black stereotypes, see GEORGE M. FREDRI CKSON, THE BLA CK
IMAGE IN THE W HITE ~'liND 256 -82 ( 19 7 1) (discu ss in g the propagation of theo ri es o f
Black inferiority and degen e racy at the turn of th e century) ; jOEL WILLIAMSON, T HE CRu CIBLE oF RACE: BLACK-\-YHITE RE LATIONs IN TH E AMER ICAN So uTH SI NCE EM,\NCIPATION
111-51 ( 1984) (di scussin g the prevalence of th eo ries nca r the turn of the ce ntury th at
Black s, fre ed fro m slave ry, were re turnin g to th ei r " natural st ate of bes tialit y") .
149. C rr~nshaw, supra not e 49 , at 1381; accord Lynn D. Tros t, IVes/ern .\Ie!aph)•sica! Dualism as ,in Element in Racism, in CU LTUR.-\L BASF.S OF RACISM AND GROUP OPPRESSION 49, 49 84 Uohn L. H od ge et a!. ed s., 197 5) (obs e rving the "dualistic nature· ' of ra ost beli efs ).
150. See Crensha w, supra note 49, at 1370-71 & n.151.
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than racism, for the state of the Black community. Descriptions of
the d egeneracy and disintegration of the Black family, for example,
have explained Black poverty, crime, and unemployment. 151 Popular mythology degrades Black women and has reinforced the systemic, institutionalized denial of their reproductive freedom. 15 2
These images deny the humanity of Blacks, obscuring Black pain
and the need for social change. 153
Racial ideology also operates at a deeper level. The dominant society constructs categories of thought that appear objective and divorced from race, but which operate in conjunction with racial
stereotypes to rationalize white domination. The universalist concepts of free will and meritocracy support the belief that Blacks' inequality results from their own disabilities rather than from racism. 154
Eldridge Cleaver demonstrated how the white cultural dichotomy
between reason and desire was another example of the language of
power. 155 Cleaver emphasized the particular manifestation of this
mind/body dichotomy in the "white supremacist discourse that depicted whites as rational and civilized, and blacks as irrational and
lustful." 156 White culture's sexual repression manifested its deep
fear of Black sexuality that both determined white identity and justified white domination over Blacks. 157 Cleaver's thinking suggested,
"the very definition and content of rationality itself represented an
ideology rooted in the sexual politics of race." 158
B.

Education and Oppression

Education also serves the interests of those in power. In contrast
to th e liberal view of public education as a means of social mobility,
radical educators have theoriz ed that schools function to reproduce
the dominant social structure, ideology, and culture . 159 Black scholars similarly have seen public schools as vehicles for inculcating
151. See J e well H. Gresham, White Patriarchal Sup remacy: The Politics of Family in Amenca,
NATION , ju1y 24/31, 1989 , a t 116, 11 8 -19.
152. R o berts, supra n o te 18 , at 14 3 7 (d escribin g "how several popular im ages denigrating Bl ac k mothers-th e licenti ous J ez ebel , th e ca reless , inco mp e tent m o th e r , the
domin eerin g matriarch , a nd the lazy welfare m o th e r-have reinforced and legitim at ed
their d evalu a tion" ).
153. See G resham, supra note 151, at 120 (describing the d o min a nt society 's r es istance to the co ncept of Black peopl e as "vulnerable human b e in gs") .
154. STAPLES, supra n o te 148 , at 260. See generally Cu LT URAL BASES OF RA CISM AND
GROUP OPPRESS IO N, supra n o te 14 9 (exa minin g th e co ncepts, va lues a nd structures of
traditio n a l Western culture, particul a rl y Western duali s t th o ug ht, th at support rac ism );
John 0. Ca lm o re, E.\ploring the Significance of Race and Class 111 Representing the Black Poor, 61
OR. L. R EV. 201' 207 (I 982).
155. See ELDRIDGE CLEAVE R, So uL ON IcE 155-92 ( 1968) ; j o hn L. Hodge , .\find, Body
and Soul on l ee. in CuLTURAL BASE S OF RACISM A:'\D GROUP OPPR ESSION, supra n o te 149, at
9 0 (di scu ss in g Cleaver's ana lys is o f mind-b o dv du a li s m in Western th o ught); cf Kenneth
L. Karst, Boundanes and Reasons: Freedom of E\presswn and the SubordinatiOn of Croups, 1990
U. ILL. L. REv. 95 , 107-1 25 (discu ss in g the domin an t culture's u se of the soc ia l co nstructs of Reas on and U nre ason to subordinate Blacks).
156. Pe ll er, sup ra n ote 52, at 805 (c itin g CLEAVER , supra not e 155, a t 145-7 3).
157. !d.
158. !d. (citing C LEAVER, supra n ote 155, a t 145 -73).
159 . Cu LTURAL AND EcON OMIC REPRODUCTIO :-J 1:-.: EDUC.H IO " (M ic hael W. App le e el. ,
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Black children with the dominant white world view. 160
Henry Giroux explains that schools reproduce the dominant social structure, ideology, and culture in three ways. First, schools impart to different social groups the particular knowledge and skills
they need to occupy their assigned position in the labor force, according to their class, race, and gender. 161 Jonathan Kozol's recent
report on American public schooling reveals a two-tiered system
that prepares Black children for inferior status through disparate
funding. 162 He contrasts schools in affluent suburbs that provide
1982); Henry A. Giroux, Theories of Reproductwn and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education: A Critical Analysis, 53 HARV. EDUC. REv. 257, 257-58 (1983) [hereinafter Giroux,
Reproduction in Educatwn]. Examples of the radical critique of schooling based on the
concept of reproduction of the dominant society include HENRY A. GIROUX, IDEOLOGY,
CULTURE & THE PROCESS OF SCHOOLING (1981) [he reinafter GIROUX, IDEOLOGY OF
ScHOOLING]; IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN ScHOOLING (Michael W. Apple & Lois Weis
eds., 1983). For discussions of how legal education supports existing hierarchi es of
power, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a R ace-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, II NAT'L BLACK L.j. I , 3 ( 1989) (describing th e "perspectivelessness" require d of
minority law students, who "must participate in the dis cussion as though they were not
African-American or Latino , but colorless legal analysts"); Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in
Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38]. LEGAL EDuc. 101 (1988); Duncan Kenne dy,
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy , in THE PoLITICS OF L;,_w: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40-64 (David Kairys e d., 1982).
160. See, e.g., Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The :v!anipulation of Consciousness:
A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309, 330-41 (1980);
STAPLES, supra note 148 , at 35-36.
161. Giroux, Reproduction in Education, supra note 159 , at 258. Standardized tes ting
plays an important role in tracking Black and Latino students into an educational program that limits their employment opportunities. See Arons & Lawrence, supra not e 160,
at 332-37; see also jACQUELI NE]. IRVINE , BLACK STUDE NTS AND ScHOOL FAILURE: PoLI CIES,
PRACTICES, AND PRESCRIPTIONS 9-12 ( 1990) (citing studies demonstrating that tracking
disproportionately places Black students in edu cat io nal programs that limit their
achievement). For discussions of schooling and its reproduction of gender rol es, see
Gail P. Kelly & Ann S. Nihl e n , Schooling and the Reproductwn of Patn archy: Unequal Workloads, Unequal Rewards, in CuLTURAL AND EcoNOMIC REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, supra
note 159, at 162 (examining how schools reprodu ce th e sex rol e division of labo r in
United States society); Terry N. Saario e t a l., Sex Role Staeotyping in the Public Schools, 43
HARV. Eou c. REv. 386 ( 1973) (demonstrating how elementary school books, educational
achievement tes ts, and diffe rential curricular requireme nts contribut e to sex rol e stereotyping); Linda Valli, Becoming Clerical Workers: Busmess Educatzon and the Culture of Femininity, in IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN SCHOOLING, supra note !59, at 213-34 (describing
how a high school office education progra m taught working-class g irl s a " feminin e work
identity").
For a description of h ow the publi c school mov ement reinforced class di vis ions in
nineteenth century industrial America, see jANSEN, supra note I 03 , at 155-56 (discussing
MICHAEL B. KATz, CLASS , BuREAUCRACY, AND ScHooLs: THE ILLUSION oF EDUCATIONAL
C HANGE IN AMERICA 3-55 (1971 )). Publi c schools r esocialized children of the lab oring
classes to fit the demands of industrial production , while private academ ies prepared
children of privilege for positions of leadership. !d. In 1828, th e Boston School Committee des cribed the ben efic ia l effect s of Lancasterian " manufac turi es ·· on students as
"'disposing their minds to industry, to readiness of atte ntion , and to subordination
thereby creating in early life love of order, [and] preparation for business.'" !d. (quotin g Boston School Committee).
162. See jo NAT HA N KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUA LiTIE S: C HILDRE:-.: Ii'i .-\ MERicA's ScHOO Ls
( 1991); see also Abbott v. Burke , 575 A.2d 359, 395-403 (N.J. 1990) (describing fa c tors
that contribute to the "infe ri o r qualitY of ed ucati on in poorer urban districts" in New
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wood-panelled libraries, computers, and seminar- size classes, with
overcrowded inner-city schools that offer fragmentary curriculums,
inadequate supplies, and decaying facilities. 163 For example, despite twenty-three years of court challenges, per-pupil spending in
San Antonio, Texas ranges from $2000 in the poorest districts to
$ 19,000 in the richest. 164
Second, schools attempt to reproduce the dominant culture by
transmitting and legitimating dominant forms of kn owle dge, values,
language, and style. 165 The curriculum organizes bodies of knowledge in a hierarchy subordinating information about women, people
of color, and the poor and working class. 166 T eachers reward students who mimic the linguistic style and other asp ects of th e ruling
Jers ey, including disparities in curriculum , equipme nt, and ph ys ica l faciliti es) ; Brenna B.
Mah oney, Children at Risk: The In equality of Urban Educatio n, 9 N.Y.L. Sc H. J. HuM . RTs.
161 , 165-73 (1991) (citing findin gs of re ports on inequities in the q uality o f urban educa ti on) ; Ger shon M. Ra tner, A New Legal Duty fo r Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in
Basic Skills, 63 T Ex. L. REV. 777 , 787-94 (1985) (describing the failure o f urban public
schools to provide ad equate educati o n, particularl y to p oor, min o rity students).
Th e United Sta tes Supreme Co urt h as upheld school finan cing schemes ba sed on local p rope rt y tax bases that create thes e gross disparities among schools. See San Antonio
lnd e p. Sch. Dist. v. Ro dri guez, 4 11 U .S. 1, 55 (1 9 73) (holding th a t th e T exas sch o olfinan cing sys tem did not vio late the equal pro tecti o n claus e). Sta te cons tituti o ns m ay,
however , provide a stronger claim to equal edu ca tion . See, e.g., Abb o tt v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359 , 408-10 (1990) (striking down New Jersey sch ool-aid formula as a vio lati o n of
the sta te co nstitution a nd manda ting increased fundin g for p o or distri cts); Serrano v.
Pri es t, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (h o ldin g that educa tion is a fund a mental inte rest
und er th e s tate co nstitutio n and appl yin g stri cte r scrutin y to edu ca ti o n al di sparities),
cert. denied, 4 32 U .S. 907 ( 1977). See generally J ohn E. C oo ns e t al., Educational Opportunity:
A Workable Constitutional Test fo r State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305 (1 969) (prop os in g a strict scrutiny standa rd fo r co nstituti o nal rev ie w of ed uca tional finan cing); Mahon ey , supra, at 171-96 (discussing recent sta te co urt deci sio ns strikin g down sch o ol
fin a nce sys te ms) .
163 . See Ko zo L, supra n o te 162, at 40-13 2 (comp arin g suburban a nd inner- city public
educa tion in Chi cago and New Yo rk C ity).
164. ! d. a t 223 .
165. Gi ro ux , Reproduction zn Education, supra no te 159, a t 258; see also Ro bert Dree be n ,
The Contributio n of Schooling to the Learning of Nonns, 3 7 HA RV . Eouc. REv . 2 1! ( 196 7) (a na lyzin g how the social structure of scho o ling co ntributes to th e soci alizati o n o f stud e nts).
Th e Supre me Court vie ws th e inculca ti o n o f va lues as the p rope r fun ctio n o f pu b li c
edu ca tion . Richard L. Ro e , Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Sch ools as Con ceptua!
Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1269 , 1274 (1 991 ); see, e.g. , Ha ze lwood Sch . Di st. v.
Kuhlm eie r, 484 U .S . 260 (1 988) (uph o ldin g rest ri cti ons on stud e nt speech in sch oo lspon so red ac tivities tha t contradi cts th e schoo l's bas ic educati onal missi o n); Be th el Sch.
Dist. No . 40 3 v. Frase r, 478 U .S. 675 (1986) (sa m e) . T h e Co urt 's o nl y res tric ti o ns o f
sch oo ls' in culca tion of valu es have b een limited la rgely to religi o us iss ues. Aro ns &
Lawre nce, supra no te 160 , a t 3 19; see, e.g. , Lee v. We isma n , 11 2 S. Ct. 2649 (1 992) (h o lding that th e n on-sectarian invoca tion of God at a pub lic school gra d ua tion ce rem o n v
viol ated th e Esta blishment Clau se); Wi scon sin v. Yo de r , 406 U. S. 205 (19 72 ) (req uirin g
the sta te to exe mpt Ami sh childre n fro m co mpul so ry hi gh schoo l a ttendance r ul es be cau se those rul es violated th e ri ght to free exe rci se of religio n); Sch oo l Di s t. v. Sche mpp .
374 U.S . 20 3 (196 3) (h oldin g un con stituti o nal Bi b le readin g a n d p raye r in th e
classroo m ).
166. See Giro ux, Reproduction in Education. supra n o te 159, a t 268 -69. H istory text
boo ks, for exam p le , us uall y e mph asize th e acco mp li shm ent s of whit e m en a n d mini m iz e
tho se of wo men and minority gro ups . See J os hu a Brown, Into the .\finds of Babes: .-!.Journey
Through Recent Children's H istol)' Books, 25 R.·\ DI CAL HI ST. REv. 127 ( i 98 l ). Practical
cou rses , such as indu strial arts, ass oci a te d wi th th e working clas s, are ran ked as inferior
to theo ret ica l co urses. See Giroux, Reproduclwn 111 Eduwlion, supra n ote 159. at 268.
Thu s, th e imp ortan ce of the h egem onic cu rri cu lum li es in b oth wh a t it indudes- with its em p hasis o n Wes tern hi storv, science, and so fo rt h- and
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culture and punish those who rebel. 167 Finally, schools inculcate
students with an ideology that replicates the current distribution of
power. 168 For example, knowledge acquisition is evaluated as a
matter of individual competition rather than as a collective process.
In contrasting the traditional American learning process with that of
the Amish, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder recognized the
ideological aspect of schooling:
The [public] high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments , self-distinction , competitiveness, worldly
success, and social life with other students. Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing, a life of "goodness" rather
than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge;
community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from,
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society. 169

The powerful attempt to control not only the interpretation of
existing knowledge, but also the way people approach new knowledge. We can tackle new information critically or assimilate it into
the old categories of thinking. The oppressor's sovereignty depends on how well people adapt to the prevailing order and how
little they question it. 170 Those in power therefore employ a
pedagogy designed to ensure that the oppressed absorb the dominant world view without resisting. 171 Paulo Freire describes thi s
pedagogy as the oppressive "banking" approach to education,
which merely deposits information into the brains of receiving objects, discouraging critical and creative thinking. 172 Although the
Title X regulations controlled knowledge dispensed in a clinic
wh a t it exclud es-feminist histo ry, black studies , labor hiswry, in-d epth
courses in th e a rts , and o ther forms of kno wledge important to the working
class and oth e r subordina te groups.
!d. a t 269.
167. See Arons & Lawrence , supra note 160, at 330-31 (telling th e storv of a g roup of
Bl ac k high school stud ents wh ose scho o l demand ed that they "walk a nd talk a nd wea r
th e ir clothes in a way that m ad e their white teache rs comfo rtable " ).
168 . Giro ux, Reproduclwn In Education, supra n o te 159 , a t 258; see also J ea n An yo n ,
Jl!orkers, Labor and Eco nomic His/or)', and Textbook Co rllenl, 111 IDEOLO GY AND PRA CTICE JN
SC HOOLI NG, supra note 159, at 37-60 (de monstratin g the legitimation o f pow e rful grou ps
and denial of wo rkin g cl ass ide ntity in 17 high schoo l history books ); Arons & La wren ce.
supra note 160, at 323 (presenting a First Amendm ent critique of th e practi ce of "exp os [ing] children only to valu e s and id eas that buttress th e sta tus qu o a nd legitimize th e
p os ition of th ose in p o wer") ; Ste phen E. Gottli eb , In the X ame of Patriotz. sm: The Co nstitutionality of "Bending" Histm y in Public Seconda ry Schools, 62 N.Y. U. L. R Ev . 497 ( 198 7) (p ro p os ing impl ementati o n of a fairness standard fo r public scho ol textb ooks ); cf Sara L.
Li ghtfoot, Polit1cs and Reasonmg: Through the Eyes of Teachers and Children , 43 l-L\RV. EDU C.
REv . 197 (1 973) (de m o nstratin g that th e politica l ideolo gy o f Bbck e lement ar y sch oo l
teac he rs a ffec ts their educati o nal phil osoph y and prac ti ce).
169. 40 6 U .S. at 211.
170. FR E IR E , supra no te 38, at 63.
171. See id at 60 .
17 2. !d. at 58 -66.
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rather than a classroom, they too adopted this pedagogical approach. The government deposits limited information about reproduction into the minds of poor women. Its "pedagogy," like that
described by Freire, treats women as objects to be manipulated by
government policy and not subjects who participate fully in decisions that determine the course of their lives. 17 3
C.

Oppression and the Control of Sources of Information

The regulations' most direct consequence was depriving poor women of their only source of important information about reproduction. The exclusion from sources of knowledge has played a
principal role in racial oppression in America. Criminal laws prior
to the Civil War punished anyone who taught slaves to read or write
and forbade slaves from meeting together for "mental instruction." 174 Whites were not allowed to employ slaves to set type in a
printing office or to give books or pamphlets to slaves. 175 White
slaveowners blocked the slaves' access to knowledge because they
feared that a literate Black population would be more capable of
rebellion. In his narrative, a former slave named Lewis C larke tells
why he never learned to read:
I did not dare to learn. I attempted to spell some words when a
child. One of the children of Mrs. Banton went in, and told her
that she heard Lewis spelling. Mrs. B. jumped up as though she
had been shot. "Let me ever know you to spell another word, I'll
take your heart right out of you." I had a strong desire to learn.
But it would not do to have slaves learn to read and write. They
could read the guideboards. They could write pass e s for each
other. They cannot leave the plantation on the Sabbath without a
written pass. 17 6

In 1863, Black illiteracy was over ninety-five percent; less than
150,000 of the four million emancipated slaves could read and
write. 177
173 . Th e regul a tion s did not seek to provide th e repro du ctive inform a tion wom e n
n eed to make decisions about their health. Ra th e r , like the " ba nking " p e da gogy, th e
regulations d e termined what informati o n to withh o ld fro m wo men to di sco urage th em
from taking a disapprov ed action. The " e du ca tion" provided b y clini cs under th e reg ulations was d esign e d not to promo te women 's criti ca l thinkin g, bu t to a chi eve the gov ernment's p o licy o bjectives.
174. A . LEON HIGGI NBOTHAM, JR. , IN THE MAlT ER oF CoLOR: RA CE AND THE AMERICA N LEGAL PROCESS 198 ( 1978); INTER ESTIN G (VfEM OIRS AND DOCUME1\'TS RELATING TO
AMERI CA N SLAVERY AND THE GLORI OUS STR UGG LE Now !'vl.-\KI :\G FOR C ol\t PLETE E MA NC IPATION 239-40 (1969) (herein after INTERESTI NG MEV!OIRS OF SLAVE RY). Fo r a d e sc ripti o n of the politi cal struggl e ove r sl ave lit e rac y in So uth Caro lina , see j ANET D.
C OR NELI US, " \VH EN I CA N READ MY TITLE CLEA R" : LITERACY, SLAVERY, AND RELI GIO N IN
THE ANTEBELLUM SouTH 37-58 (1991).
175 . STAMPP, supra n o te 146, at 208 .
176. INTER ESTI NG MEMOIR S OF SLAVERY, supra no te 174, a t 80. Lewi s Cl arke 's story o f
his mistress 's viol e nt oppositi o n to his lea rnin g is re m a rkabl y similar to th a t of Frederi ck
Do ugl as s tha t be ga n thi s Article. See supra text acco mpa n yin g no te I.
177. Du Bois, supra note 49, at 638. For accounts of the fiv e pe rcent o f sl ave s wh o
m a na ge d to le arn to rea d a ga inst a ll o d ds , see C ORI\ F.LI US, supra no te 174, at 59-104;
Eu GEN F: D. G EN OV ESE, RoLL , JoRDAN, RoLL: TII E WoRLD TIIF: SLAVES i\t;.o E 561- 66
(1974 ).
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After Emancipation, whites saw education for the freed slaves as
the ultimate absurdity. 178 Most white Southerners regarded publicly-funded education for Blacks at best an unjustifiable waste of
private property, given that Blacks were thought to be incapable of
learning, and at worst, a positive social danger. 179 The state-enforced peonage system that confined Black laborers to poor-paying,
menial occupations relied on keeping Blacks ignorant and disorganized.180 The typical sentiment was reflected in the expression,
"schooling ruins a nigger." 181
Southern whites violently opposed early efforts to educate Blacks
and considered teaching Blacks to be an act of treason again st the
white race. Throughout the South, teachers in Negro schools were
assaulted and threatened with death and schoolhouses were
burned. 182 " 'Nigger teachers' was one of the most opprobrious epithets that the Southern vocabulary furnished." 183 Officials sought
to conciliate whites by closing schools for Blacks, 184 and some Black
schools remained open only with military protection. 185 W.E.B. Du
Bois captured Southern animosity to Black education in the followmg passage:
The opposition to Negro education in the South was at first bitte r,
and showed itself in as hes , insult and blood; for the South believed an educated Negro to be a dangerous Negro. And the
South was not wholly wrong; for edu ca tion among all kinds of
men always has had , and will always have, an element of d an ger
and revo lution , of dissatisfaction and di scontent. Neverth eless,
men strive to know. 186
17 8. See D u Bois, supra not e 49, at 637-48. The rem a r ks of a white memb er of th e
re sto r e d Lou isia na legislature, upo n p ass ing on e o f th e schools esta blish ed by th e
Freedman's Burea u in New Orleans, reflects thi s view of Black learning: " ' Is this a
school?' 'Yes,' was th e reply. ' What, for niggers ) ' 'Ev identl y.' He threw up his hands.
'Well , well,' h e sa id , ' I have se e n manv an a bsurditv in m v life time, but th1s Is the cit max-'· ··
!d. at 637 (quoting J.J. Alvord, in R~PORT OF jo{NT CoMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION,
39th Co n g., 1s t Sess. 247 ( 1866)).
179. !d. a t 637 - 48.
180 . ALLEN B. BALLARD, THE EDUCATION OF BLACK FOL K: THE AF RO -A~!ER IC At\
STRUGGLE FOR K~OWLEDGE IN WHITE AMERICA 12-1 3 (197 3); DuBOIS, supra not e 49, at
696-97.
18 1. D u BoiS, supra note 49, at 645.
182. Id at 646 .
183. !d. at645 -4 6. For an account of th e Ku Klux Klan's intimidation o f teachers and
supporters of Blac k sc hoo ls, see They ll'ould :Vot Let L's Haue Schoo ls, 111 BucK WOMEN IN
WHITE Al\IERI CA: A Do cuM ENTARY HI STORY 11 2 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1973).
184. In 1862, for exa mple, Edwa rd Stan ley, th e pro visi ona l g overn or of North Carolin a, closed a Neg r o schoo l in New Bern on the grounds that his mi ss io n \,·a s to res tore
th e o ld lega l order, whi ch forbad e teaching slaves to rea d and write. D u Bois, supm note
49, a t 638 .
185. Id at 6-!G -47 .
186. W .E.B. DL· Bors , The Souls of Black Folk. 111 W.E.B. D u Bois: WRITINGS 357 -54 8
(1 986)
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D.

The Symbolic Significance of Exclusion from Knowledge

The exclusion of the oppressed from knowledge also has symbolic
significance: It serves as a powerful emblem of their inferior status.
The denial of education was more than a reflection of stereotypes
about Blacks' lack of intelligence or an instrument of subordination;
it was the most powerful reminder of the hierarchical relationship
between Blacks and whites. I believe it is this metaphoric role of
ignorance that best explains the violent opposition of Southern
whites to the efforts of the newly freed slaves to acquire an education. Whites resented Black attempts at schooling so bitterly, because they saw it as an effort by Blacks to become their equals. 18 7
Education, more than any advance made by Blacks, represented a
threat to the racial prerogatives of all whites. Indeed, whites were
more hostile to the establishment of schools for freed slaves than to
Black ownership of land. 188 While white laborers received an education inferior to the private schooling of wealthy whites, it was imperative that Blacks remained at the bottom of the hierarchy of
knowledge. 189 Thus, a Southern Congressman declared in a
speech: "Woe be unto the political party which shall declare to the
toiling yeoman, the honest laboring poor of this country, 'Your children are no better than a Negro's.' " 19 0
The Supreme Court in Brown held that de jure segregation of
schools was unconstitutional not only because of the tangible inferiority of colored schools, but because of its message of subordination. 191 Segregated education did more than separate Black
children from white children; it served to define Blacks as inferior
and to exclude them from social participation. 192 The opinion in
B-rown recognized one aspect of the symbolic exclusion created by
segregation: Separation generated in the minds of Black schoolchildren "a fe eling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be und one." 193 It is true that the Court's focus on the p sychological injury of racial separation failed to address the institutional function
o f segrega tion and led to an inadequate integrationist rem e dy. 194
18 7. Du Bms, supra note 49 , at 645 .
188 . !d. a t 647. Ev e n som e whites who supporte d the ab o lition o f s lav ery a nd parti cip a ted in th e Fre edm a n 's Aid Soc ieties to provide th e freed s laves with fo od a nd clothin g
\Ve re unwillin g to coo p e rate in any m o ve ment to educat e th e Bla ck co mmunitv. !d. at
6 4 6.
18 9. See id. a t66 3.
19 0. !d.
191 . Brown v. Bo a rd of Edu c. , 347 U .S. 483, 4 9 4 (1954 ).
192. !d.; C h a rles R. Lawren ce III, "One ,\.fore R iver to Cross "-Recogn i: zng th e Real hiJW )'
m Bro wn: .~Pre requis i te to Sh aping Ne w R emedies, in SHADES OF BROWN. supra n o te 50, at 4 8,
50 -54 [h e reina fter Lawre nce, The Real 111JU? )' in Bro wn]; C h a rles R . La wren ce III, If He
Hollers Let Hi m Go: R egulatzng R aw t Speech on Camp us, 1990 DUKE L.J. 43 1, 4 39- 4 0 (interpreting se g r egated edu cation as speech and Brown as th e rejection o f its m e ssa ge th a t
"bl ac k childre n are an untou chable cast e" ).
193 . Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
!94 . See DER RICK BELL, Th e Chro nicle cf the Sacrificed Black Schoo!chitdren. 111 AND \NE ARE
N oT S AVED: T HE EL USI VE Q.u EST FOR RACIALjusTI CE 107-118 (19 8 7) (discus s in g an a lte rn a ti ve edu ca tiona l po lic y th a t e mph as izes Bla ck co ntrol ove r its o wn s ch oo l fu n d s and
ad minis tra ti o n ra th e r th a n pu p il deseg r ega tion); HAROLD C RUS E, PLUR AL BUT EQU.-\L: A
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Yet the Brown decision stands as a landmark in constitutional jurisprudence because the Court identified the connection between educational exclusion and racial domination. The Court in Rust,
however, failed to see the symbolic significance of excluding millions of poor women from knowledge deemed essential to the
health and autonomy of the privileged. This form of exclusion,
more than any other, reinforces their inferior status and signifies
society's disregard for their humanity. In the following Part, I will
discuss how this exclusion is related to dependency on government
funds.

IV.
A.

Knowledge and Dependency

Government Gratuities and the Meaning of Dependency

In his groundbreaking article, The New Property, 195 Charles Reich
described a critical feature of the dominant conception of government aid, which he termed the "gratuity principle." 196 This principle holds that because "[g]overnment largess has often been
considered a 'gratuity' furnished by the state[,] ... the state can
withhold, grant, or revoke the largess at its pleasure." 197 The gratuity principle accords to government in its role as dispenser of public
funds the same status as a private giver. The recipients hold this
wealth conditionally rather than absolutely, subject to confiscation
by the state. 198 The gratuity principle thus creates a feudal relationship between the government and grantees: "Just as the feudal system linked lord and vassal though a system of mutual dependence,
obligation, and loyalty, so government largess binds man to the
state." 199
CRITICAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND MINORITIES AND AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY 244-57
( 1987) (criticizing the NAACP's advocacy of public school integration rather than local
control of schools); Lawrence, The Real!ryury in Brown, supra note 192, at 56-62 (arguing
that the simple reassignment of pupils, teachers, and administrators ignores the systemic
nature of segregation).
195. Reich, supra note 84.
196. !d. at 740.
197. !d.; see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Demzse of the Rzght-Privilege Dzstinctzon 111
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1440 (1968) (critiquing Justice Holmes's distinction between constitutionally protected rights of private citizens and unprotected
government-granted privileges) .
198. Reich, supra note 84, at 770; see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U .S. 587, 604-05
( 1987) ("Congress is not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, bound
to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit level.").
199. Reich, supra note 84, at 769-70. For another perspective on the relationship
bet\veen dependent people and the modern welfare state, see JoEL F. HANDLER, TJIF.
CoNDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AuTONOMY, CoM~v!UNITY, BuREAUCRACY ( 1986), and Handler, supra note 111. Professor Handler proposes a cooperative, dialogic model of
agency and client decisionmaking that preserves autonomy and dignity rather than
domination.

1993]

627

The gratuitous nature of state assistance to the poo r is an important feature of oppression. Paulo Freire explained how sta te aid in
the context of oppression always manifests itself in a false generosity: It never goes beyond the oppressor's "attempt to 'soften' [its]
power ... in deference to the weakness of the oppressed." 200 The
government's charity does not change the underlying power structure that sustains and justifies the state's mercy. Rather, "[a]n unjust social order is the permanent fount of this 'generosity', which is
nourished by death, despair, and poverty." 201 Freire distinguished
this false generosity of oppression with the true generosity that enables liberation: "True generosity consists precisely in fighting to
destroy the causes which nourish false charity." 2 0 2
The dependent status of the poor in America is reinforced by an
ideology th<J.t separates and stigmatizes them as morally weak and
"different from us." 20 3 Recent discourse increasingly has attributed
the problems of the poor to their own behavior and has based pove rty reform on correcting their social deviance through programs
such as workfare-requiring welfare recipients to work for their
benefits-aDd mandatory paternity laws. 204 The rhetoric of poverty
categorizes people who receive government aid as either "deserving" or "undeserving." 20 5 The deserving are considered entitled to
government assistance either because their impoverished condition
r esulted from forces beyond their control or because they earned
b enefits through previous work. 206 The undeserving, on the other
hand, have no claim to public funds because they are considered
res ponsible for their plight. 207 Thus, the public views disaster relief,
di sability benefits, and social security as entitlements, while it views
welfare as charity. 2 0 8
200. F REIRE, supra no te 38 , a t 28-29 .
201. !d.
202. !d.
20 3. See Ross, supra no te 66 , a t 1502-03 (describin g th e rh e toric of poverty in Am e rica n culture and Suprem e Co urt decisions).
204. See Martha L. Fin e m a n , Images of ;VIothers m Poverty Discourses, 1991 DuKE L.j. 274 ,
277- 85 (discussing pove rt y r efo rm discourse as appli e d to sin gle mothers): Lu cy A. Willia m s, The Ideology of Dz vision: Behavior l'vfodification Welfare Reform Proposals, l 02 YA LE LJ.
71 9 ( 1992) (criticizin g rece nt we lfare reform initiatives tha t foc u s on the d ev ia nce o f th e
p oo r).
20 5. See M 1cHAEL B . KATZ, TH E UN DESERVI NG Po o R: FR OM THE \VAR o :--~ PovERTY TO
TH E WAR ON WELFAR E 9-1 6 (1989).
Fo r another 3nal ys is o f d e p e nd e n cy in the cont e xt o f th e Rust d e ci sio n. see Wen dy E.
Pa rm e t & Mary E. O 'Co nn e ll , G ag-Rules and Gra tuiti es : Wh y R ust Won't Go Awav (un publish e d paper on fil e with th e author). The auth o r s arg u e that the main fu nc ti o n o f
th e id eological distincti o n b e tw een earned and un ea rn ed bene fits is to "insulate[ ] all o f
us fr o m a recognition o f th e d e pth of our own dep e nd en ce o n government , or th e n eces sit y o f the welfare sta te." ! d. a t 14.
20 6. Parmet & O' Co nn e ll , supra note 205 , at 14-1 5.
207 . fd at J4.
208 . See, e.g , J e ffe rs o n v. H ackne y, 406 U .S. 535, 549 (1 972) (uph o ld in g we lfare
sche m e that distm gUi sh ecl b e tw een undeservm g, abl e -bo d1 ed poo r , and d ese rvm g , dJ sa bl ed, a nd aged poo r); cf. Willi a m H. Simon , Rights and Redistrib ution in the f!'elfare System,
38 STAN . L. RE V· 143 1, 15 16 (1 986) (describing th e New Co ntrac t ve rs io n of priva te law
welfar e juri spruden ce whi ch "acco rds the high es t and most sec ure statu s to no mi na ll y
priva te we alth, such as pe n sio n s, the second hi ghes t to soc ial m surance , an d th e lowes t
to p u bli c assistance" ).
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Black women on welfare are considered "undeserving" because
of both their race and their gender. Blacks have experienced the
precarious state of dependence more than any group in America-a
condition Patricia Williams describes as "defining blacks as those
who ha[ ve] no will ." 20 9 As slaves, they were deemed chattel owned
by others with virtually no protection by the law. T heir physical and
mental well-being-indeed their very lives-were subject to the
whim of white masters , as well as the brutality imposed by law. 2 10
Slavery inflicted , in addition to individual white masters ' violence ,
the terrorism of th e entire state. Because Blacks remain subordinate
to whites in many ways-for example, many Blacks' dependency on
the welfare system for survival-Black nationalist scholars have
characterized the modern Black experience as a form of domes tic
colonialism. 2 11 Poor Black women 's reliance on government welfare
makes them particularly vulnerable to government control of their
reprodu ctive decisions. 212 T he popular mythology about the social
degen eracy of Blacks and the causes of th eir poverty places th e po or
Black community within the "undeserving" category of the poor. 2 13

2 09 . See PATRI CIA]. WILLIAMS , On Being the Object of Property, in T HE A LCHEMY OF RACE
AN D R IGHTS 2 16, 219 ( 199 1).
210. See Pa tricia J. Willi a ms, Alchemical Notes: Recons tructing Ideals from Deconstmcted
Rzghts, 2 2 HA RV. C.R.- C. L. L. REv. 40 I , 421 (198 7 ). See generally GE NOVESE , supra n ote
177, at 3 - 49 (discussin g th e patern a li sm o f slavery an d the hege m on ic functi o n of sla ve
la w); STA MPP, supra n o te 146, a t 14 1-9 1 (d escribin g th e ways in whi ch m a ste r s co n tr o lled
th e i1· s laves); id. at 192 -236 (dis cu ss ing the legal e nfo rce ment o f white d o min a ti o n o f
s laves). Alan Watso n co n cl udes th a t " in E nglish America on e mi g h t a lm os t say th a t a
slave b e longed to every citi ze n-at leas t h e was su bord ina te to ever y white. " ALAN W .\TSON, S LAVE LAw IN TH E A MERICAS 6 6 (1 98 9). Und er th e Fugitive Sla ve Act of 17 93 , for
e xampl e, even if a s la ve m a naged to escape his m as te r , he was s u bj ec t to captu re bv
a n vo n e. See STAM PP, supra no te 146, at 153. Free Bl ac ks in th e Nort h and So uth we re
a lso subo rdin a te d b v law. See IR A B ERLI N, SLW ES WITH OUT MASTERS 336-40 ( 197 4 ) (d iscu ss in g d e n ia l o f the r ig hts of fr ee Bl ac ks in th e So u th ); LE ON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF
SLAVERY : THE N EGR O IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1 860 , a t 6 4-18 6 (1 96 1) (discu ss in g p o litical, edu cat io n a l, and eco n o mic repressio n against Blac ks in th e free s ta tes). R obi n We st
a rgu es th at it is pre cisely thi s "dua l sove re ig nt y" wh ic h the Fourt ee n t h Am e ndm e nt was
intend ed to abo li s h. See Ro b in W est , Toward an .-J bolitzonzst l ntnpretation of the Fourteenth
.·Jmendment. 94 W . VA . L. R Ev. 111 , 132 (1 99 1) .
211. See. e.g., R oBERT BuuN ER, RAC IAL OPPR ESS ION IN AMER ICA 83 -89 (19 72) (explainin g th e fo ur bas ic co m po nents o f co lo nizati o n and h o w th e expe ri e nce o f th e A merican co mm u nities fit s within these); I-1.-'. ROLD CRU SE, R EB ELI.ION OR R EVOLUTION) 76-77
(1 968) (declaring that " the A meri ca n Neg r o h as ex is te d a s a co lo ni a l bein g" from the
beginnin g, and th a t "t h e on ly fac to r whi ch diffe re nti a tes th e Negro's s ta tu s fr om th a t of
a pure colon ia l s ta tu s is th a t hi s p os it io n is m a inta ined
in close pro ximit v to th e
do min a n t racia l g r o up " ).
212. See Robe rts, supra no te 18, a t 1432 -3 6, 144 0 - 44 , 1457 n.l 9 7 (di scus sin g the vulnerabilit y of poor Bl ac k wo men to prosec ution fo r d ru g use dunn g pre gnan cv, s te rilizati o n a bu se , forc ed cesarian sec ti o n s, and re mo va l of the ir childre n for n eglect d u e to lhc
fac t th a t the ir assoc ia ti on s with welfa re age nc ies p lace th e m un der g r ea te r governme nt
supe r vis iOn).
2 13 . See K.-'.TZ , supra no te 16 1, at 23 -29 ; supra notes 148 -53 a n d acco mp a n ying tex t.
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The distinction between deserving and undeserving poor is constructed according to gender, as well as race. 214 Men are entitled to
compensation by social insurance programs for their prior participation in the labor force, while women-especially single mothersare treated as dependent clients of the welfare system. 215 As unpaid
caregivers, many women lack the relationship to the work force necessary to entitle them to benefits. In addition, society blames them
for perpetuating poverty by deviating from the norm of marriage to
a male breadwinner.2I6
This categorization of those who receive government assistance
profoundly affects the way we view dependency. Because social welfare programs are based on mere altruism, rather than any sense of
collective obligation, it is likely that in times of economic hardship
the "undeserving poor" will lose what meager support they have. 217
Dependency on the part of the "undeserving" has come to signify a
lack of entitlement to the basic conditions of human dignity and
membership in society. The current ideology of poverty, race, and
gender links this form of reliance on the government with the forfeiture of a claim to constitutional protection. 218 Our society does not
recognize any i~ury in violating the autonomy of the propertyless.
It tolerates laws such as the regulations at issue because it cannot
imagine poor Black women as self-determining people, seeing them
as having no will.
B.

Dependency and the Constitutional Role of Property

The preceding view of dependent people is a corollary of the
Constitution's protection of property. The Court in Rust appeared
to conceptualize speech rights as individual property, which could
be owned by citizens or the government. 219 The government essentially owned the knowledge at issue in Rust because it paid the salaries of the doctors who dispensed it. Accordingly, the Court was
214. See Fineman, supra note 204, at 283-84: NANCY FRASER, Women, Welfare, and the
Politics of Need Interpretation, in UNRULY PRACTICES: PowER, DiscouRSE, AND GENDER IN
CoNTEMPORARY SociAL THEORY 144 (1989).
215. See Fraser, supra note 214, at 151-53.
216. See Fineman, supra note 204, at 289-93 (linking the view of single motherhood as
pathological to patriarchal ideology). I would add to Professor Fineman's identification
of patriarchy in the images of single mothers in current poverty discourse, the racist
devaluation of Black mothers. See supra note 152.
217. See Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racwl Politzcs: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Argwnents on Behalf of the A'onwhite Underclass, 78 CEo. LJ. 1929, 1936 ( 1990). Two examples of the weakening of altruistic suppon for the poor are the recent termination of the
Michigan general assistance welfare program and the passage of legislation in New
Jersey denying additional benefits to children born to women on welfare. See Wayne
King, Florio Signs an Overhaul of H'elfare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at B 1 (discussing Nevv"
Jersey legislation); Don Terry, To A.void Deficit, ;\ifichigan Ends IVelfare to Some Adults, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at AI.
218. Not all forms of reliance on government funds entail this forfeiture of freedom.
Our society views the millions of Americans who receive social security, Medicare, tax
deductions, and other "earned" benefits as fully entitled to constitutional protection.
See Parrnet & O'Connell, supra note 205, at 5-ll (discussing the ways in which "we are
all recipients of government subsidies"). It is only the "undeserving" recipients of government charity who have lost their claim to self-determination.
219. See Balkin, supra note 102, at 401 (observing that access to forums depends on
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able to deny poor women this knowledge because they lacked any
property right on which to base a claim. Once the government established its claim to ownership of the speech, it won the right to
restrict its use.22o
The legal institution of property occupies a critical position in
both liberal and republican constitutionalism. The interest in protecting private property structured the Constitution's concept of individual rights, as well as the limits of republican participation. 221
Liberalism views property ownership both as the object of affirmative government protection and as the shield from government
abuse. 222 The centrality of private property in liberal thought
originates in the Lockean view of human nature governed by perfect

th e state's enforcement of its own private property rights) ; cf Rand E. Rosenblatt , Legal
Entitlement and Welfare Benefits, in THE PoLITI CS OF LAw: A PROGR ES SIVE CRITIQUE, supra
not e 159, a t 262, 266-67 (discussing the "metaphor of private ownership") ; PATRICIA J.
WILLIAM S, Gilded Lilies and Liberal Guill, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RI GHTS, supra note
209 , at 15 , 35 (discussing the "notion of privately purchased public rights"). For a critique of the view of rights as a kind of individual property, see Staughto n Lynd , Communal Rzghts, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417, 1423-24 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Govern men t Co ntrol ol
Infomzation, 74 CAL. L. REv. 889, 916-18 ( 198 6) (rejecting pro perty-based n ot ion s of inform a tion ownership as justifying broad re stricti o ns o n speech by government
employees) .
220. The Rust Court's treatm e nt of speech as government propert y is reminiscent of
the Co urt's ratio nale nearly a century a go in Davis v. Mas sachusetts , !67 U.S. 43 (! 89 7),
whi ch upheld a Bosto n ordinan ce banning any public addres s on public g rounds without
a p e rmit. Th e Court adopted th e reas onin g of Oliver Wend all Holm es, th e n-Justi ce of
th e Mas sachus e tts Supreme Judicial Court: " 'Fo r th e legisla ture absolutely or conclitiona ll y to forbid pubiic speaking in a highway or public park is n o more an infringemen t
of the rights of a member of the publi c than for the owner o f a priva te h o use to fo rb id it
in hi s h o use.' " !d. a t 47 (quoting Commonwea lth v. Davis, 39 N .E . 11 3 (Mass. 1895)).
The Supre me Co urt rejected this vi ew forty years lat er in Hagu e v. Committee for Industrial Organiza tion, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (19 39) ("Wherever the titl e of streets a nd parks
m ay rest , the y h ave immemoriall y been held in trust for th e use of the public."). But sre
Add e rley v. Fl o rida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (196 6) (upholding state's d enial of access to jail
entrance a nd driveway fo r student d e mons trati on: " The s ta te , no less th an a priva te
owner of property, has power to pre serve the pro perty und er its co ntro l for the use to
whi ch it is lawfullv dedicated.").
22 1. For an e x~minati o n of America's property-based trad itio n o f co nstitution alis m ,
a ttri b uted primaril y to james Madison , se e jEN NIFER NEDELSKY , PRIVATE PR OPERTY AND
THE LEviiTS OF AMER ICA N C ONSTITUTIONA LI SM : THE MADISONIAN FR AMEWORK AND ITS
LE GACY 141-202 (1 990). Professor Nedelsky argues th a t th e original focus on prope rt y
crea ted a Co nst ituti on structured a rou nd in e qu a lit y by n eglec tin g iss u es o f popular partici pa tion in gov ernment and the rel a tionship be tw ee n ec ono mi c and politi ca l power.
Th e Madiso ni an C ons tituti o n favors civil ri g hts ove r political rights as a means of securing prope rt y from the republican threa t of the propertvless majori tv. "Fo r the Frarners.
th e p rot ec tion o f prop ert y meant th e prote ction o f unequal pro pert y and thu s the in s ulation o f both pro perty and inequality from democrati c tran sformat ion .· · !d. at 2. For a
con servative d efens e of th e primac y of constitutional pro pert y ri ghts as the g uarantee of
pol it ica l liberty , sec jAMES W. ELY, JR ., Ttl £ GuARD L\!\ OF EvERY OTHER RIGHT: A C o!\ STITUTI ONAL HI STORY OF PR OP ERTY RIGHTS ( 1992) .
222. See Rei ch, sujmz n ote 84 , a t 779.
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freedom and equality to appropriate private property. 223 Traditional liberal theory excludes the poor by making no provision for
the actual realization of their choices. The liberal connection between property and freedom ultimately dehumanizes those without
property: "Locke objectifies the propertyless as 'things' to be managed and controlled by the state, as mere means to the
propertyholders' end of happiness."2 24
Charles Reich used property's integral role in our constitutional
system of individual rights as the basis for his redistributive
claims .225 Private property affords individuals an essential base
from which to assert their individuality and claim their rights. Because private property largely has been replaced by government largess and no longer can perform its protective function, Reich
argued, society must recognize "New Property" private rights to
public funds: "Only by making such benefits rights can the welfare
state achieve its goal of providing a secure minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity in a society where each man cannot be
wholly the master of his own destiny. " 226
Civic participation, the foundation of republicanism, also depends
on material security. Only citizens who owned property were considered authentic members of the community capable of independent deliberation about the common good. 227 The best suited to
govern were, in James Madison's words, " 'men of intelligence, patriotism, property and independent circumstances.' " 228 Classic republicanism considered the poor to be corrupt because they are
subject to the will of another for existence; the dispossessed, therefore, were excluded from the public dialogue. 229 T he republican revival has sugges ted instead that the connection between property
2 23 . C ook , supra no te 19 , a t 99 3 -9 6 ; C RAWFOR D B. MACPHER SON , TH E PoLITICAL THEORY OF POSS ES SIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBB ES TO LOC KE 3 ( 1964); see also j o hann a Bre nn er,
Fem inist Politica l Discourses: Radical Versus Liberal Approaches to the Femini:at10n of Poverty and
Co mparable Worth, 1 G EN DER & So c' y 447 ,44 8 (198 7) (o bse rvin g that under lib e ral p o litical th o ught e quality is equa l opp o rtunit y, and " fa irne ss exists when th e distributi o n of
individuals within un equal pos iti ons refl ec ts th eir indi vidua l qua lities") .
2 24. Cook , supra no te 19, at 9 95; see also FR EIRE , supra note 38 , a t 136 (including
a mon g the oppress o r's indisp ensabl e myths "the m yth o f privat e prop e rty as fundam ental to pe rsona l hum an develo pm e n t, (so lo ng as o ppresso rs a re th e o nl y tr ue huma n
be in gs)").
225 . See Re ich, supra not e 84, a t 771-7 8 .
2 26 . !d. at 78 5. Fo r a criti q ue of usin g New Pro pe rt y rights, rath e r than need , as a
bas is fo r wel fare refo rm , see Sim o n , supra n o te 208 , at 1486-5 15; Sim o n . wpra no te 17,
a t 23- 37 . Pro fes sor Simon a rg ues th a t th e New Property is antiredistri b utive be cau se it
prov id es no bas is to challen ge th e co nfli ctin g cl ai m s of o ld p ro pert y r ig ht s, a nd it d isco urages coll ec ti ve ac tio n b y th e p oo r.
227. Frank I. Mi che lman , Possessio n vs. Distnlmtlon zn the Constltu t/Onal ldea of Property, 72
10\VA L. REv. 13 19 , 1328-2 9 ( 198 7 ) (s u ggest in g reaso n s fo r th e o ri g ina l foc us o n pro pe rt y as the o bj ect of co ns tituti o na li zed priva te rig hts).
22 8 . NED ELSKY, mpra no te 221, a t 51 (qu o tin g J ame s i'vla dis o n lett e r to Th o mas J e ffe rso n , 5 l!'ritzngs 6 6 (Dec. 9 , 17 8 7)).
22 9 . See Akhil R . Amar , Forty .-l cres and a Jl ule. ,-1 Republican Theo1y of ;\ /inimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB . Po r.'v 3 7 , 38 ( 199 0); De rrick Bell & Preeta Ba nsal , The R ep ubllwn Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 , 16 12 & n.12 ( 1988); Lind a K. Ke rbe r ,
M ak ing Republican ism Useful, 97 YAL E L.J 1663, 1665 ( 1988) (" [T ]h e abse n ce o f th e d e pend en t cla sses-defined by race, ge nder. and pro perty-was essential to th e re publi ca n
view o f the wo rld , no t an eas il y co r rectabl e acc id e nt. ") . But see l'vli ch e lrnan , supra no te
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and political participation requires redistribution of wealth to provide individuals with the material prerequisites of civic virtue. 230
For liberals, property is the barrier that protects the private
sphere of individual liberty from the reach of government power.
For republicans, property is the assurance of independence that enables civic engagement. Both theories concerning the constitutional
role of property demonstrate how dependence on government aid,
viewed as mere charity, places human freedom in peril. 231

C.

Dependency and the Control of Knowledge

The state's false generosity and the dependency it fosters combine with the control of knowledge to perpetuate hierarchies of
power. The gratuitous nature of government aid ensures continued
dependency on the government, which, in turn, allows the state
greater control over what knowledge is made available to dispossessed communities. Government charity merely placates the poor,
rather than providing the knowledge and other resources necessary
to change their status. Freire explains, "[i]ndeed, the interests of
the oppressors lie in 'changing the consciousness of the oppressed,
not the situation which oppresses them'; for the more the oppressed
can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be
dominated. " 232
The interdependence of discourse and material depend ency reminds us that power does violence to both the body and the mind.

227, at 1332-34 (arguing that the founders' focus on possessive property rights reflected
a democratically inclusive republican conception given the country's economic and social circumstances of "a modest proprietary competence lying within reach of all"). Of
course, Michelman's "all" does not include Black slaves who did not share the real possibility of property ownership.
230. See, e.g., A mar, supra note 229; Michelman, supra note 227, at 1330-50; Frank I.
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1981).
231. The embrace of the link between inclusion and property by both liberal and
republican scholars demonstrates how deeply it is embedded in American culture. See,
e.g., Amar, supra note 229, at 37 (arguing that socialism, in which the state controls all
resources, is incompatible with individual liberty and democracy because "the citizen
would have no ground of her own on which to stand, to define herself, and to resist
government tyranny"); Charles A. Reich, Commentary, 100 YALE L.J. 1465, 1468 (1991)
(arguing that "the idea of a propertyless people in a democratic society" is unacceptable). For a discussion of the "mythic power of property" in American society, see
NEDELSKY, supra note 221, at 246-50. Nedelsky attributes the enduring force of property
in American constitutionalism to a deeply embedded "psychological" belief that "property rights bear a special relation to liberty." !d. at 250.
232. FREIRE, supra note 38, at 60 (quoting SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, LA PENSEE DE
DROITE, AujORD'Hui ( 1908)). This dual control reinforces society's dehumanizing image
of the oppressed. See id. at 45 (stating that "the more the oppressors control th e oppressed, the more they change them into apparently inanimate 'things'").
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Although ideology is a powerful instrument of domination, domination is grounded in more than ideology. 233 It has a material foundation that often leaves the dispossessed at the mercy of those with
money and status. The metaphysical aspects of power/knowledge
do not entirely explain the subordination of poor women of color.
They lack reproductive autonomy not only because of the ideological construction of dependency and opposition to abortion, but also
because their material conditions place concrete barriers in their
way. Their poverty prevents them from paying for the information
they need; their dependency on the government makes them especially vulnerable to the government's antiabortion message.
T hese coordinated tools of power are at work in the Rust decision.
The Court held in Rust that poor women of color are not entitled to
knowledge that the rest of society deserves. 234 It reasoned that their
constitutional entitlement is to rely on the conditional generosity of
the state, rather than to change the material conditions of their
lives. 235 The Rust decision keeps these women in a state of ignorance that makes it more likely that they will adapt to social control
of their reproduction. Both methods-the state's false generosity
and the promotion of ignorance-serve to entrench the poor Black
community further into the structure of oppression.

V

Knowledge and Liberation

The relationship between knowledge and power is not unidimensional. Knowledge is not merely an instrument of domination; it
can also be a liberating force, a means of human freedom. 236 While
the powerful use knowledge to dominate, the oppressed use knowle d ge to survive, resist, and gain power. Knowledge, then, is not created exclusively by the powerful and imposed from above. It is a
contested terrain in which members of society struggle to determine
the meaning of social events and relations. Thus, the connection
between power and knowledge contains the seeds of both repression and emancipation. 2 37
233. See Cook, supra note 19, at 992 (recognizing that subordinated people may be
"limited by th e existential constraints of enslavement, aparth eid, intimidation, or po verty that make meaningful social struggle difficult if not impossible "); see also Giroux,
Reproduction m Educatzon, supra note 159, at 273 (discussing the concrete constraints on
working class students as to academic freedom and privileges); Matsuda, Voices, supra
note 63, at 1399 (describing the material and ideological dimensions of accent
discrimination).
234. Rust v. Sullivan, IllS. Ct. 1759, 1766-71 (1991).
235. See id. at 1768-69 (stating that Title X patients were not entitled to government
funding of abortion counseling).
236. See PATRICIA H. CoLLINS, BLACK FEMI NIST THO UGHT 221 ( 1991) (discussing
"Black women' s em e rgin g power as age nts of knowledge"); CORNFORTH, supra n o te 135,
at 189 ("[M)en are free not when their actions take place without causes but wh en th eir
ac tions are determined by th eir knowl ed ge of their own r eq uirements and h o w to realise
them.").

237. See JANSEN, supra not e 103 , at 7; cf Karst, supra note 155, a t 109 (observing that
freedom of expression "is a mixed bl ess in g" for subordinated groups because it is part
of th e system of domination but also necessary for emancipation). Nor is th e other half
o f th e relationship-power-a unita ry concept. Power is also a human ca p acity that may
be used to maintain oppressive institutions or to create more egalitarian ones. Black
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The oppressed use knowledge in several ways. First, their observations of the oppressor's use of knowledge to secure power helps
them to negotiate their own mechanisms for survival. 238 The oppressed are not completely fooled by the official story. Their knowledge of how the system really operates, acquired from their own
experience of enduring poverty and subordination, becomes a critical weapon of resistance. 239
Second, the oppressed create their own counter-stories that resist
and subvert the dominant version of reality. The oppressed have
always known that their "[s]tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset. " 240 Indeed, they
appropriate for their own purposes the very ideologies intended to
oppress them. For example, African slaves reinterpreted conservative Christianity as an affirmation of their humanity and a call to revolutionary action. 241 Far from understanding the Bible as a
feminist writers have stressed this alternative vision of power. See, e.g. , CoLLINS , supra
note 236, at 224 (distinguishing between power as domination and power "based on a
humanist vision of self-actualization , self-definition, and self-determination"); BELL
HOOKS, Changing Perspectives on Power, in FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 8392 (1984) (asserting that power can also mean women's ability to act to resist exploitation and work towards transforming society); see also West, supra note 132, at 50-52
(describing the "insurgency model" of Black intellectual activity which recognizes , instead of the "ubiquity of power," "the possibility of effective resistance and meaningful
social transformation"). The same point has been made about the connection between
language and power. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover,
96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1902 (1987) ("Language not only can express and confirm power but
also can challenge and claim it.").
238. See HOOKS, Introduction, supra note 237, at ix ("Living as we did-on the ed ge-we
developed a particular way of seeing reality. We looked both from the outside in and
from the inside out. We focused our attention on the center as well as on the margin.
We understood both."); Minow, supra note 71, at 68-69 (discussing biculturalism as "a
strategy of resistance and as a method for exposing the workings of power"). This multiple consciousness is expressed in the slave song: "Got one mind for white folks to see,
'Nother for what I know is me; He don't know, he don't know my mind." LAWRENCE W.
LEVINE , BLACK CuLTURE AND BLACK CoNSCIOUSNEss: AFRO-AMERICAN FoLK THOUGHT
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM at xiii (1977).
239. See Cover, supra note 22, at 1608 (arguing that ideology is more effective at justifying an order to those who benefit from it than it is at hiding the nature of the order
from its victims); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyenngfor the Poor,
56 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 885-86 ( 1990) (discussing how people in th e welfare rights
movement learned to revalue their skills and abiliti e s acquired from the experie nce of
subordination and to us e them in the struggle for welfare rights ).
240. Delgado, supra note 77, at 2413.
Feminist consciousn e ss-raising, wherein women construct a shared reality b y telling
stories about their personal experien ces, is an example of resistin g dominant id eo logy
through narrative. See CATHARINE A . MACKINNO N, TowARD A FEMI NIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 87 ( 1989) (describing consciousness-raising as a process that "gives both conte nt
and form to women's p o int of view"). For a discussion of femini st views on kn o wledge
and power, see, for example, Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized H'or!d: A!yth, Allegm)' and
the Feminine, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 644 , 687 (l990) (affirming the r o le of myth in fe minist
theory as a way of "confirm[ing] a different view of the world"); MA CKINNON, supra note
63, at 169 (defining feminism "in a way that connects epistemology with pow e r as th e
politics of women's point of view").
241. C ook, supra not e 19, at 1018. Anthony Cook gives a fa sc ina ting accoun t of the
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legitimating text, slaves saw in scripture divine condemnation of
their earthly subjugation: "To the surprise and fear of many whites,
slaves transformed an ideology intended to reconcile them to a
subordinate status into a manifesto of their God-given equality. " 242
The act of creating an alternative version of the world helps to
heal the anguish of oppression. It constructs a mental space where
one can live somewhere in the past or in the future, free from the
debilitating assault of oppression. Spirituals served this purpose
during slavery. The slaves' religious songs created a sacred time
and space that made their visions of the Biblical past and heavenly
future immediate. 243 Lawrence W. Levine explains that, for the
slaves , the sacred did not represent "a rejection of the present world
but ... the process of incorporating within this world all the elements of the divine." 244 This creative act is also the first step toward
liberation. As Audre Lorde observed, "the true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations which we seek
to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep
within each of us ."245
T he counter-stories of subordinated groups serve not only to resist the dominant culture, but also to create their own identity. 246
Black women have a strong tradition of creative res istance to the
dominant culture's norm of womanhood that denied thei r identity:
"[B]lack women have had to learn to construct themselves in a society that denied them full selves." 247 For the women in Zora Neale
ways that slaves used Christian ideology as the basis for survivin g the brutalities and
indi gnities of slavery. ld. at 1015-23. See generally GENOVESE, supra note 177 , a t 161-284
(offering a critical assessment of slaves' adopti o n of Christia nity); LEVIN E, supra note
238, at 3-80 (describing the religio us aspects of slaves).
242. Coo k, supra no te 19, at 101 8.
243. LEVINE, supra no te 238, at 37. Africans also resisted enslavement by more concrete ac ts of rebellion and escap e. See GENOVESE, supra n o te 177, at 648-57 (describin g
the exp erience of hundreds of slaves who ran away to the North, Canada, and Mexico) ;
STAMPP, supra note 146 , at 132-40 (describing Nat Turner's rebellion and Denmark Vesey's conspiracy). Black women res isted slave ry through acts of rebellion aga inst their
maste rs, such as assault , arson, poisoning, theft , participation in slave r evolts, and running away. See SARAH BRADFORD , HARRIET TuBMAN, THE MosES OF H ER PEOPLE (3 d ed.
1961); Eli zabeth Fox-Genoves e, Strategies and Forms of Resistance: Focus on Slave Women In
the Uniied States, in IN RESISTANCE 143 (Gary Y. Okihiro ed., 1986) (describin g
slavewo men's participa tion in armed rebellions, as well as dai ly resistance aga inst their
mast ers); Betty Wood, Some Aspects of Female Resistance to Chattel Slavery in Low Country
Georgia, 1763-1 815, 30 HrsT.]. 603, 620-22 (1 987) (discussing the mul tiple im prisonments of three slavewomen in Savannah , Georgia, for their acts of resistance aga ins t
the ir enslavement).
244. LEVINE, supra note 238 , a t 3 1.
245 . AuDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Dijference, in SrsTER
O uTSID ER 114, 12 3 (19 84 ).
246. CJ Martha Minow , Identities, 3 YALEJ.L & HuMAN. 97,98-100 (199 1) (explorin g
in works of fiction and judicial op inions h ow people negotiate th e ir id entitie s in the
context of soc ial and political structures of power).
24 7. Harri s, supra note 18, at 6 13 (discussing the writings o f Zora Neale Hurs ton); see
aL<o CoLLIN S, supra note 236, at 222 (discussing "s ubjugated know led ges, such as a Black
wome n's culture of res istance") ; e. ch risti cunningham, Unmaddem.ng: A Response to Professor Angela Harris , 4 YALE J.L & FEMIN ISM 155 , 156 (1991) (arguing that Black vvomen's
multiple conscious ness "sho uld no t be m ore th an an intermediary s tep to the goal of
whole , self-defined id entit y") ; Roberts , supra note 18, at 1468-69 (arguing th ac affirm in g
Black ·•.vomen's constitutional claim to personhood is esp eciall y su ited for challenging
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Hurston's novels, "[t]he dream is the truth."248 Thus, the culture
and identity of oppressed peoples is not simply the product of domination; it is forged from the constant battle over knowledge.
This liberating aspect of knowledge is reflected in the camp~ign
waged by freed slaves to acquire education during ReconstructiOn.
Blacks' desire to improve their condition by means of edu~atic:n
generated the fir~t mass movement for publicly funded education m
the South. 249 Pnor to the abolition of slavery, there was no general
education sy~ tem suppor~ed by public taxation in t_he So uthe ~~
states; educatiOn was considered a luxury connected with wealth. 2
W.E.B. DuBois observed the remarkable contribution that the freed
slaves made to the expansion of education in the South:
Public education for all at public expense, was, in the South, a
Negro idea ... . It was only the other part of the laboring clas~, the
black folk, who connected knowledge with power; who believed
that educatio~ was the stepping-stone to wealth and respect, and
that wealth Without educa tion was crippled. Perhaps the very fact
that so many of them had seen the wealthy slaveholders at close
range, and knew the ex tent of ignorance and ineffici ency amon g
them, led to that extraordinary mass demand on the part of the
black laboring class for e ducation. And it was this demand that
was the effecti ve force for th e establishment of the public school
the devaluation o f_Bla ck won: en and reinfo r cing their tradition of willful self-d efinition ).
Druolla Cornell, m her cnuqu e of Catharine MacKinnon's idenuficauon of femmm e
desire with masculine co nstru ct s, makes a similar point about all women: "I a m not
adv oca tmg th at we d en y male powe r. 1 am only suggesting that we not make th e masculin e ou r world by insisting that we are on ly what men have made us to be. " Co rnell ,
supra note 240 , a t 693.
248 . ZoRA N. HuRSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GoD 9 (Il lini Books 1978)
(19 3 7).
249. DuBo is, supra n o te 49, at 63 7-69. Booker T. Washington poigna ntl y desc ribed
the former slaves' yearn ing for ed ucation:
Few p eople who were n ot right in the midst of the scenes can form any exact
Idea of the mtense desire w hich th e people o f my race showed for edu catiOn .
It was a whole race trym g t o go to school. Few were too young , and no ne
too o ld , to make the attempt to learn. As fas t as any kind of teachers co uld
be secured ,_n ot o nl y were day-schools fill ed, but ni ght-scho ols as we ll.
!d. at 64 1. For a discu ss io n of Black w omen's contribution to the movement for e ducation, see BLACK WoMEN IN \A/HiTE AMER ICA: A Do cuM ENTARY HISTORY , supra note i 83,
at 92 -11 8 .
. The drive for educat ion after Ema nci patio n was a co ntinuation of Blacks' struggle fo~
lit eracy dunn g slavery . See generally CoRNELIUS, supra note 174 (des cnb mg th e po huca .
and rehgw us context of Black \I,t era cy durin g slavery). For enslaved Blacks, hte racy was
th e key to sclf-determma u o n: Rea din g and writin g, above all , pomt ed the wa y to freedom-first of all 111 th e mmd and s pirit , and oft en in the body .... [A)cqumng read m g_
and wn tmg ski ll s was an act of res istan ce aga in st the slave svstem an d an as sert ion ol
id entity by the litera te slave." I d. at 6 1.
'
250. Du Bo is, supra note 49, at 638-41. Th e es tablishment of a free p u blic sch ool
svstem was stym ied not on ly by the elit e 's belief that education interfered with the exploita tion of labo rers, bu t also by the fa ilure of white lab o re rs to demand it. The whit e
laborin g class relied on the poss ibilit y of becoming slaveholders th emselves as the ir
means of upw ard socia l mobilit y. ld. at 64 1.
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in the South on a permanent basis, for all people and all
classes. 251

Du Bois believed that the establishment of Negro schools built an
"inner culture" that enabled Blacks to withstand the white reaction
to Reconstruction. 252 Blacks had not acquired a sufficiently stable
economic stake in land and capital in the ten years since Emancipation. Instead, it was their knowledge that allowed them to resist the
effort to drive them back into slavery.
The Black community's desire to gain control over knowledge has
been manifested in recent decades in the demand for local control
of education. Malcolm X, for example, understood school segregation within the context of racial domination: "A segregated school
system produces children who, when they graduate, graduate with
crippled minds. But this does not mean that a school is segregated
because it's all black. A segregated school means a school that is
controlled by people who have no real interest in it whatsoever." 25 3
He advocated as the solution, not integrating Black and white
school children, but liberating schools that teach Black children
from white control. 2 54 Popular movements for community control
over schools in poor urban neighborhoods such as Harlem and
Ocean Hill-Brownsville in New York City and Adams-Morgan in
Washington, D.C. in the 1960s were attempts to implement this
view.2ss
Black people's resistance to the dominant interpretation ofknowledge has been directed at legal ideology, as well. Within the struggle for racial justice, there lies a tradition of reconstructing the
Cons titution as a text of liberation. Frederick Douglass broke with
Garri so nian abolitionists who rejected the Constitution as a slaveho lding instrument to adopt his own radical cons titutionalism. 256
Do uglass gave the following account of his decision to embrace the
Constitution:
By such a course of thought and reading I was conducted to the
25 1. !d. a t 638 , 641.
252. !d. at 667; see also BALLARD, supra note 180, a t 22 -26 (discussing th e accomplishm ents of the first Black colleges). Blacks made re m arkable progress in education durin g
Reco nstructio n . In the period between 1860 and 1880, th e pro p o rtion of Blacks who
were literate grew from 10% to 30'/'o, and of Black ch il d re n who attend ed publi c
schools, from 2% to 34'/'o. BELL , supra note 2, a t 288 n.S.
253. MALCO LM X, MALCOLM X SPEAKS 42 (George Breitman ed., 1965).
254. !d.
255. See Robert C. Maynard, Black Natwnalisrn and Commwuty Schools, in COMMUNITY
CoNTROL OF ScHOOLS 100- 11 (H enry M. Levin eel., 1970); Peller, supra note 52, a t 8000 1 & n. 89. So me Black educators advoca te th e adoption of an Afroce ntric curriculum as
a means of asserting community co ntrol over predominantl y Black sch ool s an d increasing th e se lf- esteem of Black stude nts. See, e.g., Mo lefi K. Asante, The .-l.jrocentric Idea in
Education, 60]. NEGRO Enuc. 170 (1991); Sonia R.Jarvis , Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculwn, l 0 1 YALE L.J. 1285, 1293 (1 992); Serge ~'! a dh ere, Self-Esteem of African American
Preadolescents: Theoretical and Practical Considerations, 60 J. NEGRO Eouc . 47 (1 99 1) .
256. See Cover , supra n ote 66, at 37 -38; Ma tsud a, supra note 19, at 334-35 , 34 1
(describ ing Fre deri ck Douglass ' int erp retation of the Cons titution as a " blu eprint for
fundame ntal social change").
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conclusion that the Constitution of the United States-inaugurated "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty"- could not
well have been designed at the same time to maintain and perpetuate a system of rapine and murder like slavery, especially as not
one word can be found in the Constitution to authorize such a
belief Then, again, if the declared purposes of an instrument are
to govern the meaning of all its parts and details, as they clearly
should, the Constitution of our country is our warrant for the abolition of slavery in every State of the Union .257

The liberating dimension of Douglass' constitutional interpretation
was his redemptive vision-"a vision of an alternative world in
which the entire order of American slavery would be without foundation in law." 25 8 A century later, Martin Luther King, Jr. offered
the civil rights movement a transformative vision of the Beloved
Community. 259 Dr. King envisioned a rule of law, rooted in the experience of the oppressed, that rejected the liberal subordination of
human freedom to the security of property and required the state to
remove both public and private obstacles to liberation. 260
For Dr. King, the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness meant that "all individuals everywhere should have 'three
meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their
minds, and dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits.' " T his
vision required that the state affirmatively create the institutions
necessary to realize these natural rights. 2 6 1

Pedagogy can also be liberating. Henry Giroux criticizes the reproduction theory of education for discounting the possibility of
resistance and thereby "offer[ing] little hope fo r challenging an d
changing the repressive features of schooling. " 262 In fa ct, schools
do not simply transmit ideology onto blank slates; they often encounter resistance by teachers, students, and parents. Giroux challenges radical educators to develop a critical pedagogy that not only
unravels the processes of reproduction, but also examines th e dynamics of social transformation. 2 63 This task requires analyzin g students' oppositional behavior as possible acts of res is tance
manifesting moral and political indignation. 2 6 4
DouGLASS , supra no te 1, at 267.
Cover, supra note 66 , at 38.
See Coo k, supra note 19, at 1033 -41.
See id.
! d. at 1034-3 5 (quoting Martin L. King, Jr. , Nobel Pri::.e Acceptance Speech, reprinted
111 NE G RO HrsT. BuLL. , May 1968, at 21).
262. Giroux, Reproduction in Education, supra note 159, at 259.
263. !d. at 289 -93.
264 . /d. ; GIROUX, I DE OLO G Y OF S CH O O LI NG , supra no te 159 , a t 79 - !09 .
257 .
258.
259.
260.
26 1.
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Paulo Freire similarly advocates an alternative pedagogy of liberation that rejects the banking approach to education. His model replaces the educational method of depositing information with
posing problems concerning people in their relations with the
world. 265 This liberating pedagogy encourages students both to examine the historical roots of oppressive institutions and to imagine
the implementation of new structures; students are not docile listeners, but are jointly responsible with teachers for a process in which
they all grow. 266 This critical consciousness leads oppressed people
to understand oppression as a historical reality that they can change.

VI.

Liberation Theory: The Government's Affirmative Duty to
Provide Information

What lessons can we learn from this account of the oppressive
and liberating potential of knowledge? What insights can it lend to
our reconstructive project? This Part explores using the study of
oppression and liberation as a focus for progressive constitutional
doctrine. It accepts Dr. King's liberationist understanding of liberty
that requires the state affirmatively to remove the public and private
constraints on freedom and to create institutions supporting the
ideals ofliberty and equality. 267 It shares Frederick Douglass' vision
of an alternative constitutionalism in which racial subordination is
without foundation in law. 26 8 A liberation theory would be aimed at
ending the oppressive control of knowledge available to the Black
community and ensuring the information necessary for Black emancipation. T he preceding examination of dependency and the control of knowledge suggests two featu res of a liberating constitutional
vision: It would recognize the importance of information for selfdetermination, and it would place an affirmative obligation on the
government to provide this information to people who are dependent on government funds.

265. FREIRE, supra note 38, a t 66-68; Pa ulo Fre ire , The Problem-Posing Concept of Educatwn as an Instrument fo r Liberation, in EDUCATION AND AMERICAN CU LTURE 392-93 (Elizab e th Steiner et a l. , e ds., 1980) . For Paulo Freire's thinkin g o n the r o le of e duca ti o n in
lib era ti on s tru ggles, see PAULO FREIRE, THE Po LITICS OF EDUCATION: Cu LTUR E, P o wER ,
AN D LIBERATION (19 85 ). J o hn Dewey's philos oph y of d e mo cra tic e ducation similarl y recognized the potential role of schools in developing s tud e nts' c ritical capaciti es tha t
wou ld enable them to p articip a te in the d e mo cra tic process. See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATIO N (1916); see also AMY GUTMANN, D EMOCRATIC EDUCATIO N (1987 ) (discussing the d em o cra tic id eal that all children must be ta ught e nou g h to be ab le to
parti cipate in the political process).
266. FRE IR E, supra not e 38, a t 66-68.
26 7. See supra n otes 259-61 and accom pa n yin g text.
268. See supra n o tes 256 -58 a nd acco mpa n ying text; see also Robin Wes t, The Idea l of
Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. G erald D. , 139 U . PA. L. REv. 1373, 1380 (1991)
(suggest ing a possible und e rsta ndin g o f libe rty as " li bera tio n from any numb e r of pernici ous constra ints, whethe r imp o sed by th e state , private pers ons , or nature"); West ,
supra note 210 , at 149 (interpreti ng th e Fo urteent h Amendment as a "c harte r o f positive
li berty or a charter pro tec ting o ur ri gh t to be self-governing, autonomous, free of o th er
rulers, mas ters, or superi o rs, within the co nfin es of the rul e of law ").
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A.

Knowledge and Liberation

The essential ingredient of liberation is the participation of the
oppressed in the revolutionary process. 269 The oppressed must
take responsibility for the struggle against their subordination by
shedding their status as dominated and alienated objects and assuming the status of subjects who act to achieve their full humanity.
This emancipatory transformation clearly encompasses the acquisition of the information at issue in Rust. Our society has determined
already that medical information is essential to human dignity and
self-determination. The common law doctrine of informed consent
requires the physician's complete disclosure of the risks involved in
a recommended treatment and of all reasonable medical alternatives.270 Ideally, the doctrine protects the patient's autonomy by ensuring her informed participation in a cooperative decisionmaking
process. 271 In addition, the medical profession recognizes in its ethical canons the patient's right to receive disclosure of medical risks
and alternatives. 27 2 The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional importance of the patient's interest in autonomy over medical
decisionmaking in Cntzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 273
Information about reproduction is especially critical to women's
self-determination. The denial of information about abortion deprives women of the knowledge necessary to take control of their
lives and to transform their own reality. The systematic, institutionalized denial of reproductive freedom has been a principal means of
Black women's subjugation throughout their history in America. 274
269. See, e.g. , FR EIRE , supra note 38, at 54; BELL HOO KS , TALKING BACK: THI NK ING FEMINIST , THI NKIN G BL-\CK 43 (1989).
270. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. C ir. ), cerl. denied, 4 09 U. S.
I 064 ( 1972). Courts hav e applied the doctrine of info rm ed consent to medical d ecisi o ns
re lating to childbirth a nd abortion. See, e.g., H arbeson v. Pa rke Davis , In c., 746 F.2d
5 17, 5 23-24 (9 th Cir. 1984) (holdin g tha t th e do ctrin e of informed con sent requires
d iscl os ure of the material ri sks o f continuin g Dila ntin durin g pregnancy); Phillips v.
U nit ed States, 566 F. Supp. l (D.S.C. 198 1) (holding physici ans lia bl e for failing to inform pare nts of child with Down's Syndrome of availability o f amniocentesis). See generally ANNA S, mpra n o te 58, at 83 -10 3 (discussing the doctrine o f info rm ed con sent as o ne
of th e ri gh ts of patients) ; PA ULS. APP ELBA UM ET AL., INFORMED CoNSENT: LEGAL THEORY
AND C LIKI CAL PRACTICE ( 1987) (discussing th e theo ry, legal requirem e nts, and p ra ctice
o f in fo rm ed co nsen t).
271. T he id eal of in fo rmed co ns e nt , ho wever, has n o t been reali zed in th e actual
practice of medi cin e . See KATZ , supra no te 58, a t 48-84.
27 2 . See. e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL Asso CIATION, C uRRE NT O PI NION S OF TH E CouNC IL
ON [THI C.-\L AND j UD ICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AM E R I C A ~ MEDICAL :\S SOC IATI ON, ~i 8.08, at 32
( 1989) ; see a[so PRESIDENT'S COMMI SS ION FOR TH E STUDY OF ETHI CA L PROBLEMS IN
MEDI CINE AND BIOMEDICAL AN D BEHAVIOR.-\L RESEARCH: MAKING H EALTH CARE DECI SIONS l.f 9- 50 (1982) (discussing the ethica l values underlying info rm ed consent).
273 . .f97 U.S . 26 1, 27 0 (1 990) (re cogni zin g a co n stitu tiona ll y pro tect ed lib erty int erest in re fus in g unwanted m ed ical treat m en t) .
274. Robe rt s, supra no te 18, at 1436-50 (desc ribin g th e hi storica l deva lu at ion of Bl ack
motherhood). I hav e criti cize d the foc us of mainstream feminist reprod uctiv e rights
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A liberating constitutionalism would invalidate the promotion of ignorance among poor Black women that denies them control over
their reproduction and would seek to provide the information necessary for them to experience true reproductive liberty .
Both liberal and republican constitutional theory support a government duty to provide information. Constitutional scholars belonging to both schools have suggested First Amendment
approaches rejecting the abstract focus on ideas that characterized
the Rust opinion. Rather, their systemic models analyze the role of
fre edom of speech within the social structure and in relation to a
broader vision of social justice.
Liberal scholars have argued that the aim of freedom of expression is to ensure individual autonomy. 275 This model argues that
individual liberty, rather than the free trade of ideas, deserves protection from government interference. 276 It values expression, not
because it leads to the "truth," but because it fosters the individual's
self-determination. 277 Under this view, government censorship is
the primary evil because it "stunts the individual's growth as a
human being and shows disrespect for the individual's ability to
make her own informed decisions. " 278 This approach suggests that
the government's power to restrict speech should be subject to special scrutiny where it is used to influence constitutionally protected
choices, such as the decision to terminate a pregnancy. 279 The regulations violate the liberty model of free expression because they
impermissibly infringe upon poor women's autonomy, denying women information critical to a decision that will significantly impact
the course of their lives. Abortion counseling resp ects a woman's
autonomy by providing her with the information n ecessary to make
a decision about pregnancy that best contribute s to her wellbeing. 280
lite rature o n abo rtion rights fo r negl ec ting the broader range of reproductiv e health
is sues that affect poor wo men of color. See id. at 1461-62 .
275. See, e.g., BAKER , supra note 88, a t 58-59 (describing a lib e rt y m odel of free expression); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESS ION 6 (1970)
(describin g the First Am endment's protection o f "individual self-fulfillm e nt"); Ma rtin H.
Red ish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 , 593 ( 1982) (d isc u ss in g "selfrea li zation" as th e purp ose of fre e sp eech); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 204 (1972) (arguing that th e First Amendment p rotect s
autonomy); cJ. Matsuda , Voices, supra n ote 63, a t 1389 (a rguin g th at the idea of to lera n ce
in liberal thought suppo rts recogni zing the la ngua ge rights o f indi vidua ls; " ( w)e hurt
ourselves when we exclude th e possible kn o wledge that diversity in participation can
brin g") . For th e classic liberal defense o f freedom of exp ressio n as a gu a rante e of in d ividual autonomy, see MILL, supra not e 39, at 30-40.
276 . See BAKER , supra note 88, at 12-17 (using m o dern social theory to criti q ue th e
dominant ma rke tplace o f ideas ra tion ale for fre ed om of speech).
277. Jd at 59.
278. Red ish & Lippm an, supra note 110, at 281.
279. See Jan e t Benshoof, The Chas tity Act: Govemment .\.!anipulatwn of ;ibortion Jnfonnation and the First ..J. mendment, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1916, 193 1 (1988). The Court's trea tm ent
of th e Fifth Ame ndment issue in Rust did add re ss clinic pa tie nts' ab ility to m ak e ra tion al
d ec isio ns abo u t a bortion. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. C t. 1759 , 177 7 ( 199 1). A major fl aw
in the Court's ana lys is is th at it separated the First Am e ndment d iscuss io n from th e
ques tion of wom en's auto nomy.
280 . See Ruth Calke r, Feminism, Th eology, and Abortwn: Toward Laue, Compassion, and
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Civic republicanism centers on citizens' participation in collective
deliberation. Rather than rely on individual rights to protect against
wron gful state action, republicans propose continuing dialogue
within the community as the methodology for achieving the common good. 28 1 Republican theory justifies free speech as the foundati on fo r self-government through deliberative democracy. T his
conception of the First Amendment, associated with Thomas J efferson and Alexander Meiklejohn, ensures the ability of citizens to fulfill their decisionmaking role as the true rulers in a republican
society .282 It is premised on the belief that intelligent determination
of public issues requires widespread and informed popular deliberation .283 Free speech allows citizens to gather the information necessary to make rational decisions about public issues and to
communicate with others in the deliberative process.
T hus, republican thought historically has seen popular education
as essential to self-government. 2 84 Education serves not only to
prep are citizens for deliberation, but al so to pro tect citizens against
governm ent corruption . Early constitutional thinkers believed that
Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv . 1011 , 106 7 (1989) (criticizing the Court in Roe v. Wade fo r curta ilin g a n y state regulati o n o f ab o rtion counseling durin g the first trimester and s ugges tin g th at "the C ourt shou ld e ncourage states to d evelo p programs that co ul d
im p rove a woman's delib e rati ve process about abo rti o n" ); see also Sarah Buttenwe ise r &
R eva Levi ne , Breakmg Silences: A Post-Abortion Support l'vl odel, in FROM ABO RTION TO REPRO DUCTIVE FREEDO J\1: TRANSFO RMING :\ MOVEM ENT 12 1-28 (Ma rlene G. Frie d e d .,
1990 ) (describin g the be ne fits o f a pos t-a bortion sup po rt g ro up fo r wo m e n e xpe ri e ncing
e m o tio na l struggles in m aking and living with a bo rti o n d ecisio n s); Terry N. S te in berg,
Abortio n Counseling: To Benefit !VIaternal Health, 15 AM.j.L & MED . 483 -51 7 (1989) (dis cu ss ing im p o rtance of abo rti o n co unseling to the e m o ti o nal health o f women and advoca tin g state law~ requirin g a bo rti on co unseling). It is criti cal, h o wever, that abort ion
coun selin g be offered in a way tha t r espects women's auto n o m y, ra ther than ove rr idin g
it. See Akro n v. Akron C tr. for Re pro d . Health, 462 U.S. 4 16, 44 3 -44 (!983), overruled by
Plan ned Pa renthood v. Casey, 11 2 S. Ct. 2791 ( 1992) (s trikin g d o wn "informe d con sen t " regul ation design ed n o t to info rm the woman' s co nsent , but to persu ad e h er to
withh o ld it alto geth er) .
28 1. See Fr ank I. Michelma n , The Supreme Court 1985 Tenn , Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 10 0 H ARV . L. R Ev. 4, 17-33 ( 198 6 ) (d escri b in g th e ro le o f civic virtu e a nd se lfgovern m e nt in the r e publi can tra diti o n ); C ass R . Suns te in , Beyond the Republican Revtval,
97 YALE L.J. I 539 , 154 1 (1 988) (ide ntifyin g delibe ra ti o n in governm ent , p o litica l e qual ity , unive rsali sm , an d citizen shi p as the central republi ca n com mit me nts) .
282. See Sun stein , supra note 72, at 26 3 (" [T ]he Firs t Ame ndme nt is fund am e n ta ll y
aimed at prot ecting dem ocratic se lf-government. " ); Suns tein , supra note 219, at 890- 9 1;
see also Ric hmond Newspap er s, Inc. v. Vi r ginia, 4 4 8 U .S . 555, 58 7 (1980) (Brenn a n, J. ,
concurring) ("[T]he First Ame ndme nt ... has a stmctura l role to play in securin g and
fos te ring o ur republi ca n sys tem o f self-go vernment. "); Owen M. Fi ss , Why the State?, I 00
HARV. L. REV. 78 1 (! 98 7) (ar gu ing tha t the Fi rst Amendment pro tec ts co ll ec tive se lfdete rmination ra th e r than ind ividua l express ion ) . Alexander lvle iklejo hn p rese n ted h is
theory o n the fun cti on o f fr ee speech as a g ua ra nt ee of cit izen de li bera tio n abo u t publ ic
iss u es in ."'. LEXANDER ME IKLEJOHN, FREE SPEEC H A;\ID ITs RE LATI ON TO SE LF-GovERNMENT
( 1948). For a d iscuss io n of J efferso n's views o n pub li c del ibe ratio n , see l-!A i':Nc\ 11 ARENDT. ON REVOLUTION 234 - 42 (1 963) .
283 . Suns tc in, supra no te 2 I 9, at 890 -93 .
284 . See Akhil R. Arn ar, Th e BILl of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YAL E L.J . 1 13 1. 1210
(!991) .
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government had an obligation to educate the populace because education was "[t]he most obvious republican instrument for ... inculcating virtue in a people. " 285 This educative function is critical to
Akhil Reed Amar's structural account of the Bill of Rights as the
popular majority's protection against self-interested government. 286
Professor Amar demonstrates how the concept of popular education
emanates throughout the Bill of Rights: Each of the intermediate
associations it protects-church, militia, and citizen jury-can be
understood as "a device for educating ordinary Citizens about their
rights and duties."287
Modern republican scholars have used traditional republican philosophy to establish the populace's affirmative claim to the basic necessities that are prerequisites for genuine self-government. 288
Frank Michelman's work on the distributive implications of republican theory places on democratic society the responsibility of providing its members with these prerequisites of political participation. 289
Citizens cannot contribute effectively to public deliberation without
the basic necessities of life to sustain them and without an understanding of the issues at hand. 29 0 Michelman asks:
Without basic education-without the literacy, fluency, and elementary understanding of politics and markets that are hard to
obtain without it-what hope is there of effective participation in
the last-resort political system? ... [W]hat about life itself, health
and vigor, presentable attire, or shelter not only from the elements but from the physical and psychological onslaughts of social debilitation? Are not these the universal, rock-bottom
prerequisites of effective participation in democratic representation? . . . How can there be .. . sophisticated rights to a formally
unbiased majoritarian system, but no rights to the indispensable
means of effective participation in that system? 291

Michelman argues that the legitimacy of majoritarian republicanism
implies a duty to ensure against bias arising out of the distribution
285. GoRDON S. Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 , at 426
(1969). The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for example. declared : "Wisdom and
kno wled ge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people , bein g
n ece ssary for the pres ervation of th eir rights and liberties; as these dep e nd on sprea ding
th e opportunities and advanta ges of e du ca tion ... it shall be the duty of le gis latures and
m agistra tes to encourage [these ends]." MAss. CoNST. of 1780 , pt. II , ch. V, §II.
286. See Amar, supra note 284 at 1132-33, 1208. Professor Arnar id e ntiftes th e
"agency problern"-the problem of gove rnm e nt officials following se lf-inte rested policies that fail to refl ec t th e views and protect the liberties of ordinary citizens-as one of
th e prin cipal co ncerns of the Bill of Rights. !d. at 1206. Th e Supreme Co urt' s validation
of the regul ations a nd President Bush's veto of congressional legi slat ion o verturning
th e m is a glaring example of th e profes sional judiciary and the executive branc h co llab orating to den y the will of citizens exp ressed b y their e lected repres e ntatives. See Adam
Clymer, President r·etoes Bill on .-lbortion; Oven1de Bid Falls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at
Al.
287. Amar, supra not e 284, a t 1210.
288. See, e.g., ld.; Frank I. ivtic hclm an , ll'eljare R 1ghts 1n a Conslllutlonal Democracy, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q 659, 677.
289. Michelman , supra note 288, a t 677.
290. !d.
291. !d.
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of unmet needs .292 His theory gives specific support to welfare
rights and regulations designed to equalize political access. 293
These republican concerns also justify substantial restrictions on
government secrecy. 294 When the government withholds information from the public, it hinders public deliberation and dramatically
increases the risk of self-interested representation and of corruption
in government processes by powerful private factions. Cass Sunstein concludes that the republican theory of free expression requires a right of access to information held by the government. 295
This republican model of free speech supports the government's
obligation to provide abortion counseling. The regulations degrade
the citizenship of poor Black women by limiting their ability to participate in the public sphere. A constitutional guarantee of the necessities for republican self-government would invalidate the
regulations' obstruction of information critical to the public debate
on abortion and to citizens' knowledge of their rights. 296
Both liberal and republican theories of the First Amendment explain the constitutional importance of knowledge. Taken together,
they support the value of self-determination, embracing both the
liberal ideal of individual autonomy and the republican ideal of participation in collective decisionmaking. C. Edwin Baker's theory of
fundamental, progressive change as a central function of rights protected by the First Amendment integrates both ideals. Baker argues
that human progress requires transforming the social conditions
that link liberalism's normative content-the values of human equality, self-determination, and self-realization-with its oppressive institutional content-historically manifested in the capitalist market
292. !d. at 684 .
29 3. Seeid. ; Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 , 1495 (l988 ) (arguing that republican constitutionalism inh e re ntly inv olves an o ngoing revision o f normative history in order to includ e in th e political co mmunity thos e who h a ve been
excluded); Mich elman , supra n o te 227, at 1340-50 (d iscussin g redistribution in the con text o f political speech) ; see aLso Sunstein , supra note 72. at 263 -300 (ad voca ting a " New
Deal" for speech protec ting d e mocratic effo rts to pro mote p o pular sovereignty); Sunstein, supra not e 281 , at 1577 (arguing tha t a republican approach to th e First Amendment supports campai g n finan ce regulati o n in ord e r to achi eve politica l equality) .
294. See Sunstein , supra note 2 19 , at 894; cj. Vin ce nt Blas i, The Checking 1/alue in Fin t
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FoU ND. RE s. J. 521 (su ggestin g that an important function
of th e First Am e ndm ent is to check gov e rnment ab uses by e nsuring citizen access to
info rma tion).
29 5 . Sunste in, supra no te 21 9 , at 921.
296. Cass Sunstein, however , exempts Rwt from these re publican concerns o n the
ground that " it involve d a limita tion on a governmentally funded private co un selin g
progra m ," ra th e r th a n " publi c, po litical speech ." See Sunste in , supra note 72 , a t 299
n.1 36 . Suns te in 's priva ti zation of the speech in vo lved in Rust ign o res th e po litical
dim e nsions I attempt to demon stra te in thi s Articl e . I beli e ve that Sun stein's th eory of
th e ro le of sp eech in pro tectin g po pular so ve reignty supp o rt s the go ve rnment' s dut y to
prov id e abo rti o n co un selin g as a po liti ca l res ource.
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and bureaucratic state. 297 "Progress results from people engaging
in popularly chosen, self-realizing, value-integrating practices that
oppose, transform, or replace alienating institutions." 298 The rights
embraced by the First Amendment provide the structural preconditions for this progressive change by protecting people in expressing
and living their values and in joining together to create new
structures. 299
Baker suggests that the First Amendment's role in providing the
means needed for progressive change requires not only protection
from government intrusion, but also requires "the guarantee of material resources necessary to allow large numbers of people to engage in self-constitutive political activities." 300 Although Baker
does not elaborate on the extent of such an affirmative guarantee of
free expression, the process of progressive change would require
ensuring women's access to information essential to their self-determination. 301 Reproductive information is a political resource because it enables women to take control of their lives and to join in
transforming social institutions. 3 02
The liberal and republican models of the constitutional role of
information are strengthened by recognizing the connection between the control of knowledge and racial subordination. Acknowledging this connection enhances the First Amendment analysis in
two ways. First, it complicates the fear that both liberalism and republicanism have concerning the concentration of power in the corporate economy and bureaucratic state as the primary threat to
human freedom. 303 Both the liberal protection of the individual
297 . See BAKER, supra note 88, at 99-100.
298. ld. at 120. While Professor Baker's analysis of the collective process of cha n ge
in co rporates republican principles, its driving conce rn see ms to be indivi d ual liberty.
For example , Professor Baker a rgues that the conc ep t of speech as a key elem ent of
d emocracy is actually premised upon liberty: "[ L]ib e rty implies dem ocracy as a p ro ce ss
for specifying a nd impleme ntin g pe o ple's choices. " ld. at 31. An y attempt at stri ct cat egorization, howeve r, would be futile. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., H'hat is RepublicanIsm , and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1730-3 1 (1 989) (noting
com mon aliti es between libera li sm an d th e th eo ries of re publica n revival); Jam es G.
Pope, Republican Afoments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the Amen can Co nstitut wnat
Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 , 297 n.38 (1990) (ass e rtin g that "republican a'.1d liberal
tradition s ha ve been intertwin ed since th e ir inc epti o n s") .
299. BAKER, supra note 88, a t 120- 2 1. For other vi e ws of the First Amendment's rol e
in the struggle for social chan ge, see Pope , supra n ote 298, at 345-56 (di sc us sin g th e
First Amendment's protection o f dire ct exe rcis es of popular powe r); Sp arer, supra note
19 , at 530-35 (defe ndin g the need for in alie nable ri ght s to fr ee speech a nd political
di ssent in th e stru ggle to chan ge soc iety).
300. BAKER, supra note 88, a t 120.
30 I . Professor Baker a rgu es e lsewhere that the Constitution re quires governm e nt to
guarantee the minimum res ource s n ec es sary for a mea nin gful d aily li fe, bu t not the fulfillment o f all pers o nho od -based cl aim s to prope rty. See C. Edwin Bake r, Property and Its
Relat zon to Constitutionallv Protected Libertv, ! 34 U. PA. L. REv . 741 ,760- 64 (1 98 6).
302. See LINDA GoRDON, WOi\lAN's ~B oD Y , WoMAN's RI GHT: A So c iA L HISTORY or
BIRTH CoNTROL IN AM ERI CA 414-18 ( 1976) (" Rep rod uctiv e self-de termina tio n is a bas ic
conditi o n for ... wo men to assum e full memb e rship in all other hu ma n group s.") .
303. See Am y G utmann , Comnwnltarian Critics of Liberalis111, 14 PHIL. & PuB . AFF. 308,
32 1 (1 985) ; see, e.g. , BAKER, supra n o te 88, a t 92-122 (identifying hierarchi ca l struct ures
of burea ucra cies an d cap itali st markets as the ta rget for pro gressi ve change); Re ich,
mpra note 63, at 1409 (" Ex ist in g cons ti tutio nal theory is ina dequa te to pro tect aga inst
th e cea se less a nd rap idl y increas in g e ncroa chments of orga niz ed pow e r." ).
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against the state and the republican protection of the majority
against self-interested government ignore the context of social
power, defined by race, gender, and economic status, in which these
conflicts occur. The state is not a monster that strikes arbitrarily
simply to enhance its might. Rather, it wields its power in ways that
have historically supported the subordination of particular groups
of people. The alienation of all citizens in the capitalist, bureaucratic state cannot explain the particularly brutal oppression of the
Black community. The liberal and republican approaches also discount the possibility of using the power of government to destroy
illegitimate social domination.
Second, the connection between knowledge and subordination
brings into question the faith that both liberalism and republicanism
have in an ideal government process, a faith that neglects the need
to eradicate these forms of subordination. 304 Republicanism relies
on the notion that reasoned deliberation, divorced from private interests, will lead to community consensus as to the common
good. 305 The republican reliance on dialogue may provide insufficient protection against repression of minorities. 306 The model of
civic deliberation presents the danger that outsiders' freedom of expression will be sacrificed on the basis of the dominant group's perception of the common good. Subordinated voices typically have
been silenced on the ground that their speech is not worthy of participation in the public debate. 307 When a subordinated group challenges the social order it is more likely to generate violent conflict
than reasoned deliberation. 3os
The history of racial domination in America demonstrates that
304. An important exception is civic republicans' recognition of systemic bias du e to
the in equalities of wealth. See, e.g. , Michelman, supra n ote 288 , a t 684 .
305. See Bell & Bansal, supra note 229, at 1610 ("Republicanism, through its faith in
the existence of shared valu es and the possibility of a co mmon good, assumes at the
base that a social con sens us will emerge from 'reasoned' deliberation by individuals who
are thinking 'ra tionall y.'" ); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and In commensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REv . 1441 , 14 76-85 (1990) (critiquing Michelman 's reliance o n
rational argumentation).
306. Bell & Bansal, supra note 229, at 1610-1 I; see also De lga do , supra note 217 , a t
1939 (noting that dialogic arrangements often increas e preexisting p o wer differentials
among participants); Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Xotes on Civzc
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1658-62 (1988) (arguing that civic republican reforms
may bias the political system in favor of the status quo).
307. Cf MEIKLEJOHN, supra not e 282, a t 25 ("What is essential is not th at every one
sha ll speak, but that eve rything worth saying shall be said.").
308. See Karst, supra note 155, at 96 ("When a subordinated group challenges a dominant com munity of meaning , those expressions are bound to aro us e strong emotions,
for they threate n th e individual id ent ities of the people who live inside the boundaries of
the dominant culture ."). For an alt e rnative view of republican political theory that focuses on periodic o utbursts of direct popular power, see Pope, supra note 298. According to Professo r Pope, it is during thes e " republican moment s" that groups that are
underrepresented in liberal interest-group bargaining a re able to achi eve so cial ch ange
through extra-institutional forms of politi ca l participation. !d. a t 320.
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Blacks are particularly vulnerable to exclusion. For most of American history, Blacks were barred by law from civic participation, mcluding voting, holding public office, and serving on juries. 30 9
For centuries in this country ... blacks have served as the group
whose experiences and private needs have been suppressed in order to promote the "common good" of whites. Indeed, the
"shared values" in which the antifederalists laid faith included a
historically constant and (for whites) a unifying belief in the inferior and subordinated position of black Americans. 3 10

The common good is an elusive goal when one group defines its
interests in terms of the continued subordination of another. Liberation is a precondition for true republicanism. 3 11
Liberalism depends on neutral government decisionmaking that
protects rational individual choice . The experience of group oppression, however, teaches that the dehumanization of the individual is connected to the subordination of the group. 3 12 The
individual's ability to make autonomous decisions is circumscribed
by the material conditions of her life, including the community to
which she belongs. For members of subordinated communities,
protecting individual autonomy necessarily involves the struggle for
group liberation. These individuals recognize a positive aspect of
group membership that corresponds with communitarians' faith
309 . Karst, supra note 155 , at 112-13. See generally Scott v. Sa ndfo rd , 60 U .S. (19
How.) 393,412 (1857) ("[Blacks] have neve r been regarded as a part of the people o r
citizens of the State, nor suppos ed to possess any politi ca l rights which the dominant
race might not withhold or grant at th eir pleasure."); C. VANN WooDWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF jiM C Row 67-109 (3d ed. 1974) (describing the creation and implem entation o f jim Crow statutes foll owing Reconstruction); Randall Kennedy, i\Iartin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the M ontgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE LJ. 999,
I 006-07 ( 1989) (discussing segregation in the public sph ere).
310. Bell & Bansal, supra note 229 , at 1610-11 ; cf. Iris .ivl. Yo ung, Polity and Group
Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenshi,tJ, 99 ETHICS 250, 25 3 (19 89 ) (providing, by analogy, the feminist critique of civic republicanism fo cus in g on its imposition o f
" universal values and norm s whi ch were derived from specificall y m as culine exp e rience"). Th e n ew republicans have repudiated the elitist traditi on o f republi can tho ught
and propose a republican vision that includes direct parti cipa tion by all citi zens, especially the historically dis emp owered . See, e.g., Michelman , supra n ote 293, a t 1505-06;
Sunstein, supra note 281, at 1569 -7 1.
311 . See Radin & Mich elman , supra no te 49, at 1041 ("How can we h o p e to appro ach
o r preserve a state of undominat ed di alogue without <:>.concerted ass ault on [race , ge nd e r and clas s] stratifications?").
3 12 . See Roberts, supra not e 18, at 148 0 . Th e communitarian understanding that the
individual identity is determined at least in part by the co mmunity, m ay b e tter explain
this experi ence. See Alex M.J ohn so n,Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 20 52
( 1991) (arguing that a communitarian persp ective is prefe rabl e to libera li sm as a method
for advancing the goals of peop le o f color); see, e.g., MICHAEL]. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
ITs CRITICS 6 ( 1984) ("[T]he story of my life is always em bedded in the story of those
communiti es fro m which I derive my id entity."). Relational fem ini sts al so have criticized
liberalism for presenting a masculin e vi e w of the indi vidual as se pa rate , competitive, a nd
atomistic, rather than caring and co nn ec ted to o th ers. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Femin ine Voice in Constitutional fld;udication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Wes t,
j urisprudence, supra no te 20. I have argued, how eve r , th at th e recognition of th ese connections betwee n th e individual and the community are n ot inheren tly incon siste nt with
the no tion of auton omy. See Rob erts, supra not e 18, at 1478 & n. 297 ; see also Linda C.
McClain , "Atomistic !'v!an" Revisited: Libera lism, Connection, an d Fermnist J urispmdence, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1171 , 11 74-75 ( 1992) (contesting the fem ini st "carica ture" of liberalism as
a tomi stic) .
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that "freedom might encompass an ability to share a v1s10n of a
good life or a good society with others." 313 In contrast to the liberal
emphasis on individual freedom, many Blacks see their historically
created community as the basis for social identity and the source of
liberation. 314 The existence of liberating aspects of both liberalism
and communitarianism affirms the inevitable interdependence of individual autonomy and community membership-"the affirmation
of free human subjectivity against the constraints of group life,
along with the paradoxical countervision of a group life that creates
and nurtures individuals capable of freedom." 315
The systemic nature of racism in American society suggests that
rational processes will fail at social transformation without a more
deliberate eradication of racial subordination. 31 6 Liberal and republican theories do not address the invidious potential for government to perpetuate racial subordination by controlling knowledge
available to the Black community. The power to control knowledge
not only limits individual women's ability to engage in self-determining activity, it also keeps entire communities of people in ignorance. This critical nexus between freedom of speech and racial
equality strengthens the affirmative claim to information.
B.

Knowledge and Dependency

Although the reasoning of Rust was premised on the gratuity principle, I believe the decision is a powerful endorsement of government's affirmative obligations to the dispossessed. The violence of
the regulations and the ease with which the Court overlooks that
violence demonstrates the dangerous potential of the state's false
313. ROBERT N. BELL<\H ET AL. , HABITS OF THE H EART: INDI VID UALISM AND COMMITME NT IN AMERICA N LIFE 24 (1985). Mo reover, subo rdin a ted group s have exp e ri e n ced
the proc ess o f dialogi c sh aring as emp o we ring. See Co LLI NS, supra n o te 236, a t 212-13
(discussing the use of di a lo gue in Afri can and Afri ca n-American culture); FREIR E, supra
note 38, at 66-68 (discussing a liberatin g dialogue b e tw een teache r a nd student); MAc KINNO N, supra note 240 , a t 87 (discussin g the femini s t m e thod o f co n sciousn ess-raising
which focu ses on specific incidents and dialo g u e) .
314. See Pe ller , supra n o te 52, at 794-9 5.
315. Dun can Kennedy , Critical Labor Law Theory .i Co mment. 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 503,
506 (1981); see also Dun ca n Ke nnedy , The Structure of Blackstone's Co mm entaries, 28 B uFF. L.
REv. 209, 212-17 ( 1979) (di scussing th e "fundam e nta l contradi cti o n " embodi e d in the
" collective as p e cts of o ur individuality").
316. Fo r an o th e r critiqu e of both indi viduqli s ti c a nd co mmunita ri a n perspec ti ves on
the rights o f e thnic min o rity group s, see Adeno Ad d is, Individualism, Commu nitanan ism,
and the Rights of Ethnzc ;'v!i no rities, 67 No TR E DAME L. R Ev . 615 (1 991). Professo r Addis
propos e s in s te ad a mod e l o f "critical plura lism," whi ch is "conc e rn e d not only with providing resource s for min o riti es so as to e n able th e m to maintain a nd d ev elop th e ir culture , to pro du ce and te ll th e ir stori es, but [w hich l seeks also to d eve lop in s titutional
s tructures th a t will e na bl e the min o rit y cultures to e n gage th e do min a nt c ulture in a
dialogu e ." !d. at 649- 50.
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generosity. Giving government aid the status of a mere gratuity affords government intolerable power to perpetuate the powerlessness of subjugated commumt1es, particularly by limiting the
information available to them. I argued earlier that we have accepted this power structure based on the underlying belief that dependency entails the forfeiture ofliberty. 317 This analysis suggests a
second element of a liberating constitutionalism-the rejection of
th e prevailing understanding of dependency. We could choose to
value ensuring autonomy and participation in the community over
securing private wealth. Once we reject the constitutional primacy
of protecting property from invasion, we can set about rethinking a
co nstitutional structure that affirmatively nourishes self-determination.318 Consistent with this understanding, people who are depend ent on government welfare would be entitled to information
n ecessary for self-determining activities. 319 Rather than view dependency as a bar to autonomy and political participation , society
wo uld acknowledge its responsibility to foster the self-determination of its members who are dependent on government assistance.
Property owners undoubtedly will object to paying for the needs
of others. Property is a social construct, however, that serves societal interes ts and its meaning can be revised to accommodate changing views of justice. 32 ° For example, the most dramatic
redistribution of property in the name of social justice in American
3 17. See supra Part IV.
3 18 . See NEDELSKY, supra note 221, a t 273 ; see also Mary A. Glendon , Rights in Twentleth -Centwy Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 523 (1992) (noting that most western
cons tituti ons omit property rights and include affirmativ e welfare obligations); cf Schnab ly, supra note 140, at 930-31 (suggesting a privacy theo ry that asks how the power of
the sta te sho uld be d e plo yed to improve the institutional contexts of moral d ecisionmaking , rath er than how individuals ma y be shield ed from it); Simon, supra n ote 17, a t 17
("R ights ... did n o t constitute a fortress for th e individu al against the stat e, but rath er
a n e ncounter between the individual and th e sta te in which the identity o f each was
partly up fo r grabs."). For a diametrica ll y opposed view , see Ri cha rd A. Epstein, Propc;ty, :3peech, and the Politics of Distmst, 59 U . CHI. L. REv. 4 1, 57 (1992) (arguing that "expa nsive pro tection of freed o m of speech ... becomes an unambiguous go od only wh e n
paired up with a sys tem of limited gove rnment a nd stro n g prop e rty rights") .
319 . One precedent for the government's affirmativ e obligation to provid e information to dependent p eople is Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U .S . 436 (1966), which requires
po lice to give custodial suspects specific inform a tion ab o ut their legal right s before interrogation. This ob ligation arises from the susp ect 's d epen dence o n the gove rnm ent in
th e isola ted and police-dominated stationhouse for kno wledge o f his rights. Th e Mtmnda vvarn ings were designed not only to rem edy the inherent coerciven ess of police
interrogation, but also to dem o nstrate the gove rnment's respect for the susp ec t's dignity
and se lf-d e te rminatio n. See id. , at 47 3 (" [O]nl y by effec ti ve and exp res s exp lana ti on to
th e indi gent of this right [to counsel] ca n th e re be assurance tha t he was trul v in a po siti o n to exercise it. "); Thom as S. Schrock et al. , InterTogatwnal Rights: R eflections on Mira nda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. I, 44 ( 1978) (describing the warnin gs as
" co mmunication by the govern ment to the indi vidual of it s reco gni ti o n th at in constituti o nal contem plati o n he is a moral agen t, capable of respo nsibl e cho ice" ); Steph e n J
Sch ulh ofer , Recons1denng Miranda, 54 U . C m. L. REv. 435, 44 7 (1987) (asserting that the
warn in gs dem onstrate to th e suspect that the police kn o w his rights and are prepared to
res pe ct th os e righ ts). For a criticism o f the warnings' failure to achieve th ese objecti ves
due to th e Suprem e Co urt' s gradual e ros ion of .\firanda, see Cha rles J. O gletree, Are
Co nf essions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Jhrandt: e i'vl irand a , l 00 HARV. L. REv.
1 8 ~6 (! 98 7) .
3 ~0 . See Baker, supra note 301 , at 743-44 (observing that pro perty rules serv e a
r,u mber of social functi on s; "[Tjhe notion of a co mpl e te set of ti meles s , natural , or
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history was the abolition of slavery. 321 The Thirteenth Amendment
deprived slaveholders of their property interest in Blacks and gave
Blacks an inalienable property right to their own persons. 32 2 The
purpose of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was not
only to protect the liberty of individual Blacks, but also to eliminate
a racial caste system that was deemed intolerable. 323 The work left
undone by Emancipation demands an equally dramatic modern reconstruction of the social order-one that eliminates the role of
government gratuity in the perpetuation of that caste system and
replaces it with an affirmative duty to provide the basic requirements of self-determination. Affirming the humanity of everyone
can no longer be seen as subversion of rights to property. 324
Conclusion: Utopia and Liberation

I anticipate two objections to this liberationist theory from those
who agree with the goal of liberation. 325 First, some will argue that
this theory is internally inconsistent. My very premise that knowledge is an instrument of power dispels the possibility that those in
power would use their legal knowledge to dismantle the very foundation of their domination. How can oppressed people possibly
proper prope rty rules is absurd."); Reich, supra note 84 , at 779 (describing the function
o f pri va te property to protec t individual liberties).
321. See Amar, supra note 229, at 39- 40; see also West, supra note 85, at 715 (discussing
the redistributive directive embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment). The history in
the United States of revising property rights to serve societal interests also includes the
oppression of people of color. Indeed , much of the claim to land in this country deri ves
from the state 's extinguishing India n title by conquest and granting titl e to private individual s or groups. Reich , supra note 84, at 778, (citing Johnson v. Mcintosh , 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823) (holding Indian title subordinate to that of United States on
grounds of "discovery" and "conquest")).
Jerome Culp observes that , although slavery has influ enced American thinking about
property, legal scholars have large ly overlooked this relationship. See C ulp , supra note
51, at 77 & n.ll5. Professor Culp's comments suggest that we will not be able lO uproot
o ur d eeply embedded ideas about property and freed om until we trulv confro nt the
whole history of racism in Ameri ca.
322. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII.
323. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (asserting th at the T hirte enth
Amendme nt abo lishes "all badges and incidents of slavery") ; Th e Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) (identifying as the "one pervad ing purpose" of
the amendments "the freedom of the slav e race, the securitv and firm es tabli shm e nt of
that freedom , and th e prot ec tion of the newly-made freem~n a nd citizen from th e oppressions of those who had formerly exercis ed unlimited dominion ove r him ") . Akhil
Reed Amar and Dani el Widawsky e mpha size that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
certain state inaction, as well as certain privat e action: "Hence the broad command that
slavery shall not exist does more than impos e an abs olute duty on private would-be enslav e rs; it also imposes a duty on the sta te to provide an adequate apparatus to enfo rce the
ema ncipation of all persons within its jurisdic tion. " A mar & Widawsky, supra note 82 , a t
1380.
324. See FREiRE, supra note 38 , at 45 (observing th at humanit y is seen as something
possessed by opp resso rs as an exclusive right, while humani zation of "others" appea rs
to be subversive).
325 . T hese questions have pla gued me most in writ in g thi s Articl e .
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trust the oppressor to provide the information they need for a liberating knowledge? Moreover, the theory contains the paradox of
recognizing an affirmative government obligation to ensure self-determination, while acknowledging the control that dependence on
government subsidies allows. Would not expanded government aid
to the Black community simply increase that community's subjugating dependence on the government? Even if the claim to government aid is declared a right rather than a gratuity, judicial
enforcement of welfare rights has limited liberating potential. 326
The struggle over knowledge does not end with the receipt of information; that is only the beginning. Dispossessed communities
must appropriate the information for themselves. The government 's obligation to provide information must coexist with an effort
to promote the community's ability to generate and distribute information on its own. At times it will be equally important to resist
state interference in local sources of knowledge. 327
My defense of government aid attempts to overcome th e dangers
of dependency in several ways. Government aid should be based on
collective obligation rather than altruistic charity. It is not a special
dispensation to the poor; it ensures the fulfillment of the human
needs of all. Rather than reject state assistance, my approach seeks
to redefine government aid to eliminate its libe rty-de priving qualities. Moreover, the government must fulfill its affirmative obligations as part of the pursuit of liberation from oppressive conditions
that create and perpetuate reliance on the government. The goal of
state ass istance is to facilitate action b y the oppressed, rather than
simply placating them to ensure the prevailing order.
Second, some will argue that a liberationist legal th eory, which
326. For an hi storica l examination of how the Ameri ca n public welfare system regulates the political and economic be havior of th e poor, see FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD
A. CLOWARD, RE GULATING THE Po oR: THE FuNCTIONS oF Pus u c WELFARE ( 197 1). Legal
scholars have criti cized welfare ri ghts litigati o n in particular for stuntin g th e radical p otenti al of a grass-roots, welfare-ri ghts movem ent. See, e.g . Delgado, supra note 217 , at
194 7 (arguing that civil rights liti gation requires claimants to exagge rate vic timhood in a
manner inco nsist en t with human dignity); Rosenb latt, supra no te 2 19 , at 27 1- 75 (d isc ussin g the limitations of welfare legaliza tion as a stra tegy for redistributive change); Mark
V. Tushne t, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694, 708-09 (1980) (book review) (argu ing th at
welfare reform liti gatio n dimini shes political forces seekin g equa litv). But see Sparer.
supra note 19, at 562-63 (critiquin g Tushnet's assess ment o n the ground th a t the de cision to pursue welfare rights through litigation was an organizing strategv of the welfare
ri gh ts movement) ; White, supra note 239 , at 870-7 1 (d isc uss in g how liti ga tin g Go ldb erg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), b e nefi tted th e we lfa re rights m ove mem).
327. Regina Austin sugges ts an ana logou s approac h to the state's rol e in faci lit ating
th e grow th of th e informal economy in Bl ack com muniti es. See Regin a Austin, "Th f
Bfack Co mmunzty," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politlcs of ldenti.fiwtlon, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769 ,
1807- 11 (1992). Professor Austin recognizes that a politics of ident ifi cat io n \,·ith poorer
Blacks who must " hu stl e" to s urvive requ ires both advocacy of gove rnm ent support for
Black info rmal ent repreneurship a nd working " to kee p th e law a t bay. " !d. at 1808 . She
d emonstrates th at in cases of ri va lry from th e formal econom y, informalitv better prote cts the intere sts of Blacks, such as squatters a nd sidewalk merchants, working in th e
info r ma l sector, whil e the need for cre dit req uires more lega l forma litv. !d. at 18 09- l 0.
Alth o ugh this Article advoca tes govern ment support o f se lf- dete rmi nat ion. I do not di sco un t th e need some tim es to "keep the law a t bav." See Robert s, supra not e JR, a t !44 950 (oppos in g crimina lizat ion of Black women 's reproducti\C decis io ns \,·hil e advocat ing
governmen t su pport for prenatal care and drug treatment ).
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I
t

implies economic redistribution and affirmative government duty, is
purely utopian-irreconcilable with our current legal system and
impossible to implement. 328 These ideas are deemed incongruous
with the accepted market economy and negative vision of constitutional rights. Those in power have always aimed to destroy utopian
ideas that challenge the system sustaining their dominance. 329 They
characterize utopian ideas as absolutely unrealizable even though
these ideas are unrealizable only within the present order. 330 They
drain these ideas of revolutionary potential by integrating them
within the prevailing world view. Thus, as I discussed in an earlier
section, 331 the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine has served as a
way of integrating the recognition of economic inequality within the
existing constitutional order that rejects affirmative government obligations. 332 The Rust opinion hides not only the repressive function of the law, but also the possibility of a more liberating
interpretation of the Constitution.
In describing the martyr's commitment to God's law, even in the
face of world-destroying pain, Robert Cover reminds us of the
human capacity to imagine a just social order despite the effects of
dominant ideology. 333 The slave songs enabling Blacks to imagine
freedom despite their chains and the dreams of Black women told
by Zora Neal Hurston confirm the power of vision. 334 The effect of
th is realization is profound. It frees us to consider the possibility of
a more radical constitutional vision. We may no longer be able to
res ist th e q uestion buried in our consciences: How can we tolerate
the lawfulness of the intolerable? How can we tolerate laws that
force women to travel in desperation from city to city in search of an
328. See Torres, supra note 52, at 1045-46 (discussing the difficultv of making plausible arguments for redistribution of social resources within current legal ideologv). For a
discussion of utopian ideas, see MANNHEIM, supra note 139, at 192 ("A state of mind is
utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs."), and
utopian constitutionalism, see Cover, supra note 66, at 39.
329. MANNHEIM, supra note 139, at 193.
330. !d. at 196.
331. See supra Part II.B.
332. Conservatives similarly have usurped the progressive rhetoric of tolerance.
color-blindness, and equal opportunity to confine the possibilities of reform. See Peller,
supm note 52, at 762.
333. Cover. supm note 22, at 1604-05. Drucilla Cornell similarlv has celebrated the
utopian potential of the feminine: "Feminism calls us to the dream of a utop1a of sensuous ease in '.vhich the real1ly of the castrated subject appears as a nightmare from which
we are trving to awaken. Feminism calls us all to wake up and to 'see' the cloublv-prizecl
world which might be ours." Cornell, supra note 240, at 699; see also Cornell, supm note
132. at 1229 (challenging us to accept the "invitation to realize the potential inherent in
the 'would be's' of our social reality"); Minow, supra note 237, at 1867 (explaining an
alternative meaning of "rights" that people imagine. even though thev have not been
formaliv recognized or enforced). For a story about a Black South African \·illage's
struggle for justice. grounded outside the South African law, see Lucie White. To Lmrn
ond Tmrh. Lessonsjiom Dnejonle1n on Lawycnng and Power, 1988 Wrs. L. Rn. 699. 7! 9-:3 8 .
334. See supm notes 243-4 8 and accompanying text.
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honest answer about their health? How can we tolerate laws that
lead women to spend their last penny for an abortion in an unlicensed clinic when safer, less expensive ones are available? How
can we tolerate laws that deliberately deny poor women of color the
knowledge they need for self-determination? Freed to ask these
questions, we may then imagine an alternative constitutional order
in which this inhuman treatment has no foundation in law.
While vision is an essential part of a liberating legal theory, it is
inadequate for worldly redemption. 335 Without social action, the vision will remain mired in some "moral heaven. " 336 Social change
requires resistance and creation by people willing to live according
to the vision. It requires lawyers and legal scholars willing to collaborate with social movements to assist in constructing, defending,
and implementing the vision. 337 Because the conventional political
and legal process is biased in favor of the prevailing order, radical
visionaries must use unorthodox means. Masses of people must repudiate their participation in institutions of domination and refuse
to obey unjust laws. 338 They must collectively force their vision to
the forefront of political discourse through mass demonstrations,
militant protest, strikes, boycotts, and other forms of direct popular
335. See Cover, supra note 66, at 38 (contrasting Garrisonian perfectionism that permitted the pursuit of pure nomos without a polity with Douglass' redemptive vision of
slavery without foundation in law) .
336. I borrow this phrase from Frank Michelman. See Michelman, Protectlng the Poor,
supra note 17, at 58 (discussing the need for a standard in order for the duty of minimum
protection to be enforced).
33 7. I do not presume that the vision is created exclusively by legal scholars, divorced
from social action. Rather, it must be forged by a collaborative effort of academics,
lawyers, activists, and ordinary citizens. For a case study of a lawyer's collaboration with
a Black South African village to resist forced removal from their homes, see White, supra
note 333. Arthur Kinoy's career as a movement lawyer provides another illustration. See
ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE's LAWYER ( 1983).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore fully the relationship between law and
liberation. A comprehensive analysis would include a historical and normative examination of the form of legal discourse that best critiques the present social order and describes the vision of a new one; the role of law in the process of achieving social change,
particularly the possibility of using the legal system as a vehicle for fundamental change
and the work of lawyers and legal scholars in social movements; and the role of law in
the new social order. For scholarship addressing some of these issues, see, for example,
Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 L.>.w & PoL'Y 5 (1985) (asserting that
progressive lawyers have significant power to change the law, the legal system, and society); JoEL F. HANDLER, SociAL MovEMENTS AND THE LEG . \.L SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAw
REFORM AND SociAL CHANGE (1978) (examining the possibilities and limitations for social movements' use of courts to achieve social change); GERALD P. LoPEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO's VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE ( 1992) (describing
the work of progressive lawyers within subordinated communities). The role of legal
acad emics in the process of social change requires further examination. See Radin &
Michelman, supra note 49, at I 019 (calling for self-inquiry as to "preciselv how ... we
imagine that cur scholarship might work to move the world closer to whatever it is we
mean to be contending/or"); Pierre Schlag, .\'onnat1uity and the Politics of Fonn, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 801 , 879 (1991) (criticizing normative legal scholars for omitting ··any sense of
how th[ eir] prescription [s] might realize [themselves] in the social sphere"); Symposium
on Feminism in the 90s: Bridging the Gap Between Themy and Practice, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
l (1991 ).
338. See BAKER, supra note 88, at Ill (describing a non-hierarchical, noninstrurnental
process of progressive change). For an account of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s philosophv of nonviolent civil disobedience, sec Adam Roberts, .\!art1n Luther King and .\'on-
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power. 339 Their goal may be legislative implementation of their vision rather than the creation of judicially enforceable rights. 340
The regulations were met immediately with resistance. Women's
and health organizations mobilized to force Congress to pass legislation invalidating the regulations. 341 Clinics stated that they would
refuse to give women misleading information; they would forgo
government funding rather than abide by the government's oppressive law. 342 Most important, Black women have formed their own
organizations, such as the National Black Women's Health Proj ec t,
to share information about reproduction and otherwise empower
themselves to take control of their health. 3 4 3 Those engaging in
Violent Resistance, m MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER, THEOLOGIAN, ORATOR 759 (David Garrow ed ., 1989) (3 vols). For a defense of revolutionarv count e rvi ol e nce as the only means of liberation from violent colonialism, see F ANON, supra note
38 , a t 85-106.
339. See Pope, supra note 298, at 293 (defining "Direct Popular Power" as the form o f
political participation cha racteristic of social movements that is inclusive and outs id e th e
formal structure of representative democracy). Such mass movements have peri o di ca ll v
compelled the Court to increase protection of speech rights. See David Kairys, Freedom of
Speech, in THE PoLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE , supra note 159, at 140, 141.
For a discussion of the tension within the civil rights movement of militant, "direc t
a ction" versus legalistic, litigation-oriented strategies, see Peller , supra note 52, a t 826 30. See generally THOMAS R. BROOKS , WALLS COME TuMBLING DowN: A HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT, 1940-1970 (1974) (describing the rifts that develop e d in th e
civil rights coalition betwee n non-violent integrationists and militant Black pow e r a d vo cates) ; ALDON D. MoRRIS , THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEME NT: Bu.cr: C0 1>-IMUN ITIES ORGANIZING FOR C HANGE ( 1984) (describing te nsion between burea u cra ti c
organizations and local community groups) ; RoBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BouND : A
HISTORY OF AMERICA 'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEME NT (1990) (d escribing the conflict b etween
the liberal coalition and Blac k a c tivists).
Strategic use of the legal system nevertheless contributes to social struggl e by exp a nding the movemellt's ta cti cal options, protecting its ability to e ngage in direct ac ti o n.
a nd providing a forum to express its vision. See, e.g., White, supra note 239; \Ne s t, supra
note 22, at 1799-800 (d escribing the defensive work of radi cal lawyers within th e ex isting legal system; "This work , a lthough often demora li zing , se rves as an importan t lin k
to p a st victories and as a basis for th e next wave of ra dica l ac tion.").
340. See Michelman, supra n o te 69 , at 98-99 (proposin g a vi e w of liberty that im o h ·es
judic ia l respect for governm e nt a c tions designed to provide a id. rather than jud icia lh·
e nforcea ble entitlements to gove rnment aid); W es t, supra n o te 210, at !5 2-55 (sugges ting that legislatures, ra th e r th a n courts , implem e nt the a bolitionist inte rpre ta ti on o f
th e Fo urteenth Amendm e nt); \V es t , supra note 85, at 717 (ch a ra cterizing th e "p r•.')gres sive interpretation of th e co n s tituti o nal guarantees o f liberty and equality as p o iiti ca i
idea ls to guide legislati o n , ra th e r than as legal restra ints o n le g islation").
341. See Philip J Hilts, House Votes to Overturn Lzmit on Abortion Adrnce, N.Y. TlO.I f.S, ;<ov.
7 , 1991, a t A24. President Bush ve toed this legislation, a nd th e House failed bv 12 \'Otes
to o ve rride the veto. See C lym e r, supra note 286.
34 2 . See supra note 37 a nd acco mp anying text. Pl a nn e d Pa r e nthood's Sout h Bro nx
clini c re fused about $37,000 in T itle X funds so that it co uld co ntinue to provi d e inform a ti o n a bout abortion . Fe li city Ba rringer, Ban on .1. bortion Co unseling Is St ruck Dozl'n, ~~. Y .
T IMES, No v. 4, 1992 , a t A29.
343. See Byll ye .-\ve r y, Empowennen t Through il'ellneJS, 4 Y.-\LEj.L. & FD II NIS i\1 l -P . l·:\7 150 (1 99 1) (statement b y Fo un d in g Pres ident o f th e Na ti ona l Bl a ck \Vome n 's Hc·a lth
P roj ec t) (d es cribing th e origin s o f the Na tional Black W o m e n 's Health Proj ec t ); Hrpro ducti ve Rights Posztzon Paper: .Vatlona/ Bla ck J!'om en 's Health Project, zn FRO 'VI .-\ BO RT i oN TO
R EPROD UCTIVE fREEDOM: T RAN S FORMING A MOVEMENT, supra n o te 280, at 291.
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popular struggle declare: "[O]ur lives constitute bridges between
the reality of present official declarations of law and the vision of
our law triumphant." 344 In this way, we may craft a vision of law
that, far from promoting ignorance and pain in outcast communities, will foster the knowledge necessary for their liberation.

344. Cover, supm note 66 , at 47. See genna!l\· Svmposzz11n on Lawyers and Civil Dzsobedience, 52 U. PnT L. RE\'. 723 (1991) (discussing lawvers' role in social change). For
accounts of \\·omen's resistance to laws controlling reproduction, see NINL\ BAEHR ,
ABORTION WITHOuT APOLOGY: A RADICAL HISTORY FOR TilE 1990's ( 1990) (describing
the evolution of the radical, grass roots movement for reproductive control); Lvnn \1.
Paltrow, Women .. -lbortzon and Civzl Dzsobedience, 13 Nm·A L. REv. 4 71 ( 1989); Roberts, supra
note 18, at 1439-40 (describing ways in which Black women struggled to resist efforts of
slave masters to control their reproductive lives).
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